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3Abstract
This thesis examines the American policy of ‘dual containment’: the assumption by the
US of a predominant role in the security system of the Persian Gulf in the 1990s,
necessitating the simultaneous ‘containment’ of both Iran and Iraq.  American policy
towards Iran receives special attention thanks to its more unusual aspects, including
the vehemence of American attempts to isolate it.
While other scholars have sought to explore the empirical aspects of this policy, this
thesis seeks to place it within an overarching theoretical framework derived from
neoclassical realism (NCR). Additionally, the thesis integrates insights drawn from
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to explain the impact of domestic variables on the
formation of American policy towards Iran and Iraq during this era.
In terms of domestic factors, the thesis identifies three key ‘intervening variables’ and
their role in the adoption and evolution of dual containment: perceptions of threat on
the part of policymakers, domestic political structures, and the operation of policy
coalitions.  In terms of the external, the role of the idiosyncratic ‘tripolar’ dynamics of
the Persian Gulf region in shaping American policy is examined, as is the
longstanding American interest in the Persian Gulf as an area of important national
interest and key importance in the global economy, which endured into the 1990s
despite the end of the Cold War.
The thesis concludes that US policy towards Iran and Iraq was shaped by the
intervening variables it identifies and examines. It strongly reflected the perceptions
held by American policymakers of American power, and also of Iran and Iraq as
‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states, and the measures perceived as necessary to advance Arab-
Israeli peace.  Moreover, it also reflected the influence of domestic interest groups
and Congressional activism in the realm of foreign policy.
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8CHAPTER 1 Introduction
“[American] Iran policy has been a failure at every level.  The message has been: (1)
You are evil; (2) We won’t talk to you unless you come out with your hands up; (3)
We intend to overthrow your regime; (4) if you don’t comply we might bomb you;
(5) if you try to develop a deterrent we will certainly bomb you, maybe with nuclear
weapons.”
Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, interview with author, Washington D.C., February
2011.
1.1 Context
The central objective of this thesis is to examine, from the perspective of
International Relations theory, American ‘dual containment’ policy in the Persian
Gulf.  This was the avowed foreign policy of the Clinton administration with respect
to this sub-region.  This policy, which was directed at the problems Washington
perceived as stemming from Iran and Iraq, was formally introduced to the world in a
speech by a National Security Council official in 1993, and essentially persisted until
the end of the second Clinton administration, despite evolutions in form.  The policy
encapsulates many of the key features of American policy in the Middle East: its
intensely antagonistic relationship with Iran after the 1979 revolution, its
preoccupation with Israel, its close alignment with the Arab monarchies of the Gulf,
and its entanglement with the Persian Gulf in particular and its close involvement
with the affairs of the Middle East overall.
Despite its importance, dual containment has not been considered by scholars
in a systematic, theoretically-informed way.  Scholars of International Relations and
Middle East studies have done excellent and comprehensive work on American
relations with Iran and Iraq, and American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era in
general, so many studies give at least a brief description of this policy and American
foreign policy in the 1990s.  Nonetheless, few have attempted to examine ‘dual
containment’ itself from a theoretical perspective rooted in International Relations
theory.  This is an understandable lapse to some extent – compared to events of the
91991 Gulf War and the attacks of 11 September 2001, nothing as dramatic happened.
Overall, dual containment has predominantly been viewed almost as a historical
footnote in the post-Cold War, pre 9/11 era, primarily of interest to scholars
researching more expansive issues who are required to discuss it for the sake of
thoroughness.  This is a regrettable oversight, but it offers the researcher a new
opportunity to approach American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf from a fresh
perspective, and attempt to glean insights about the nature of the American
relationship with the states of the Gulf, and Iran in particular.
It must also be noted that this thesis focuses specifically on the Clinton
administration, though its predecessor is also discussed briefly.  This focus is
justified if we take the ‘lame duck’ status of an outgoing president, the lengthy US
presidential election campaign, the need for an incoming president to find his or her
feet, and the frequently slow pace of change in policy in broad terms – in the final
and first year of a presidential administration, dramatic changes of direction are
extremely unlikely, barring some dramatic event. Therefore, a study of dual
containment and the post-Cold War, pre-September 11 era discussed above is best
studied through a focus on the Clinton administration.
Aside from scholarship focusing on the American relationship with ‘rogue
states,’ dual containment and the era in which it was formulated has received little
attention from scholars of American foreign policy more broadly.  Chollet and
Goldgeier, whose book on this era is one of the few to address this period, aptly
characterise this era as ‘misunderstood’ (their work, however, mentions Iran and Iraq
only in passing).  This is puzzling when one considers that American foreign policy
is studied and commented on extensively both in and outside the discipline of IR,
doubly so when one considers that is was also a major ‘flagship’ policy in a
strategically-vital region.
This brings us to a second point.  ‘Dual containment’ is more than a case
study in post-Cold War American foreign policy.  It also allows us to examine in
detail the nature of the American relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI),
which has been bitterly antagonistic since the founding of the IRI in the wake of the
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1979 revolution that overthrew the Shah, a close American ally.  From the American
side of the relationship, summed up succinctly but somewhat simplistically in the
quote that began this chapter, it has been marked by alternating stretches of out-and-
out antagonism and periodic attempts at reconciliation.  Both of these were on
display during the Clinton years, which offers a unique opportunity to examine US-
Iranian relations and the factors, both international and domestic, that determine this.
As one ‘half’ of dual containment, Iran loomed large in the perceptions of American
policymakers, as it continues to do so.  The relationship between the two states is a
highly unusual one, and both states seem to hold a special place in the politics of the
other as a uniquely sinister and threatening enemy.  In the words of Hollis, “a special
relationship endures in the sense that both US and Iranian policymakers are
somehow fascinated by each other and use their relations, even when antagonistic, as
a measure of their respective strengths and status domestically.”1 Indeed, at the
beginning of 2013, many of the same patterns are repeating themselves, but with a
new urgency, amongst them attempts by Congress to escalate American pressure on
Iran, unprompted by the president.  Much of this thesis is therefore dedicated to
examining American relations with Iran in this period, as part of the larger dual
containment policy.  This stems from the fact that the Iranian half of the policy is the
most complex, most troubled (in certain respects), and from the perspective of IR
theory requires the most explanation.  Although many of the same forces were at
work with regards to American policy towards Iraq, these are much less marked,
though the course of events has received more attention, and the military clashes
between the US and Iraq are more attention-grabbing.
With the end of the Cold War and the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent war to reverse it, American policymakers were
confronted with a new set of strategic issues and problems to wrestle with in regards
to their existing interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.  With the demise
of the Soviet Union, American policymakers were deprived of the overarching
framework that had done so much to determine the outlines of American foreign
policy since the end of the Second World War, provoking much soul-searching
1 Rosemary Hollis, ‘The US Role: Helpful or Harmful?’ in Lawrence Potter & Gary Sick (eds.), Iran,
Iraq and the Legacies of War (New York City, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.209
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amongst the foreign policy establishment, journalists and pundits about how this new
‘unipolar’ world should be approached, and what America’s role in it would and
should be.2 To some degree, this uncertainty persists to the present day, with the
period between 1991 and 2001 referred to simply as the ‘post-Cold War era’ in many
sources, a perfect example of the lack of an idea as to what trends in international
politics this era embodied, if any.  Indeed, one of the defining features of American
policymaking in the 1990s was the hunt for a winning entry in the ‘Kennan
sweepstakes,’ a doctrine that would embody the challenges and solutions faced by
the US in the 1990s, in a similar fashion to the American diplomat George Kennan’s
influential espousal of ‘containment’ to meet the emerging Soviet threat in the late
1940s.  In the words of another scholar of this era: “Absent the Soviet Union, the
fundamental rationale for American foreign policy has been lost, the importance of
foreign policy was in question, and the level of public support for foreign-policy
actions uncertain.”3 As Chollet and Goldgeier discuss in their book on American
politics in this period, a semi-serious competition was held in the pages of the New
York Times in 1995 to coin a new name for this time period, and many of the entries
reflected a sense of uncertainty and even unease.4
Despite the end of the Cold War, the US still faced some major challenges to
its interests abroad even as its policymakers and pundits struggled to articulate a new
global role for it.  The Persian Gulf remained a region where international instability
and turmoil could generate significant economic disruption and threaten the outbreak
of new wars and the re-ignition of old ones, both of which would have serious
impacts on longstanding American interests.  This was exacerbated by the traditional
American perception of the Persian Gulf as a key focus of strategic power, and in
particular there remained the tricky question of American relations with Iraq and
Iran, which were both hostile to the US and perceived as dangers to American
2 For instance, see Richard Haass, ‘Paradigm Lost,’ Foreign Affairs, 74 (1) 1995, pp.43-58
3 Nicholas Kitchen, American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America’s Search for
Purpose Between the ‘Wars’ 1991-2001, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 2009
4 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, Between the Wars From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years
Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror (New York, NY:
PublicAffairs, 2008). Entries included “The Muddle Ages” and the “Cold War Lite Era.”  Sarah
Boxer, ‘Words for an Era; No Time Like the Present to Leave Something for Posterity,’ The New
York Times, 2 April 1995
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interests.  The dilemma faced by the American policymakers was therefore a
pressing one that would have to be addressed if the US was to retain an international
role.  The answer formulated by American policymakers was ‘dual containment.’  In
the absence of a global, over-arching security threat, dual containment was therefore
one of the major foreign policies of its era, addressing one of the few genuine
strategic challenges still facing the US.  It was a concrete problem rather than a
conceptual one like the need to formulate a new vision for America’s role in the
world, but one that was nonetheless a product of the new era of uncertainty: virtually
unchallenged American power, but uncertainty as to what to do with it, and with an
increasing preoccupation with domestic issues and concerns.
‘Dual containment’ itself is a somewhat obscure term, largely unknown to
anyone from outside of the community of policymakers and students of American
foreign policy in the Persian Gulf.  In fact, the lifespan of the term itself was a
limited one.  Once it was coined, it was rarely used in official discourse, was
criticised by some policymakers as misleading, and was much-maligned by analysts
and observers.  Its broadest definition runs as follows: the simultaneous
‘containment’ of the regional influence of both Iran and Iraq by the US, which was
implemented concurrently but via different means and with different objectives.  For
instance, the sanctions on Iraq were multilateral (though the US had great influence
as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council), while sanctions on
Iran were unilateral.  ‘Regime change’ was the implicit goal in the case of Iraq,
while this was never seen as realistic in Iran by the Clinton administration.  While in
some ways it resembles two policies running in parallel, there is an unbreakable
connection between the two thanks to the ‘brute fact’ of geography: the two states
are neighbours, and the fact that both found themselves the target of American
hostility.  Underlying this is a more subtle truth: the assumption by the US of a
direct, predominant role in Persian Gulf security, one that excluded both Iran and
Iraq from the exercise of regional influence and treated them both as pariahs,
stemming in large part from the American role as the security guarantor of the Gulf’s
Arab monarchies, particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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While it was militarily predominant, maintaining the strongest military forces
in the region to contain Iraq and Iran, the role played by the US in this era was quasi-
hegemonic compared to the dominance exhibited by the British Empire in the Gulf
in the 19th century and early 20th century. Also, while American power was the
lynchpin that allowed the system to function, the basic architecture of the system
itself was inherently limiting and sub-optimal from the American perspective. While
the US was relatively successful in accomplishing its goals of excluding both states
from the regional security system that it oversaw, it was unable or unwilling to effect
the changes it desired in these states, leaving it to manage a system it disliked,
maintaining the least worst (from the US perspective) balance of forces..
Specifically, while it was a key part of the security system, at the same time the US
was unable to fully enforce its will upon its allies and adversaries, and was reluctant
to go further than containment and into the territory of ‘regime change,’ and
exercised little influence over the domestic affairs of regional states. As Gause
observes, the US merely sought to contain Iraq and Iran, and lacked even diplomatic
representation in those states, potentially the most powerful and influential in the
region, and sought only “to sustain the regional territorial and political status quo.”5
In this sense it was in keeping with Stephen Walt’s summing up of Clinton’s overall
approach to foreign policy during eight years in office: “hegemony on the cheap.”6
By the end of Clinton’s term in office, ‘dual containment’ was still in effect,
according to the broad definition offered above: both Iran and Iraq were still problem
states for the US, and both were the target of American sanctions, and the US still
played a predominant role in Persian Gulf security.  Despite the adoption of this
policy, alternative options were theoretically available, and there were other
junctures after the adoption of the policy when alternative paths could have been
taken.  What remains, therefore, is the question as to why events unfolded as they
did.
5 F. Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge, Cambrdige University
Press, 2010), p.88
6 Stephen Walt, ‘Two Cheers for Clinton’s Foreign Policy,’ Foreign Affairs, 79 (2) 2000, p.79
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In terms of the bilateral relations between the US and Iraq and between the
US and Iran, the picture is, of course, far more complex.  Nonetheless, US foreign
policy towards both was subjected to the tumult of domestic American politics,
stemming both from the nature of the American political system and the unique
constellation of political forces acting in this system to produce and shape dual
containment.  With the assumption of a quasi-hegemonic role in Gulf security,
American policymakers were left with important details to work out, details that
would define the policy, namely the relationship of the US to Iran and Iraq.  The
relationship with these two states, particularly Iran, was often defined as much by
domestic American politics as much as it was with global and regional political
forces and trends.
1.2 Dual containment and the absence of theory
Some other studies have sought instead to place ‘dual containment’ within a
different, wider framework, such as the American approach to ‘rogue states,’7 or
treated it only as a part of the wider timeframe of American policy in the Middle
East in the second half of the 20th century.  In terms of the latter, as a consequence of
the broad nature of this focus the era itself also risks being overshadowed by larger
events in the region with a wider, global profile: it falls between the 1991 Gulf War,
and the momentous events of 11 September 2001, both of which have obvious and
strong connections to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf in particular, and were
described by Halliday as two of the four key events in the modern history of the
Middle East. 8 Dual containment therefore can tell us much about American
policymaking in the post-Cold War era, and before the events of ‘9/11’ brought in
their own changes to global politics and altered the trajectory of American foreign
policy.  There is also a tendency amongst some scholars to use American domestic
7 See Robert Litwak, U.S. Foreign Policy and Rogue States: Containment After the Cold War
(Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Jeffrey Fields, Adversaries and Statecraft:
Explaining US Foreign Policy Towards Rogue States, PhD thesis, University of Southern California,
2007
8 Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.130
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politics as an explanatory factor in the shaping of American foreign policy, but
without integrating this into a wider theoretical framework or examining it in an in-
depth manner.  In many examples, causal force is attributed to domestic political
variables, but the mechanisms by which these domestic pressures are translated into
policy often go unexamined, as do the reasons why this occurs.  The following
sections discuss examples of these two tendencies, and demonstrates the gap this
leaves in the literature, a gap this thesis aims to fill.
Litwak’s work on ‘rogue states’ and US foreign policy is an example of both
of these tendencies.  It is comprehensive and insightful, but focuses on the concept of
‘rogue states’ per se, and while its treatment of US foreign policy towards Iran and
Iraq includes a domestic political component, it does not integrate this into a wider
theoretical framework in a consistent way.  It also focuses on larger issues, taking as
its starting the point the concept of a ‘rogue state,’ and its place in the post-Cold War
World, despite his admission that the Clinton administration’s codification of ‘rogue
states’ (or ‘outlaw regimes’ or ‘backlash states’ or any other term) emerged from
‘dual containment’ itself.9 In doing so, it also fails to address the regional factors
influencing American foreign policy: though Litwak does argue that one of the
central obstacles to an American-Iranian rapprochement is the struggle between
hardliners and reformists within the Iranian government, he does not examine the
impact of the balance-of-power dynamics of the Persian Gulf, or the impact of wider
Middle Eastern issues, such as the Arab-Israeli peace process.  As stated above, the
domestic context in which American foreign policy is made is not discussed in detail
either, though he holds that this is an important factor.  There are two major
examples of this.  Although Litwak concedes that congressional pressure was an
important factor in the tightening of sanctions on Iran, and to some degree Iraq, and
argues for the importance of “political impetus” from domestic constituencies in
bringing this about,10 he does not deal with the institutional or factional aspects of
this factor in a theoretically informed manner.  Nor does he integrate his assertion
that a major component of America’s adversarial attitude towards ‘rogue states’ is a
reflection of its “unique political culture”, which reflects a “traditional Manichean
9 Liwak, U.S. Foreign Policy and Rogue States, p.57
10 Ibidp.63
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streak of American diplomacy in which international affairs is cast as a struggle
between forces of good and evil” into a larger theoretical framework, though he
holds it to be equally important.11
Niblock tackles the issue of ‘rogue states,’ albeit somewhat indirectly, in his
study of the application of UN sanctions in the post-Cold War era.12 While his case
studies (Iraq, Sudan, and Libya) are detailed and informative, he does not advance a
comprehensive theoretical framework either.  He instead begins with the assumption
that several trends in the post-Cold War era, such as the end of East-West
competition, allowed and incentivised powerful Western states to attempt to
‘contain’ states “deemed to be playing an international role that was not only
disruptive to US interests but was also contrary to the norms and values of the
international order.”13 As such, he focuses on the effects of international sanctions
and the sanctions themselves as a means, rather than discussing in detail the ends, or
the factors making these desirable ends from the perspective of the states that seek to
impose them.
The absence of a theoretical framework encompassing domestic and
international variables is partially addressed by Jeffery Fields, whose research also
focuses on American policy towards ‘rogue states,’ though he includes Syria within
this category, as well as Iran, Libya and North Korea.  This contrasts somewhat with
Litwak’s definition of a ‘rogue state,’ which excluded Syria on the grounds that the
US government has sought to engage with it diplomatically at various times.  Fields
also excludes the example of Iraq, which while less puzzling than that of Iran (at
least in the 1990s), is by no means irrelevant.    In this sense, his discussion of ‘dual
containment’ is incomplete.  Nonetheless, Fields also attempts to answer the
question as to why some states are engaged by the US (like Syria and North Korea),
while others are contained with economic sanctions and military force (like Iran and
Iraq).  He goes further than Litwak in that he advances a theoretical framework to
11 Liwak, U.S. Foreign Policy and Rogue States , p.63
12 Tim Niblock, Pariah States and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 2001)
13 Ibid, p.12
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explain these policy choices, one which is also derived from neoclassical realism
(hereafter abridged to ‘NCR’).  The international and domestic variables that he
introduces in his attempts to explain these differences derive from polyheuristic
decision theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and as a whole his work
“emphasises the role of ideology, American exceptionalism and powerful elite
decision-makers in narrowing action choices, sustaining status quo…strategies, and
shaping the overall directions of US policy.”14 He therefore contends that four
factors are significant in forming a ‘domestic lens’ that conditions American
response to systemic incentives: elite power, ideology, information gaps, and
historical legacies.15 Fields does not arguably give a full account of the institutional
context in which American policy is made, or the impact of political coalitions and
interest groups, which many scholars agree are crucial factors in the American
policymaking system.  Instead, his approach to the construction of a ‘domestic lens’
is somewhat nebulous, including so many factors as to be indistinct, though it is
broadly correct in its emphasis on the powerful role played by domestic political
forces.
Among other scholars who have tackled the subject of the influence of
different groups within American politics on its foreign policy towards Iran and Iraq,
the work of Trita Parsi16 and Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer stands out.17 Both
focus on the role of the pro-Israel lobby and the government of Israel in attempting
to portray Iran as a dangerous and malevolent force that requires an American
response.  Although these works do not focus on the Clinton administration and the
1990s exclusively, they devote some time and energy to arguing that the Israeli
government, and American lobby groups like American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC), have attempted to shift American policy in a more coercive
direction when it comes to Iran, and that ‘dual containment’ is no exception.  Walt
and Mearsheimer also argue, controversially, that American policy towards Iraq
14 Fields, Adversaries and Statecraft, p.14-15
15 Ibid, p.15
16 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007)
17 Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (New York, NY:
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007)
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(including the 2003 invasion) has also been strongly influenced by pro-Israel groups,
while Parsi does not engage with the Iraqi side of the equation of dual containment,
focusing exclusively on the relationship between the US, Iran and Israel.  Like
Litwak’s study of rogue states, neither of these works advances a consistent
theoretical framework to explain American foreign policy in the Middle East and the
Persian Gulf, though admittedly Mearsheimer and Walt write from a ‘realist’
standpoint that strongly influences their analysis.  In the case of Mearsheimer and
Walt’s book, the domestic aspects of the American political system discussed by the
authors – its institutional openness to interest groups outside the government and the
disproportionate influence of some of these interest groups – are examined and
discussed to some extent, but not incorporated into the realist framework the authors
rely upon.  Fayazmanesh attempts something similar in his study of American
sanctions on Iran in the 1990s, and similarly his analysis is largely untroubled by
theoretical speculation or analysis.  However, he does approach the issue from a
direction more attuned to the economics (loosely defined) of the situation.  In
particular, he argues that decisions by policymakers regarding unilateral American
sanctions on Iran were influenced at key points by lobbying by American
corporations seeking to advance their commercial interests, and therefore holds that
domestic politics is a factor in American foreign policy.18 Similarly, theoretical
engagement with the history of US-Iranian relations is almost wholly absent in
Alikhani’s work on the subject, though his work is extremely useful and detailed in
its study of the American sanctions regime on Iran.19 Alikhani traces the evolution
of American sanctions on Iran in exhaustive detail, and argues that the influence of
the pro-Israel lobby and some legislators in pushing the US into taking a more hard-
line position in regards to Iran.  Once again, his analysis is implicitly based on an
FPA framework that he does not explicitly describe, or seek to apply more
systematically.
Gerges takes a different tack to all of the above, in that his analysis is focused
on American policy towards the various ‘Islamist’ movements on the rise in the
18 Sasan Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual
Containment (London: Routledge, 2008)
19 Hossein Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy (London: IB Tauris, 2000)
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Middle East in the 1980s and 1990s, in order to examine the basis of US foreign
policy when it comes to these groups.20 Iran is one of the case studies he examines,
together with Algeria, Egypt and Turkey.  Gerges therefore analyses the American
relationship with Iran in the 20th century in some depth, up to the end of the first
Clinton administration and the beginning of the second, and concludes that the
American experience with Iran has done much to shape American views of
subsequent Islamist movements.  He also focuses intensively on the process and
ideological/political context of American foreign-policy making, emphasising the
latter.  In doing so, he takes an implicitly FPA-based approach, examining primarily
developments within the domestic US context and their causal impact on shaping the
American response to developments in the Middle East.  This is a useful study from
an empirical perspective and to some degree theoretically as well, but it does not
integrate international and domestic-level variables into a single wider framework.
Despite the existing lacuna in the overlapping bodies of literature and
research around the subject of dual containment, some useful precedents exist for a
study of the kind envisaged for this thesis, i.e. one that seeks to place US foreign
policy in the Persian Gulf within a consistent and comprehensive theoretical
framework that encompasses different levels of analysis.  Yetiv seeks to examine
both American foreign-policy decision-making and the viability of the Rational
Actor Model (RAM) with reference to a single case, and moreover one that focuses
on American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf.  In this case, the example is the 1991
Gulf War, and the decision of the Bush (1988-1992) administration to reverse Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait with military force.21 In doing so, he seeks to examine a mixture
of variables, and determine the influence of each on the decision to go to war in that
instance.  Yetiv also states that his work is also an attempt to integrate insights from
different levels of analysis and theoretical perspectives, as this thesis does.22 Despite
these similarities, Yetiv’s project differs in that it contains a larger comparative
aspect, testing his theoretical model against alternative explanations.  This is not
20 Fawaz Gerges, American and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999)
21 Steve Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-Making in the Gulf Wars, 2nd edition
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011)
22 Ibid, p.3-4
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attempted here, both for reasons of space (rather than focusing purely on American
relations with Iraq as Yetiv does, this thesis devotes much space to Iran), and more
importantly, because NCR (used in this thesis) is arguably a much less-developed
theoretical position, despite its position within the spectrum of a larger, realist,
paradigm.  This thesis aims more for the development of its theoretical framework
than its testing, and in any event attempts to bridge neoclassical realism and FPA in
some respects, rather than locating itself almost wholly within the FPA position, as
Yetiv does.
1.3 Argument and theoretical framework
The central claim of this thesis is that ‘dual containment’ is best understood
through a framework of neoclassical realism (NCR).  This strand of realist theory is
a relatively recent outgrowth of a renewed interest in the role of domestic factors in
defining the limits of traditional ‘power politics,’ and is therefore distinct from
structural realism, such as that advanced by Kenneth Waltz.  It holds that while the
distribution of power within the international system is a key independent variable in
determining the range of a state’s foreign policy, the dependent variable, this is
conditioned by the interplay of ‘intervening variables’ within the state itself, which
might be key features of its internal politics such as the perceptions of its leaders, its
system of government, or a host of others.
The insight that unit-level variables have profound impact on the behaviour
of states corresponds to work in many aspects of the sub-field of FPA, which has
long approached the problem of understanding the creation and implementation of
foreign policy from the opposite direction: looking outwards from within the state,
examining which of its domestic features are definitive in the formation of its policy,
such as its system of government, competition between different bureaucracies and
so on.  How can these two theoretical strands be reconciled?  It seems intuitive that
attempting this would a worthwhile endeavour from the perspective of NCR.
Utilising the pre-existing frameworks and research of FPA has the potential to
strengthen overall understanding of how states make and enact foreign policy and to
improve our understanding of which intervening variables are significant in this
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regard, and in doing so improve the tools open to adherents of NCR, and contribute
to its development as a useful research programme within International Relations
theory.  To date, while NCR theorists have sought to integrate ideational and
institutional variables into their analysis, they been relatively reluctant to integrate
FPA research into their analysis.  In contrast, this thesis attempts this, and in this
sense it is theoretically novel.
The framework used in this thesis draws upon insights from scholars of FPA
in its attempts to conceptualise an appropriate and useful NCR-based explanation of
American dual containment policy, while remaining inside the overall realist
paradigm.  Specifically, it is influenced heavily by calls from scholars working in the
FPA tradition for the transition towards models that integrate the institutional, social
and international contexts of foreign policy into cohesive, unitary models of foreign
policy decision-making.  In particular, it draws upon some of the work of Thomas
Risse (formerly Thomas Risse-Kappen), and his work on the relative autonomy of
foreign policy elites, which is defined in turn by the nature of the domestic
institutions in which policy decisions are made and the interplay of political forces
within these institutions.  He uses the terms ‘domestic structures’ and ‘coalition
building processes’ of ‘policy coalitions’ to describe these variables, which I have
also adopted.  Many scholars agree, including Risse, that the American system of
foreign-policymaking is a highly ‘open’ one, in which the domination of the process
of foreign policy-making by the presidency is diluted by the division of powers
between the executive and legislative branches, and that the legislative branch is
open to pressure from organised interest groups in society.  This means that
‘domestic structures’ and ‘policy coalitions’ are particularly useful concepts to
borrow, and in addition have many parallels with contemporary research and
theoretical trends amongst scholars of NCR.
The core argument of this thesis is that ‘dual containment’ policy was the
product of the interplay of three key intervening variables in the American political
system: the perceptions of policymakers, the nature of the ‘domestic structure’ of the
American political system, and the influence of ‘coalition building processes’ of
‘policy coalitions’ within the power structure.  In applying this NCR framework to
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American policy in the Persian Gulf during the 1990s, this thesis argues that the
assumption by the US of a quasi-hegemonic role in the security system of the region
and the Clinton administration’s strong interest in the Arab-Israeli peace process
made the dynamics of American domestic politics an important factor in the
conception and implementation of dual containment policy.  The perceptions of
American policymakers of the threat posed by Iran and Iraq and of relative American
power, and the domestic structure of the American political system, together with the
influence of some social forces such as interest groups, heavily influenced American
policy.  As discussed above, other scholars have examined different aspects of these
features in isolation from each other, but this thesis attempts to create a unified
image of American policymaking incorporating all three, given that any monocausal
explanation is highly likely to be unsatisfactory given the complexity of the
policymaking process.  While some scholars highlight the role played by the Israeli
government in shaping American perceptions of Iran in the 1990s,23 others turn their
attentions to the role of pro-Israeli lobby groups, like AIPAC, in forming American
foreign policy.24 There is some truth to this claim, but in order to assess how much it
is also necessary to give some attention to the context in which this is possible, that
of the American political system, which, in one memorable phrase, is an “invitation
to struggle” for the direction of American foreign policy.  This struggle is in turn
motivated by the perceived threat(s) that needs to be addressed.
This reflects a feature within the existing body of NCR research into
American foreign policy, which this thesis attempts to address.  NCR is only now
beginning to seek integrated theories of the impact of both ideational and domestic
structural factors in the shaping of foreign policy.  The latter have traditionally been
more closely studied by scholars working in the FPA tradition.  This thesis attempts
to integrate the two, partly in order to improve its analytical traction, but also to
advance the cause of constructing NCR as a fully-formed theory of foreign policy,
and help to bridge the gaps between NCR and FPA.
23 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance
24 The most high-profile, and probably most controversial, being Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israeli
Lobby and US Foreign Policy
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At the same time, there are also the global and regional aspects of the policy.
The factors driving American involvement in the Persian Gulf are also important
aspects that require examination for a host of reasons.  Amongst these is the fact that
any realist theory places a premium on the role of the international system as a driver
of foreign policy, by imposing pressures and creating incentives that policymakers
strive to address.  Any understanding of dual containment policy must also
acknowledge the structural factors enabling and shaping American policy, chiefly
the role of the US as a global superpower, and the existence of regional factors
creating a demand for the intervention of an extra-regional power in regional affairs.
To fully understand the nature of dual containment policy, and how it is modulated
by the intervening variables within the US government, it is therefore also necessary
to examine the larger, external forces driving American involvement in the Persian
Gulf, in particular the extensive US interest in the region during the Cold War.  This
must also include the configuration of regional forces drawing the US in - no region
is simply an agency-less chessboard on which global powers impose their own
wishes and plans, and to do justice to this fact the impact of these factors must also
be weighed and included.  The ‘push’ and ‘pull’ of American involvement in the
Persian Gulf from the end of the Second World War onwards, must therefore also be
examined.
1.4 Methodology
As this thesis focuses on a single (albeit wide-ranging) regional foreign
policy, and utilises a theoretical framework derived from NCR, its central
methodology is one of theoretically-informed historical process-tracing.  This results
from the intersection of several important factors.  One of the primary factors
influencing this decision is the scope of this thesis: while dual containment
admittedly addressed American relations with two states, these do not form separate
case studies in this work, therefore while American policy towards Iran and Iraq are
examined separately in order to discuss them as fully as possible, a cross-case
comparison is not appropriate in this instance.  Process-tracing is therefore a natural
choice, as it allows the scholar to examine and assess specific causal mechanisms
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within, in this case, the formulation, development, and evolution of a specific foreign
policy in a specific time period, and without the use of controlled comparisons.25
The enquiry into casual mechanisms is an important aspect of the research
contained in this thesis, and it is likewise an important factor in determining the
appropriate research methodology.  The theoretical aspect is also significant.  The
use of NCR strongly suggests the usage of a methodology that involves a
longitudinal approach that examines the interaction of several factors in a complex
causal process that cannot be easily quantified.  As George and Bennet observe,
“The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the
causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables)
and the outcome of the dependent variable.”26 Arguably this applies equally well to
‘intervening variables’ of the NCR model, making process tracing highly compatible
with the multiple intervening variables model utilised here.  More specifically, this
thesis utilises the ‘analytic explanation’ variety of process tracing, in which a
historical account is adapted into “an analytical causal explanation couched in
explicit theoretical forms.”27
Although it uses a typological theory (NCR), this thesis does not seek to
advance a ‘covering law’ to explain American foreign policy in general, but seeks to
illuminate the causal chain governing the adoption of dual containment.  It identifies
the steps and links between the independent, intervening, and dependent variables in
this case under the rubric of NCR, in the hopes of advancing the disciplinary
knowledge of American policy towards Iran and Iraq, and in the post-Cold War era
more generally, and secondarily contribute to the development of NCR more
broadly.
In terms of the existing material it seeks to draw upon, it utilises the study of
the extensive literature on American foreign policy formation, American relations
25 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005) p.214
26 Ibid, p.206
27 Ibid, p.211 Italics in original text
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with the Middle East in general and the states of the Persian Gulf (especially Iran
and Iraq), and the equally extensive area studies literature on the politics and
international relations of the Middle East.  In addition, contemporary news reports
from the 1990s, including articles from such publications as The New York Times
and The Washington Post are used in some instances in an attempt to glean insights
about developments during this era.  The author also conducted a series of semi-
structured interviews in early 2011 and 2012 with former officials who served in the
State Department, Defense Department and National Security Council during the
Clinton years, both in person and via telephone, as well as a smaller number of
Congressional committee staff members and former members of lobbying
organisations.  Finally, it makes use of a small number of declassified documents
from the National Security Council, and released by the Clinton Presidential Library
to George Washington University’s National Security Archive.
1.5 Structure of thesis
Chapter 2 deals with the theoretical framework of the thesis, discussing the
origins and the nature of NCR, such as the coining of the term by the academic and
journalist Gideon Rose in 1998, and goes into further detail on the work of Risse and
the concepts of ‘domestic structures’ and ‘policy coalitions.’ It also explores the
links between NCR and FPA, and the details of how FPA concepts are integrated
into an NCR framework in this case.  In addition, it attempts to distil the insights of
other scholarship in the burgeoning NCR tradition, and show where and how this
thesis fits into it.
In Chapter 3, the ‘big picture’ of American involvement in the Persian Gulf
since the end of the Second World War is examined.  In essence, this chapter
examines the external, ‘push’ factors that led to the creation of an extensive
American role in the Persian Gulf’s regional security system, and how this role
fluctuated with regional and global developments, but ended with an extensive
American presence in the Persian Gulf region.  The dominance of the ‘Cold War’
and the superpower rivalry with the Soviet Union on American foreign policy is
examined, as is how the Persian Gulf figured in this rivalry as an arena of Cold War
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tensions.  It argues that the Persian Gulf and its energy supplies were seen as a key
strategic region and resource that had to be kept clear of Soviet influence, leading the
US to utilise various policies, both hands-off and hands-on, over the second half of
twentieth century, culminating in the decision to maintain a large, permanent
military presence in the years after 1991.
Chapter 4 deals with the Persian Gulf itself, specifically the regional factors
and the local balance of power dynamics that created a permissive environment (and
subsequently a vacancy for an external actor) which the US was drawn into.  As
discussed above, no region or state is merely an empty landscape for external powers
to shape and impose their policies.  Instead, the Persian Gulf forms a scalene
triangle, a ‘tripolar’ system of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, with its own recurring
patterns and balance of power dynamics.  The chapter discusses how the
intermeshing of religion, economics and military strength, regime type and ideology
has shaped this tripolar system, and how the breakdown of the system incentivised
Saudi Arabia and its fellow monarchies to invite the US into the Gulf to act as their
patron and security guarantor in order to counterbalance Iran and Iraq.  Together
with chapter 3, these two chapters examine the larger, global/external context in
which American foreign policy was made, in other words the systemic inputs into
the American foreign policy process.
Chapter 5 examines the chronology of the evolution of dual containment
from its inception to the end of the Clinton administration.  It describes the
circumstances in which the policy was formulated, and how it was announced to the
world at large, as well as the criticisms levelled against it by scholars and analysts
during the 1990s.  This chapter in particular discusses the ‘ins and outs’ of the
containment regimes of both Iraq and Iran.  In regards to Iraq, it examines the
complex series of Security Council resolutions, military strikes, inspection programs
and controversies that dragged on through the decade.  It details the lengthy ‘cat-and-
mouse’ game played between the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein on one
hand and the UN inspectors and the US on the other.  It also traces the shifts in
American policy towards Iraq, and the American response to the various crises that
regularly erupted in Iraq as the multilateral sanctions regime degraded.  In regards to
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Iran, it discusses the basis and evolution of US policy in in the same era, and how
both containment regimes were subject to change thanks to developments in
regional, international and domestic American politics.
Chapter 6 is the first of three chapters examining the intervening variables
identified at work in the case of dual containment.  Firstly, it examines the
importance of perceptual variables in NCR in general, and explores how this variable
is integrated into the wider NCR framework.  Secondly, it discusses the role of
perceptions of American power held by policymakers in the formation of US foreign
policy in the post-Cold War era.  The largest section examines the role of negative
perceptions of Iran, prevalent in the US since the hostage crisis of 1980-81, and the
role of these perceptions in the formation of adversarial policies towards Iran.  This
chapter also examines the role of negative perceptions on the part of the US of
Islamist political forces, but concludes that this was not a major factor in American
policymaking in the case of the executive branch, although it did have some impact
on public and Congressional opinion.  In addition, this chapter discusses the role of
the Israeli government in promoting an alarmist view of Iran and political Islam
during the 1990s, drawing upon the research of Gerges and others.
Chapter 7 explores the importance of the second intervening variable, the
‘domestic structures’ of the American federal government.  It therefore examines the
unique features of the American system of government, particularly the separation of
powers between the presidency and Congress, and its strong influence on the
formation of American foreign policy, including dual containment.  The system also
allows for the easy penetration of social interest groups of the policy-making
process, which is examined in further detail in the following chapter, reducing the
autonomy of the executive branch in the formation of foreign policy.  Finally, the
chapter discusses the impact of the Cold War and inter-party disputes (especially
after 1994) in narrowing the field of action for the Clinton administration in regards
to Iraq and Iran.
Chapter 8 focuses on the third intervening variable, ‘policy coalitions’ and
‘coalition-building processes.’  It examines the constellations of interest groups and
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their attempts to lobby the US government, and the impact of this on dual
containment policy.   It argues that the imposition of American sanctions on Iran has
been strongly influenced by the activities of pro-Israeli organisations, especially
AIPAC, in Congress, and explores the role of these groups in lobbying for the
tightening of sanctions on Iran during the 1990s, as well as efforts by lobbyists and
groups representing business interests to limit the impact of sanctions on US trade
with Iran and other ‘rogue states.’
The thesis concludes with a summation of the argument throughout the work,
an analysis of what has been achieved in the preceding chapters, and an assessment
of the importance of the variables discusses above in relation to one another.  It will
also briefly explore further avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 Neoclassical realism, intervening variables and
relative autonomy in foreign policymaking
The theoretical framework used throughout this thesis is a modified
neoclassical realist (NCR) one, drawing upon a relatively recent addition to the
extensive realist paradigm, and one that is attracting increasing attention from
scholars of International Relations.  This chapter explains the selection of this
framework, and the reasons for the rejection of possible alternative theories.  It
explores the nature of neoclassical realist thought and contrasts it with its close
relatives, classical realism and neorealism, in order that it might be defined and
explained as fully as possible.  It is argued that NCR represents the best option in
regards to the task at hand, namely the exploration and analysis of American dual
containment policy in a theoretically coherent and systemic manner.
This chapter also examines the work of several of the ‘third wave’ of NCR
theorists, to demonstrate the application of NCR theories in other contexts.  As this
thesis also makes extensive use of some of the insights from Foreign Policy Analysis
(FPA), particularly the early work of Thomas Risse (and his collaborators) and his
analysis of the degrees of ‘relative autonomy’ enjoyed by governments in the process
of making foreign policy, it examines these ideas in some detail as well.  In
particular, Risse’s analysis of unit-level structural and political factors (in the sense
of the institutional nature of the state and the constellations of political forces at
work) is discussed, as is the integration of these concepts into an NCR framework at
the level of intervening variables, and their compatibility with NCR.  The chapter
concludes with an explanation of how the framework will be employed in
subsequent chapters, and in the context of this thesis as a whole.
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2.1 The insufficiency of constructivist, systemic and unit-level
theories
As this thesis examines a specific foreign policy - dual containment - theories
of IR focusing primarily or exclusively on systemic factors are a poor fit for this
project, and theories focused on the domestic factors at work in the formation of a
state’s foreign policy, such as those based in FPA, are a more obvious choice.
Nonetheless the systemic aspect cannot be ignored in an analysis of US foreign
policy in the Persian Gulf.  The American involvement in the Persian Gulf in the
second half of the 20th century has been that of an external superpower in a sub-
region with its own political dynamics.  In other words, American foreign policy in
the Persian Gulf has operated in two international contexts simultaneously: global
and regional, with the former dominated for the bulk of the post-1945 period by the
Cold War.  Arguably, an analysis derived from Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), or
one based primarily on domestic American political factors, would fail to integrate
these aspects in their entirety in a theoretically-consistent way.  At the same time, as
Putnam suggests, American policymakers have played a ‘two level game,’1 forced to
conciliate domestic and systemic/international demands, which makes the inclusion
of state-level factors necessary.  As a consequence, while systemic factors play a
significant role in determining American policy, they are ultimately insufficient to
explain particular policy choices,2 necessitating the use of a theoretical framework
more receptive to national and sub-national variables, whilst an analysis focusing
primarily on internal politics would miss the important aspects of policy stemming
from international power differentials and regional and international inter-state
dynamics.  Therefore, systemic or ‘Innenpolitik’ (theories focusing exclusively on
the domestic politics and structures of states) are perhaps the least compatible with
the goals of the research project represented by this thesis.
1 Robert Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,’ International
Organization, 42 (3) 1988, pp.427-460
2 Hence Kenneth Waltz’s claim that “the theory [neorealism] does not tell us why state X made a
certain move last Tuesday.” Theory of International Politics (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979)
p.121
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An alternative theoretical framework which appears more appropriate and
relevant to dual containment is constructivism.  The necessity of accepting sub-
national and regional factors does to some extent imply the acceptance of the role of
“shared ideas, norms, and values held by actors” in the production, reproduction and
alteration of agents and structures.3 This is especially true in important ways in
relation to the Persian Gulf, as the internal security status of many Gulf regimes is
strongly influenced by transnational links within the region and sub-region,4 and
“our understanding of the dynamics of policy formulation is enhanced by taking into
consideration the factors that inform regimes’ perceptions of their internal security
matrix.” 5 An analysis rooted in a constructivist approach is therefore
accommodating to this issue.  It avoids some of the problems of structurally-focused
theories, specifically through sensitivity to the nuances and subtleties of state and
regional factors, which, as Barnett argues, may be rooted in shared norms, values
and identities.6 However, it should be noted that constructivists do not enjoy a
monopoly on the study of the role of ideational factors such as perception and
identity.  Other strands of IR theory have a long pedigree of the study of the role of
these factors in foreign policy in particular and international politics more generally,
with examples such as Jervis’s work on the role of perception abound.7 This is also
true of the ‘classical’ realist (distinct from neorealist) tradition.8 An analysis based
in realism is therefore also a valid choice.
3 Dale Copeland, ‘The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,’ in Stefano
Guzzini and Anna Leander (eds.), Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and
his Critics (Oxford, Routledge, 2006), p.3
4 Gregory Gause, ‘The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia,’ in Raymond Hinnesbusch & Anoushiravan
Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002),
p.196
5 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil
Era (London: Hurst & Co., 2011), p.5
6 Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 1998)
7 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976)
8 For instance, Thucydides’ famous assertion that "The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm
which this inspired in Lacadaemon, made war inevitable." (my italics), History of the Peloponnesian
War, translated by Richard Crawley, electronic edition (Adelaide, University of Adelaide, 2010),
Book 1, chapter 1
32
The importance of domestic political factors should also not be
underestimated with regards to American foreign policy, the subject of this thesis.
Admittedly, this includes significant ideational/perceptual factors, which could also
be encompassed by a constructivist approach.  However, the focus on the co-
constitution of systems and identities that is characteristic of constructivist analysis
of international politics and foreign policies holds less traction in the case of specific
policies like dual containment.  As Hadfield-Amkhan argues, constructivism per se
has less to say about how identities and ideas are operationalized within states.9 This
allows space for the articulation of a constructivist analysis of the process of foreign
policy making, but offers no guidelines as to how this should be accomplished.  In
other words, constructivism is an approach, not a theory.  Arguably, this cannot
therefore be taken as a substantial argument in the favour of constructivism, given
the necessity of examining the influence of domestic institutions and political factors
in the formation of foreign policy.
The analysis in this thesis therefore contrasts with that offered by those that
view American foreign policy towards Iran and/or Iraq through a purely
constructivist lens. Adib-Moghaddem, for instance, focuses on what he argues are
the ideational underpinning of the American approach to Iran.10 Adib-Moghaddem
argues, with some justification, that groups within the US have in recent years
successfully ‘manufactured’ an image of Iran as an irrational, hostile international
pariah.11 While this is undoubtedly true in the sense that the language used by
policymakers illuminates their perceptions and experience of different issues, this is
by itself not sufficient to explain policy developments fully. Consideration of
structural factors is also necessary to explain how specific foreign policies are
shaped and implemented, at both the international and the domestic (i.e. within a
government and society) level.  Perceptions and ideology are undeniably important
9 Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan, British Foreign Policy, National Identity, and Neoclassical Realism
(Plymouth: Rowan & Littlefield, 2010), p.27
10 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, ‘Discourse and Violence: The friend-enemy conjunction in contemporary
Iranian-American Relations,’ Critical Terrorism Studies, 2 (3) 2009, pp.512-526
11 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, ‘Manufacturing War: Iran in the Neoconservative Imagintation,’ Third
World Quarterly, 238 (3) 2007, pp.623-653
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factors, but these vary from group to group and from person to person, and are often
shaped by the position held by policymakers within the policymaking structure
(hence the old adage that “where you stand depends on where you sit”).  Which
perceptions and ideological preferences are more important than others in the
formation and implementation of policy is therefore conditioned often by the
structure of domestic political institutions and policymaking within states, depending
on the nature of factors such as the distribution of power and responsibility within a
government.  An examination of the ideational factors at work alone is therefore
insufficient, unless accompanied by an account of how these factors are
operationalized. To have an impact, perceptions of, for instance, a security threat
must be acted upon, and the process by which this happens is in part a product of an
institutional context and political contestation which can be equally important, and
must therefore also be examined. Adib-Moghaddam tacitly recognises this, stating
that relations between the US and Iran, arguing that US and Iranian leaders must
conduct foreign policy “within a discursive field that is permeated by memories of
violence and populated by powerful social agents who are wholly antagonistic to the
other side,” but leaves the means that they are able to impact upon the policy-making
process (aside from on the broadest scale, that of discourse) largely unexamined.12
The question is therefore one of degree (and therefore, to some extent,
judgement) to which theoretical framework is superior in its ability to encompass
structural, ideational and institutional aspects.  Given the flaws and strengths of the
approaches discussed above, we can see than an ideal solution would be an approach
that consistently seeks a balance between taking account of both the nature of the
structure of the international and regional system, and the ideational and unit-level
factors that motivated and influenced foreign policy choices on the domestic and
individual level. In other words, a theoretical framework that examines the
international distribution of power, as well as the domestic perceptual, institutional,
and social terrain.
12 Adib-Moghaddem, ‘Discourse and Violence: The friend-enemy conjunction in contemporary
Iranian-American Relations,’ p.514
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Consequently, this thesis utilises a modified neoclassical realist framework,
one that maintains the importance of the systemic level in determining foreign policy
choices, but at the same time integrates insights from FPA in acknowledgement of
the key importance of domestic political factors in the determination of foreign
policy, while at the same time seeking to integrate perceptual and ideological factors
into its analysis. The following sections therefore discuss NCR and the nature of the
specific borrowings from FPA used in this thesis, and why the two are compatible.
2.2 Neoclassical realism
To gain a proper understanding of NCR, one must understand how it relates
to neorealism and ‘classical’ realism.  It makes sense to begin with the shared
characteristic of all three bodies of theory, namely the core element of realism, a
commonality that is reflected most obviously in their titles.  Like classical realism
and neorealism, NCR holds to basic assumptions about the nature of international
relations that are fundamental to the realist paradigm.  NCR adherents Lobell,
Ripsman and Taliaferro identify three of these core assumptions, and describe them
in the following passage, which deserves to be quoted in full:
First, human beings cannot survive as individuals, but rather as members of
larger groups that command their loyalty and provide some measure of security from
external enemies.  Tribalism is an immutable fact of political and social life.  Thus all
variants of realism are inherently group-centric.  Second, politics is a perpetual struggle
among self-interested groups under conditions of general scarcity and uncertainty.  The
scarce commodities in question might be material capabilities, or they might be social
resources, such as prestige and status.  Groups face pervasive uncertainty about one
another’s present and future intentions.  Third, power is a necessary requirement for any
group to secure its goals, whether those goals are universal domination or simply self-
preservation.13
13 Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman & Jeffrey Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State and
Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.14 - 15
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Additionally, like other modern realist theories, NCR is ‘state-centric’, and holds that
competition for power and influence between states in an anarchic international
system is the most significant feature that defines international politics.
Neoclassical realists hold a view of the international system that is strongly
influenced by that of neorealism, in that they believe it forcefully incentivises a
state’s behaviour, rewarding or punishing in accordance with the dynamics of the
system.  Gideon Rose (who originally coined the term ‘neoclassical realism’ in
1998) argues that for adherents of NCR, “the scope and ambition of a country’s
foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and
specifically by its relative material power capabilities.” 14 This is therefore the
‘independent variable’ of NCR, in that it is the primary casual force in determining
changes in its ‘dependent variable,’ a state’s foreign policy.  This has led some to
claim that NCR is a logical extension of neorealism,15 even though the two bodies of
theory are separated by profound differences.  Nonetheless, an important aspect of
NCR is its reliance on systemic-level factors in explaining foreign policy.  It is a
state’s place in the global system of states that is the most important factor in
determining its foreign policy in the long term, setting the broad boundaries a state
must operate within and determining what threats and opportunities it faces.  For
neoclassical realists, international systemic factors are inescapable because, speaking
generally, in an anarchic system a relatively powerful state (in economic and military
terms) has a wider field of action and more available options than less powerful
ones, which will lack the capabilities that come with greater power, and other states
will react to it in differently depending on its power capabilities.
Where NCR definitively parts company with neorealism is in its goals, its
view of the importance of the units of the system and the consequences this has for
its conception of anarchy.  As already stated, while neorealism is a theory of
international politics in the general sense, in that Waltz attempts to explain the nature
14 Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ World Politics, 51 (1) 1998,
p.146
15 Brian Rathburn, ‘A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary
Extension of Structural Realism,’ Security Studies, 17 (2) 2008, pp.294-321
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of the international system,16 NCR theories are theories of foreign policy.  In this
regard, its focus is on that of individual states and why they pursue particular
policies in each specific instance.  NCR approaches therefore typically utilise a
multi-level analysis, one that scrutinises both the state unit and the system it is
embedded in.  As a consequence, NCR’s view of states is highly differentiated, with
each state host to important causal factors that are not necessarily products of the
system of which the state forms a part.  These factors are ‘intervening variables,’
between the independent (structural/systemic) and the dependent (foreign policy
outcomes) variables.  A state may therefore have a range of policy options open to it,
which are determined by systemic factors, but which options in particular its leaders
select may well be the product of these domestic factors, or ‘intervening variables’ to
use the terminology of NCR.  To use a simple analogy drawn from economics, while
the demand is external, how the demand is supplied is affected by domestic modes of
production.  Therefore, while two states may face identical systemic challenges, they
may adopt very different policies depending on their differing domestic features.  In
more specific terms, it is the decisions of foreign policymaking elites and the forces
that affect them that are studied, as it is not states that make foreign policy decisions
but their leaders.  As a consequence of this, NCR differs in its view of anarchy.
While it shares neorealism’s view that the international system is anarchic, this
anarchy is ‘murky’, or ‘opaque’, to return to Rose’s terminology.  The system is
perceived by fallible human beings and therefore does not typically send clear,
unambiguous and immediate signals to leaders, so states “must grope their way
forward in twilight, interpreting partial and problematic evidence according to
subjective rules of thumb”17 (According to neoclassical realists, a state’s foreign
policy is typically formulated by a small group of senior leaders and officials, often
referred to as the ‘foreign policy executive’ or, FPE). 18 The consequence is,
arguably, a shift in emphasis from structural forces and towards human agency.  For
adherents of NCR and classical realism the emergence of balances of power, or
attempts to disrupt and/or re-shape it therefore have a contingent component, and
16 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p.121
17 Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism’, p.152
18 For instance, see Steven Lobell, ‘Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical
realist model,’ in Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclasssical
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
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stem from the more-or-less conscious decisions of leaders to pursue these states of
affairs as a matter of policy. 19 Nonetheless, it is objective material power
capabilities which determine what policies states can employ, and in the long run
these will prove to be decisive in shaping the overall direction of policy.  NCR
therefore trades neorealism’s theoretical parsimony for greater explanatory depth,
and, arguably, the ability to deal with situations that represent anomalies for
neorealism.
However, another question arises which should be addressed: why call it
‘neoclassical’?  What exactly is ‘new’ about it?  As we have seen, NCR is
substantially different from neorealism, yet we have not discussed what
differentiates it from the vast and diverse body of literature that is grouped together
as ‘classical realism’.  Rose addresses this issue also.  He too, asks “why must we
add yet another bit of jargon to an already burgeoning lexicon”? before supplying an
answer: “unfortunately there is no simple, straightforward classical realism”.20 In
other words, classical realism resembles more than anything else a philosophical
tradition, a way of looking at the world, rather than a research program.  This is, of
course, not necessarily a flaw, but it is a very different state of affairs from that of
NCR. NCR theories all share a basic model, a model with distinctions between
independent variables, intervening variables and dependent variables and the role of
each.  The relationship between the independent and dependent variables is
essentially fixed, with the role played by the intervening variables requiring the most
examination, usually through empirical case studies.  Adherents of NCR are
therefore distinct from classical realists because they follow a fundamentally
different project, one which they claim aspires to “greater methodological
sophistication”.21 Most importantly, while NCR shares classical realism’s sensitivity
to state-society relations and its focus on foreign policy outcomes rather than the
international system, it does take a different view of the latter, one heavily
influenced by neorealism.  Neoclassical realists “begin with the fundamental
19 Adam Quinn, US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology from the founders to the Bush
Doctrine (Abindgdon, Routledge, 2010), p.12
20 Rose ‘Neoclassical Realism,’ p.153
21 Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, p.19
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assumption of neorealists that the international system structures and constrains the
policy choices of states.”22 This is a legacy of Waltzian neorealism, one not present
in the work of scholars in the traditions of classical realism, but central to NCR.
Overall, “[w]hat makes neoclassical realism ‘new’ is its ongoing attempt to
systematise the wide and varied insights of classical realists within parsimonious
theory, or to put in in reverse, to identify the appropriate intervening variables that
can imbue realism’s structural variant with a greater explanatory richness.”23
The close kinship between NCR and classical realism raises an important
question: why use NCR rather than an approach rooted in classical realism?  The
insights offered by structural realism are too valuable to ignore.  As discussed above,
neorealist theory is not sufficient to explain why the US pursued a dual containment
policy towards Iran and Iraq in the post-Cold War era.  It explains why it was
possible for the US to do so, but this is not the same as explaining why this
particular substantial and wide-ranging policy was adopted and implemented.  This
is obviously not sufficient if we wish to attain a deeper understanding of the issue.
However, at the same time, it is not desirable to ‘throw the baby out with the
bathwater’ and entirely reject any of the insights that structural realism offers, given
its usefulness in explaining the particular dynamics of the Persian Gulf sub-region
and the unipolar nature of global politics in the post-Cold War era.  NCR is better
constituted to take account of this need, as it allows us to integrate the systemic and
the domestic, and the material and the ideational, while remaining theoretically
coherent and consistent.  From a purely instrumental perspective, NCR is also
arguably somewhat more rigorous than classical realism.  It has an explicit model
that will make investigation and analysis easier without doing excessive violence to
the facts and the standards of scholarship.
In sum, NCR is a valid compromise between the need for theoretical rigour
and admission of the messier aspects of real-world foreign policy choices.  It allows
us to acknowledge that there were important structural factors that went some way
22 Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy, p.19
23 Nicholas Kitchen, ‘Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a neoclassical realist model of grand
strategy formation,’ Review of International Studies, 36 (1) 2010, p.118.
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towards determining the choice of dual containment by the US, but also encourages
further investigation into the specific factors in play in American foreign
policymaking, factors that were the most likely to be decisive in the adoption of dual
containment specifically.
2.3 Intervening variables – perceptions and resource extraction
Intervening variables are, as already stated, the defining features of any NCR
analysis, and as such form a critical part of any foreign policy analysis influenced in
whole or part by NCR. From a theoretical perspective, they are required to bridge
the gap between theory and policy, and show how the pressures of the international
system are translated into foreign policy.  As a consequence, the exploration of the
intervening variables behind dual containment will form a major part of this thesis.
It will therefore be useful to examine how other scholars have defined and
investigated various intervening variables in the course of their own research, in the
hope that this might assist in the identification of variables that may also be at work
in the case of dual containment.  In particular, I will focus here on the four texts
identified by Rose in his 1998 article, which arguably constitute the core of the ‘third
wave’ of contemporary NCR scholarship, and some complementary later work but
the same authors. 24 The following survey demonstrates that, broadly speaking,
previous studies utilising NCR as a theoretical framework have sought to explain
foreign policies in reference to the perceptions of leaders and key political figures,
and/or the ability of governments to mobilise state resources and the ‘distorting’
effect of the necessity of doing so on the ensuing policy.  The latter is sometimes
referred to as ‘state power,’ meaning the ability of the official bodies (‘the state’) to
extract from society the means to pursue its preferred policies.  The following survey
will demonstrate the application of NCR to specific cases, illustrating the approach
described above, and offer points of comparison that demonstrate the origins and
derivation of the modified framework used in this study as a whole.
24 Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ p.156
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An obvious place to begin is the work of Fareed Zakaria, who also sought to
study US foreign policy from a realist perspective, tracing the changes in American
foreign policy during its rise to great power status between 1865 and 1908.25 In
doing so, he sought to test realist hypotheses about the relationship between the
expansion of a state’s material power and its interests abroad.  From a theoretical
perspective, his work is significant because of his development of the NCR theory of
‘state-centred realism,’ which he posited in opposition to ‘defensive realism’, as
advocated by scholars such as Walt.26 Zakaria seeks to test realist claim that, in
general, states expand their foreign policy ambitions roughly in step with the
advance of their material power. 27 However, the experience of the rapidly-
industrialising US at the end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th is something
of an anomaly if we accept this claim.  While the US economy grew at a breakneck
pace following the end of the Civil War, the US, in Zakaria’s words, “hewed to a
relatively isolationist line, with few exceptions, until the 1890s – a highly unusual
gap between power and interests, for it lasted some thirty years.”28 To explain this
failure to adopt a more activist foreign policy, he introduces domestic, intervening
variables.
Zakaria holds that the key variables in this case is the power, or lack thereof,
of the state (hence ‘state-centred realism’) to use national resources to pursue foreign
policy goals, and the perceptions of leaders charged with making and executing
foreign policy of the extent of this power.  In his words, “State power is the portion
of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease
with which the central decision-makers can achieve their ends.”29 According to
Zakaria’s account, the US was held back from pursuing a more active role abroad
because it was a ‘weak’ state, where the central government’s key policymakers (in
this case the executive branch of the federal government) lacked the authority and
autonomy to pursue their foreign policy objectives.  As the 19th century wore on, the
25 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton,
NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1998)
26 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (New York, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987)
27 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, p.19
28 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, p.5
29 Ibid, p.9
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capabilities and responsibilities of the American federal government grew, as did the
authority of the Presidency over Congress and the Senate, which enabled leaders
with ambitious and activist foreign policies (e.g. Presidents McKinley and Theodore
Roosevelt) to put them into effect, converting American industrial and financial
resources into military power, overseas possessions and international influence.
Consequently, Zakaria reserves a critical role for the perception of ‘state power’ by
policymaking elites in the expansion of a state’s foreign commitments.  A perceived
increase in ‘state power’ by a leadership cadre will result, in Zakaria’s model, in an
expansion of that state’s interests abroad, and the adoption of correspondingly
ambitious foreign policies.
Another scholar who gives serious consideration to the perceptions of
policymakers in the formation of policy is William Wohlforth.  In his study of the
role of perceptions of the balance of power on Soviet foreign policymaking he
details the problems faced by scholars who try to explain the role of power in
international politics while relying on it as a causal factor, and advances some
arguments in favour of making a careful study of policymaker’s perceptions of
power. 30 Wohlforth maintains that while realists rely on the distribution of power
between states to explain interactions between them, it is extremely difficult to pin
down exactly how and why this is the case in particular instances.  This difficulty
extends to attempts to produce a convincing definition of power that can be
empirically validated without trying to understand the perceptions of the individuals
involved.
Wohlforth argues that no definition of the balance of power is ever strictly
‘objective’ in the sense that it cannot be understood wholly separately from the
phenomena it seeks to explain.  In particular, “Theorists in the realist or balance-of-
power tradition are virtually unanimous in their insistence on defining power as
capabilities”, by which he means the ability to use force.  However, the only way to
validate this hypothesis is to use outcomes as empirical proof, which results in
circularity of a kind: “A relationship of power can never be known until after power
30 William Wohlforth , The Elusive Balance: Power and perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca,
NY; Cornell University Press, 1993)
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has been exercised.  Under such a definition, it is impossible to distinguish a given
relationship of power from the outcome produced or influenced by that relationship,
since the former will have to be inferred from the latter.”31 While we may be able to
make general observations about the role of power distribution in international
politics, to understand particular policies we must seek detailed knowledge of how
policymakers perceived their environment if any conclusions we draw regarding
these policies are to be valid: “What, if not hindsight, gives the scholar remote in
place and time from the events she analyses a special insight into the distribution of
capabilities, not possessed by the participants themselves?”32
The perception of power therefore plays a key role in explaining the end of
the Cold War in Wohlforth’s eyes.  The decision by the Soviet leadership to move
away from confrontation and revisionism and adopt a more conciliatory set of
foreign policies was driven to a large extent by their perception of the decline of the
USSR’s military and economic power relative to its rivals.  This manifested partly as
a shift away from a view of military force as the ultimate arbiter in international
politics, towards a view similar to that of ‘defensive realism,’ namely that Soviet
military power bred unease in other states, which in turn balanced against the Soviet
Union and strengthened the hand of its main rival, the US.  This became more
apparent as the Cold War began to ‘wind down’ towards the latter half of the
1980s.33 The trend towards this policy can in turn be explained by the inherent
uncertainties and inaccuracies in the act of perceiving and judging power, which are
themselves rooted in human nature: “What “power” is is determined in part by how
given material distributions are interpreted.  Since many interpretations are always
possible, state leaderships will tend to interpret particular changes
opportunistically.”34 Elsewhere, defending realism from charges that it ‘failed’ to
predict the end of the Cold War, he is more concise: “In the case of the Soviet Union
and the Cold War’s end, perceived relative decline was a necessary condition for the
31 William Wohlforth , The Elusive Balance, p.4
32 Ibid, p.6
33 Ibid, p.267
34 Ibid, p.303
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adoption of perestroika and “new thinking” and decline was connected to the
burdens imposed by the Soviet Union’s international position.”35
Following on from this, it makes sense to turn to the works of Randall
Schweller, another influential author within the NCR paradigm.  In particular, the
implications of his work for the role of the perceptions of threat in policymaking.
This revolved around an attempt to understand the phenomenon of ‘underbalancing,’
which Schweller defined as when states fail “to recognise a clear and present danger
or, more typically still, have responded in paltry and imprudent ways.”36 As with
Zakaria, Schweller’s study of ‘underbalancing’ is not at first glance immediately
applicable to a study of dual containment.  Nevertheless, Schweller’s work is, like
Zakaria’s and Wohlforth’s, useful because it introduces concepts and avenues of
investigation that are relevant to dual containment.  Like other studies within the
NCR trend, Schweller seeks to examine how pressures and incentives generated by
the international system are translated into foreign policy by states and their leaders.
Similarly to scholars of NCR, he attempts to do this by analysing the nature of the
state unit, specifically its decision-making actors and process.  He concludes that
foreign policy decision-making is influenced heavily by what he refers to as ‘state
coherence,’ the ability of a state’s policymakers to act rationally and consistently.
States are more likely to ‘underbalance’ when they are insufficiently coherent to
enact foreign policies that address an external threat.  In pursuing this line of
enquiry, Schweller admits that “states respond (or not) to threats and opportunities in
ways determined by both internal and external considerations of policy elites, who
must reach consensus within an often decentralised and competitive political
process.”37
Schweller derives ‘state coherence’ from four sources: elite cohesion, elite
consensus, government/regime vulnerability and cohesion within society at large.
‘Elite cohesion’ is the degree to which a state’s leadership is fractured or polarised
35 William Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, International Security, 19 (3) 1995,
p.109
36 Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p.1
37 Ibid, p.5
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by internal divisions at fundamental levels, while ‘elite consensus’ refers to both the
level of agreement within the policymaking elite(s) of a state that something
represents a threat or opportunity, and what policy outcomes are the most desirable.
‘Regime vulnerability’ describes how far policymakers must take domestic dangers
into account in the forming of foreign policy - at one extreme, will a particular policy
threaten the legitimacy of the regime (or the popularity of a particular government)
to such an extent that it will fall?  Finally, ‘social cohesion’ refers to “the relative
strength of ties that bind individuals and groups to the core of a given society.  Social
cohesion does not mean political unanimity or the absence of deep political
disagreements within society.”38 Instead, it means how far the citizens of a state see
the state itself as legitimate and representative of them, and not just a political entity
they just happen to find themselves living in.  Ultimately, the lower these values, the
lower the coherence of the state.  Likewise, the higher these values, the more
coherent that state.  The more coherent the state, the more likely it is to respond to
shifts in the international system appropriately.  The domestic political systems of
states are therefore also an important factor in determining a given state’s foreign
policy.
Schweller also includes another variable, namely the attitude of a state
towards the current distribution of power in the system.  Schweller posits that a
fundamental cleavage exists that defines the outlook of states: bias towards either
revisionism or the status quo.  Further sub-divisions exist, but these are questions of
degree: how much risk states are willing to assume in trying to change or defend the
status quo, and how extensive their goals are- ‘unlimited’ or ‘limited’.  Which of
these a state tilts towards will determine how it views developments in the
international system.  This is also dealt with in his earlier work, which examined the
structural causes of the Second World War. 39 Here, Schweller argued that the
outbreak of this conflict was facilitated to a large degree by the instability in the
international security system that was caused by shift to tripolarity, as a result of the
rise of Germany in the 1930s, when it joined the existing polar powers of the United
38 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, p.51
39 Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998)
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States and the Soviet Union.  This tripolar system, together with the ‘unlimited aims
revisionism’ of Nazi Germany and the failure and/or inability of other states to
balance against it enabled the war to happen.  In this work, Schweller therefore
adopts two intervening variables:
the inequalities of power among the Great Powers and their level of satisfaction with
the status quo.  These refinements transform neorealism from a theory of international
politics to one of foreign policy.  The amended theory, which I call balance-of-interests
theory, yields more varied and determinate predictions about system dynamics and state
behaviour and richer explanations of concrete historical cases than does Waltz’s
theory.40
What lesson can be drawn from this?  Arguably, that the perception of threat
and opportunity plays a key role in foreign policymaking.  This is most obvious in
Schweller’s discussion of ‘underbalancing’.  In an ambiguous world, how states
respond to threats is determined to a large extent by the perceptions of their leaders
of the magnitude and nature of the threat itself, or even if something poses a threat in
the first place, as the act of perception is one that is riven with problems and
vulnerable to distortion and error.41 In Schweller’s model, elite consensus that a
threat exists is therefore the “proximate causal variable”: without a strong consensus
there will be no action.  It is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for action.42
Furthermore, his introduction of the notion of a state’s ‘interests’, i.e. its attachment
to (or disenchantment with) the status quo includes a strong element of threat
perception.  This can be found specifically in his categorisation of states according to
the risks their leaders are willing to run in order to change the status quo, and also in
the act of deciding something represents a threat to the status quo or an opportunity
to challenge it.
Domestic political dynamics is the final intervening variable we must
consider.  While Schweller integrates this into his analysis to some extent, it is more
prominent in the work of Thomas Christensen, most notably in his study of Sino-
40 Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, p.184-185
41 Schweller, Unanswered Threats, p37 - 43
42 Ibid, p.48
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American relations in the early phases of the Cold War.43 This is particularly useful
from the perspective of this thesis because, like Zakaria, he deals extensively with
American foreign policymaking, but in this case a more contemporary period (albeit
one with significant differences from the 1990s).  Christensen’s work is therefore
highly relevant, doubly so when we consider that it too is one of the ‘founding texts’
of NCR reviewed in Rose’s article of 1998.
The essential claim of Christensen’s work on Sino-American relations of this
era is that these were shaped to a great extent by the need of leaders on both sides to
appease various domestic political forces, and pursue foreign policies that were
influenced by the desire to achieve their political agendas as much as responding to
shifts in the international system.  He argues that at times they resorted to
‘overbalancing’ in order to mobilise sufficient resources for foreign policy, even if
the situation did not warrant such action when viewed dispassionately.  In the first
instance, Christensen analyses the approach of the Truman administration towards
the nascent People’s Republic of China (PRC).  He argues that President Truman, his
advisors and officials wished to pursue a conciliatory approach towards Chairman
Mao’s regime, and recognise the PRC as the official government of China once it
had secured the Chinese mainland.  In doing so, they hoped to drive a wedge
between the PRC and the Soviet Union, seeing the latter as by far the bigger threat.
However, Christensen contends that Truman’s foreign policy became a victim of the
administration’s rhetoric.  In order to ‘sell’ its activist foreign policies and provision
of economic and military aid to Europe (especially the Marshall Plan), it was forced
to rely heavily on a discourse of national security and the threat of international
Communism.  In doing so, the administration became trapped by the logic of the
situation and the particular dynamics of the American political system in that era.  It
could hardly acquiesce to the victory of a communist movement over a wartime US
ally (Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT) in China, while at the same time emphasising
the need to contain communism in the rest of the world without appearing deeply
hypocritical.  Moreover, Truman relied on Congress to appropriate the vast sums
necessary for his foreign policy and defence programmes, and was forced to grant
43 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilisation, and Sino-
American Conflict 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996)
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concessions to legislators who would only approve of this expenditure if the US took
a more bellicose stand towards Communism in Asia.  Consequently, Truman
continued (amongst other measures) to provide military aid to the KMT even after he
judged it a lost cause, and declined to recognise the PRC even though privately
believing that it was in America’s national interests to do so.  This was complicated
by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950:
Unfortunately for Sino-American relations, the potential for being accused of
hypocrisy was great during an expensive mobilisation drive backed by an ideological
crusade.  To avoid this crippling charge, the administration needed to demonstrate some
degree of consistency between rhetoric and practice.  Truman could not adopt a hands-
off policy toward Taiwan , let alone a conciliatory policy toward Beijing, if he hoped to
guarantee support for the Korean War and, more generally, to transform the fervour
over Korea into broad popular support for larger security policy budgets.44
Indeed, Christensen goes so far as to assert that this bellicosity had much to do with
the Chinese decision to intervene in the conflict.45 This in turn assisted Truman in
justifying large increases in defence expenditure and assisted in the passage of the
accompanying measures through Congress.46
Within the Chinese government, Christensen argues that Mao felt driven to
manufacture the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis in order to justify the radical changes of
the ‘Great Leap Forward.’  In his analysis, Mao felt threatened by what he saw as the
increasing power of the Soviet Union in the 1950s, which he feared would
marginalise China.  In order to compete on the world stage, he thought it necessary
to increase China’s material power capabilities, symbolised by the acquisition of
nuclear weapons and rapid industrialisation.  China was at the time still a largely
rural society and lacked a sophisticated industrial and technological base, so this
would require enormous economic sacrifices and social dislocation to achieve:
“Almost every aspect of the Great Leap communization was unprecedented in
Chinese history…The Great Leap Forward was nothing short of a social revolution.
44 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p.137
45 Ibid , p.162
46 Ibid, p.169 - 170
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But it was more than a social oddity; it was an enormous physical and economic
burden on the average Chinese citizen.”47 In what came to be known as the 1958
Taiwan Straits Crisis, Mao ordered the shelling and blockade of two KMT-held
islands off the coast of China, Matsu and Quemoy, which dramatically raised
tensions with Taiwan and the US.  This, argues Christensen, was designed to foster a
“siege mentality” 48 amongst the Chinese populace that would enable the mass
mobilisations of the ‘Great Leap’ to take place, and justify the sacrifices the people
of China were called upon to make.  At the same time international tensions were
carefully managed to avoid excessive escalation and the actual outbreak of war, as
“Mao did not want war, just conflict.  Conflict short of war would guarantee popular
consensus for his broad economic strategy without wasting the mobilised resources
on actual warfighting.”49
What do Christensen’s examples tell us?  If we accept his arguments, then the
domestic political system of a state is a key intervening variable in determining its
foreign policy, as much as the perceptions of its elites or its material power
capabilities.  Not only does it go some way towards determining how a policy is
presented and ‘sold’ to key figures and the populace, we can also see from the case
of the Truman administration and its China policies (the most relevant example with
regards to dual containment) that the administration was not only prevented from
doing what it wanted to do, it was also pressured into doings things it didn’t.  In
other words, the nature of the American political system (combined with the
ideological commitments of its actors) made certain policies essentially impossible
to implement, and had a substantial impact on others.
Christensen and Schweller’s demonstration of the role of a state’s internal
politics and political system, and Zakaria and Wohlforth’s demonstration of the
importance of the perceptions of policymakers are persuasive examples of these
intervening variables at work.  These examples suggest that some key areas should
be studied with regards to the examination of foreign policy, and American foreign
47 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, p.213 - 214
48 Ibid, p.9
49 Ibid, p.219
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policy in particular: the perceptions of relative American power and of the threat to
American interests posed by Iran and Iraq on the part of key foreign policymakers,
and the domestic political structure of the US and the balance of forces within it.
The following section discusses how the theoretical framework utilised in this thesis
does so by borrowing insights and concepts derived from FPA.
2.4 Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and neoclassical realism
Scholars working in the FPA tradition locate the sources of a given state’s
foreign policies at the domestic, or ‘unit’ level, within a state and its government.
Therefore, this body of work is a logical ‘hunting ground’ in which to seek relevant
intervening variables.  Although FPA focuses primarily on the ‘unit level’ of
analysis, scholars working in this tradition have by no means disregarded wider
questions about the relationship between systemic and domestic factors, and the
relationship between them.  As a result, many scholars working within the FPA
tradition have advocated mixed models of foreign policy, with the integration of
different levels of analysis, both at and above and below that of the state.  This
obviously corresponds strongly with the objectives and methods of NCR.  Some of
the work of Thomas Risse (together with his collaborators) is arguably very close to
directions taken concurrently by scholars in the NCR school, especially the
insistence that “[a] complex model of international politics has to be conceptualized
which integrates the three levels of analysis: society, political system, and
international environment.”50 Some of his earlier work, focusing on the effects of
public opinion on the foreign policies of democratic states, offers two viable
candidates for inclusion into an NCR framework as intervening variables: ‘domestic
structures’ and ‘coalition-building processes,’51 which correspond (very roughly) to
the distinction between ‘agent’ and ‘structure’ in the domestic political sphere.  Risse
50 Harald Müller & Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘From the Outside In and from the Inside Out:
International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy’, in David Skidmore & Valerie Hudson
(eds.) The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1993), p.31
51 Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal
Democracies,’ World Politics, 43 (4) 1991, pp.479-512
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argues that these two ideas represent different approaches taken by scholars working
in FPA, and should be integrated to provide a more complete picture.52
‘Domestic structures’ refers to “the nature of the political institutions (the
“state”), basic features of the society, and the institutional and organizational
arrangements linking state and society and channelling social demands into the
political system.” 53 ‘Coalition-building processes’ (a term borrowed from
Gourevitch)54 encompass “policy networks,” in other words “the mechanisms and
processes of interest representation by political parties and interest groups that link
the societal environment to the political systems.”55 As Risse concedes, ‘coalition-
building processes’ and ‘domestic structures’ are closely interlinked because “state
structures do not determine the specific content or direction of policies.  On the other
hand, coalition building takes place in the framework of political and societal
institutions.” 56 In other words, the institutional context determines under what
conditions a policy network or political coalition will be successful in its attempts to
influence policy, and the means it has available in which to do so.  Consequently,
Risse argues that varying strength of states in the domestic sphere is a key
determinant of foreign policy, and that states fall on a spectrum ranging from
‘strong’ to ‘weak’ in terms of “the centralization of state institutions…and the ability
of political systems to control society and to overcome domestic resistance.”57
Overall, the framework advocated by Risse and others aims to measure the
degree of relative autonomy a state enjoys vis-à-vis society.  Risse, amongst others,
argues that the US is an example of a relatively ‘weak’ state, one in which the
foreign and security policymaking structure is decentralised, with a “federalist
structure, the system of checks and balances between Congress and administration,
52 Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,’
p.485-6
53 Ibid, p.484
54 Peter Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,’
International Organization, 32 (4) 1978, pp.881-912
55 Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,’
p.485
56 Ibid, p.485
57 Ibid, p.484
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and the extensive network of interest group representation.”58 In comparison to
other Western democracies, “the American system seems to come closest to the
society-dominated type.  Constant building and rebuilding of coalitions among social
actors and political elites is fairly common even in foreign and security policy.  The
openness of the political system provides the society with comparatively easy access
to the decision-making process.”59 At the other end of the scale is the French Fifth
Republic, which Risse argues the presidency has virtually unchallenged supremacy
in the making of foreign and security policy (leading some observers of French
politics to dub it a ‘nuclear monarchy’), with little input from the legislature or the
public, making it a ‘strong’ state, at least in comparison to the US.60 This view is
derived from Krasner, for one, who argues that “The American state – those
institutions that those institutions and roles that are relatively insulated from
particularistic pressures and concerned with general goals (primarily the White
House and the State Department and to a lesser extent the Treasury and Defense
Departments) – is weak in relation to its own society.”61 A ‘weak’ state is therefore
one in which the central government is permeated by the influence of societal
interest groups, perhaps the expense of the nation as a whole (Krasner cites pre-1975
Lebanon as an extreme example).  In contrast, a state at the opposite end of the
spectrum, a ‘strong’ state, is “one which is able to remake the society and culture in
which it exists: that is, to change economic institutions, values, and patterns of
interaction among private groups.”62
There are obvious parallels between the projects advocated by Risse and his
colleagues in FPA and the approach taken by scholars in the NCR tradition described
above, especially Zakaria, Christensen, and Schweller.  For instance, the ‘resource
extraction’ aspect of NCR correlates strongly with the notion of relative autonomy
58 Müller & Risse-Kappen, ‘From the Outside In and from the Inside Out: International Relations,
Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy’, p.34
59 Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,’
p.490-1
60 Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,’
p.491
61 Stephen Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations (Abingdon,
Routledge, 2009), p.37.
62 Ibid, p.42
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(i.e. the power of the state in relation to society), as both approaches seek to explain
foreign policy outcomes in regards to the ability of elites and leaders to mobilise
national assets to achieve their ends.  In the words of Amon and Alden,
“Neoclassical realism’s integration of ‘intervening variables’ such as the role of
perception, the role of leadership and domestic structures found within particular
state actors as an explanatory source for diversity of outcomes in international
politics brings these three crucial FPA insights into the realist theoretical
paradigm.”63 They therefore conclude that the scope for the development of greater
theoretical depth in NCR through “careful ‘borrowing’” from FPA is “wide”, despite
the central role of the international system in NCR theory.64 More recent research in
NCR has arguably approached the integration of the type advocated by Risse even
further, through attempts to construct theories of the role of contestation between
‘the state’ and ‘society,’ and how this modulates systemic pressures and determine
foreign policy outcomes.  Lobell, for instance, theorises on the interaction of social
forces, state structures and perceptions at the level of the state and constructs an
intricate model of threat identification by elites across international, regional and
domestic levels.65 His model allows for the contestation of perceptions of threat by
different actors within a state, such as between the core foreign policy executive and
societal leaders, who may each have a different set of priorities or concerns, which
does much to shape their perceptions.  He cites the example of societal leaders who
assess a foreign state based on its threats to their parochial interests rather than the
nation as a whole, which makes the ‘domestic balance of power’ a factor in
policymaking if they are able to influence the process, especially in the economic
sphere.  Consequently, “Societal leaders will seek to identify and brand states that
have a component of power that harms their parochial interests as a national
threat.”66 This leads him to identify three scenarios.  In the first, the perceptions of
the foreign policy executive (FPE) and societal elites align, leading to a relatively
seamless process of the formation and adoption of an appropriate policy. In the
63 Chris Alden & Amon Aran, Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches (Abingdon: Routledge,
2012), p.117
64 Ibid, p.118
65 Steven Lobell, ‘Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model,’ in
Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy
66 Ibid, p.60
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second scenario, there is some discord between the two sides, ensuring that the FPE
is somewhat autonomous, but faces some constraints on its policy. In the third
scenario, changes in the external environment are interpreted in significantly
different ways, which “disables a foreign policy coalition”, constrains the FPE in its
threat identification and leads to inappropriate counterbalancing.67 Ripsman also
seeks to determine which societal interest groups, and under which conditions, are
able to influence the foreign policy of their state. Rather than perceptions, he
focuses more attention on the structure of the state and social forces seeking to
influence policy.  He subsequently theorises that in democracies with powerful
legislatures that face minor external security threats, influential domestic interest
groups will be able to have substantial impacts on policy.68
Given the compatibility of these concepts with an NCR framework, and their
importance in the American case, ‘domestic structures’ and ‘coalition-building
processes’ are integrated into a wider NCR framework in this thesis as intervening
variables.  This is not to say that Risse’s recommendations have been adopted
wholesale.  One of the factors Risse and other FPA scholars, such as Gourevitch and
Katzenstein, have highlighted, the degree to which a society is fragmented or
polarised,69 has been excluded for two reasons.  Firstly, to remain as theoretically
parsimonious as possible and maintain a manageable number of variables, and
secondly (and more importantly) because this can arguably be incorporated into the
‘coalition building processes’ and ‘domestic structures’ sections without serious loss
or distortion: the degree to which groups in society disagree about policies will
operate within a context determined by the states domestic institutional structures,
and the contestation of different societal actors and will be reflected in the policy
coalitions contending to shape policy.  It can also, in part, be accommodated within
the broader perceptual variable, with the different perceptions of different social and
official state actors examined together.  This difference is therefore largely one of
67 Lobell, ‘Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model,’ p.66
68 Norrin Ripsman, ‘Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups,’ in Lobell, Ripsman &
Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy
69 Discussed by Risse in ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal
Democracies,’ p.486. As mentioned above, this is a feature also considered by Schweller,
Unanswered Threats
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organisation.  In terms of where this framework differs most markedly from an FPA
analysis, it, like all realist theories, accords more weight to systemic, structural
factors and less to those rooted in the psychology of decision-making of individual
policy-makers and groups.  This thesis also breaks with some of the work of other
NCR scholars in examining domestic structures and the policy coalitions separately.
Ripsman, for instance, treats the legislature as another kind of interest group, on the
grounds that “while organised interest groups can make representations directly to
the political leadership, they frequently have easier access through the legislature.
Thus a theory that specifies the extent and nature of the legislature’s influence on
policy will be relevant to all of these domestic political actors.”70 This might suffice
for determining broad outlines of state-society contestation in the making of policies
on a large scale, but it is a less useful approach in the case of a specific policy like
dual containment.  While the domestic institutional structures of a state may
determine the means and degree to which interest groups (or other social groups and
forces) may influence policy, it does not determine why some groups are successful
and others are not in different cases.71 The influence of the legislature itself may
also vary in different eras and on different issues, making a more in-depth study of
legislative/institutional structure a significant variable in and of itself in regards to
specific policies.  The impact of the domestic structures and coalition building
processes are therefore examined in separate chapters.
The thesis therefore examines three intervening variables in total: the
perceptions of threat and power of American policymakers, the effect of the
domestic institutional framework of the American federal government, and the
influence of social and political coalitions (like interest groups) on dual containment
policy.  This is preceded by an analysis of the international context in which the
policy of dual containment was conceived and carried out, in terms of both the
American approach to the Persian Gulf in the wider context of its global policies as a
superpower, and the realities arising from regional inter-state factors which
70 Ripsman, ‘Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups,’ p.171
71 Risse-Kappen,  ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,’
p.485
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American policy attempts to address.  Taken together, the latter two aim to address
the international systemic factors shaping American policy in the 1990s.
2.5 Conclusions
NCR is a relatively new and highly-promising variant on the long-standing
‘realist’ tradition of IR theory, as part of a new resurgence of interest in Realism in
contemporary IR.  In terms of its goals and objectives, it breaks with the neorealism
advocated by scholars like Kenneth Waltz, its most immediate predecessor in
chronological terms, in its insistence on the desirability of developing a general
theory of international politics that can also offer insights into specific foreign
policies.  Scholars working in NCR attempt to do so by integrating unit-level
variables into their analysis rather than relying predominantly upon the systemic
incentives of the struggle for power and security between states as neorealists do.
Adherents of NCR conceptualise these ‘intervening variables,’ falling between the
independent variable of the international system and its systemic incentives and the
dependent variable of foreign policy outcomes, as ‘transmission belts’ that shape and
condition the response of states and their elites to the international system.
Remaining within the broader realist paradigm, they reserve an important role for the
power capabilities of states (which, like other realists, they also view as the central
focus of IR study), with more powerful states able to access a wider range of policy
options thanks to their position in the international system, and also view states as, in
general, aiming for power-optimisation, acting usually to advance their own interests
in a fundamentally anarchic system.
While previous studies which have utilised theoretical frameworks derived
from NCR have tended to break down into two broad strands – ‘resource extraction’
and ‘perceptual’ models, the framework utilized in this thesis attempts to bridge the
gap between them.  It does so by bringing in some insights from the IR sub-field of
FPA, specifically the idea of the relative autonomy of the state and its FPE vis-à-vis
society.  However, rather than relying on this as a separate intervening variable, here
it is disaggregated into the two components identified by Risse, namely ‘domestic
structures’ and ‘coalition building processes’.  In contrast, perceptions of threat and
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power on the part of policymakers (American, in the case of dual containment) are
dealt with in one variable, though many NCR theorists regard them as key.  This
stems from the relatively narrow focus of this thesis, specifically one (albeit major)
foreign policy, in one region, and in one decade, and primarily under one
government (both Clinton administrations).  This approach, while relatively novel in
theoretical terms, is possible thanks to the convergence of aims and methods in both
NCR and the approach promoted by Risse et al.
With a theoretical framework in place, it is now possible to begin the
examination of dual containment in earnest.  The following chapter examines the
background of US. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf in the second half of the
twentieth century, and the international factors that shaped it.
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CHAPTER 3 US Foreign Policy in the Persian Gulf 1945-1991
This chapter discusses the evolution of American foreign policy in the
Persian Gulf in the post-war era, up until the end of the Cold War and the
introduction of dual containment.  From the perspective of the NCR theory
utilised in this thesis, it aims to demonstrate the international, global factors
driving American involvement in the region, and discuss the structural, systemic
aspects of American Middle East and Persian Gulf policy.  In other words, its
role is to describe how the superpower status of the US, and its wider concerns
stemming from this position in the international system, has shaped American
Persian Gulf policy.
The chapter will show how US Persian Gulf policy has changed in this
period, and, more importantly, illustrate the ‘push’ factors that motivated
American policymakers to maintain their country’s involvement in Gulf politics,
and made them responsive to appeals by regional states for assistance.  The
strong ties between Israel and the US are also discussed, but it is argued that
these are essentially secondary in the wider perspective, as the US involved itself
in the Persian Gulf for other reasons, rather than as corollary to its relationship
with Israel, though of course connections existed, and will be discussed briefly.
The chapter argues that it was the Cold War itself, and the presence of oil in vast
quantities, that were responsible for American involvement in the first place,
predating the foundation of the state of Israel.
In seeking to accomplish objectives related to these concerns, the US
intervened directly as well as relying on proxies.  Examples of both will be
discussed in this chapter, as will the bilateral relations between the US and the
three largest Gulf States, Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia.  Generally speaking, the
US preferred to maintain a relatively low-key role in the region, maintaining only
a token military presence geared towards ‘showing the flag’ rather than playing a
major role in regional security.  Instead, the US relied on first the UK, then
regional surrogates to ensure the security of its interests.  It was only when the
US ran out of surrogates and the Cold War wound down that American
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policymakers opted for a large American presence.  The chapter therefore
examine each of the primary US interests and the role they played in determining
American approaches to the Persian Gulf in turn (with the partial exception of
Israel).  This is followed by an examination of American strategies, including its
reliance on regional proxies.
3.1 American interests in the Persian Gulf
As far as a consensus can be said to exist in such matters, a consensus
exists among scholars that the most important American interests in the Middle
East (up to the end of the Cold War) were containing Soviet power, the free flow
of oil, and Israel.  Regarding the first, between the end of the Second World War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, minimising the presence and influence of
the USSR in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf in particular was an overriding
priority for American policymakers, determined by the global rivalry between
the two superpowers.  As to the second, the oil reserves present in the Persian
Gulf assumed an increasingly critical role in the economies of the developed,
industrialised states throughout the second half of the twentieth century.  Finally,
the intense American relationship with Israel also became increasingly important
to American policymakers, partly for its perceived strategic utility and partly for
reasons that had much to do with American domestic politics.
The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated
global politics in the second half of the twentieth century.  While some scholars
have argued that the direct impact of the Cold War on the Middle East and the
Persian Gulf was surprisingly small in terms of direct superpower presence1 (at
least in comparison to other regions), 2 the Cold War nonetheless had an
enormous impact on American foreign policy, with profound indirect
consequences for regional states.  This fact arguably hindered the formulation of
1 For example, see Fred Halliday, ‘The Middle East, the Great Powers and the Cold War’, in
Yezid Sayigh & Avi Shlaim (eds.), The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997), and The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.123-129
2 For example, Asia (‘hot’ wars in Vietnam and Korea), and Europe (the American presence as
part of NATO and the division of the continent)
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appropriate regional policies by the US, as it imposed a “Cold War framework
upon this complex mosaic that distorted the realities of the situation and
encouraged inappropriate responses.”3 The over-arching American policy was to
contain the Soviet Union, which was played out on a global scale with little
attention played to the regional dynamics of the Persian Gulf and the Middle
East.
The Persian Gulf was indubitably seen by American policymakers as an
area of vital strategic interest to the national security of the United States.
Palmer argues that this began simply with the Persian Gulf as another arena for
East-West confrontation, with the Soviet refusal to withdraw from Iran in 1946,
together with Soviet pressure on Turkey and support for communist guerrillas in
Greece’s civil war.4 As Taylor argues, “The overriding concern of American
foreign policy in the immediate postwar period was finding an effective way to
check Soviet expansionism throughout the world.” 5 This attitude changed
swiftly, taking into account the presence of what is now known to be
approximately 60% of the world’s proven oil reserves in the area, which the US
judged to be of inestimable strategic value in any confrontation with the Soviet
Union.  American planners considered it essential that this resource be either
inaccessible to the USSR, freely accessible to the West, or both.  This also
precluded the domination of the Gulf by any hostile power, external or regional,
which could undermine the ability of the West to confront the Soviet Union.6
While the US had been able to fuel the Allied war machine in the Second World
War, it quickly became apparent that it alone would not be able to continue its
wartime role as the oil well of the ‘free world.’7 Consequently, Western Europe
and Japan would have to rely on Persian Gulf sources to fuel their economic
3 Alan Dobson & Steve Marsh, U.S. Foreign Policy since 1945, 2nd edition (London: Routledge,
2006), p. 119
4 Michael Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian
Gulf, 1833-1992 (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1992), p.35
5 Alan Taylor, The Superpowers and the Middle East (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
1991) p.49
6 Shibley Telhami, The Stakes: America and the Middle East, The Consequences of Power and
the Choice for Peace (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), p.140-3
7 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York, NY: Free Press,
1991), p.395
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recovery and opposition to the USSR.  By 1948, the oil of the Persian Gulf had
therefore become a necessary component of America’s Cold War strategy, and
essentially a strategic commodity rather than a strictly commercial one.8 This
view would persist throughout the Cold War and ensured that the US would
remain engaged with the Persian Gulf, alert to any developments that threatened
to increase Soviet influence in the region.  In Yergin’s words: “To the United
States, the oil resources of the region constituted an interest no less vital, in its
own way, than the independence of Western Europe; and the Middle Eastern oil
fields had to be preserved and protected on the Western side of the Iron Curtain
to assure the economic survival of the entire Western world.”9
The centrality of oil to modern society, as a fuel for transport and
electricity generation, and as a raw material, is difficult to overstate.  As
described above, its centrality ensured that it was seen as an irreplaceable
strategic asset as much as a commodity and a source of wealth creation.
However, leaving aside the Cold War, access to oil was recognised as vital to
economic development at the end of the Second World War among the states of
the West and Japan, and this became more pressing as demand for it grew in the
post-war era.  While coal had fuelled the industrial revolution and still supplied
the industrialised world with much of its energy for a short period after 1945, this
changed swiftly:
in the boom years of the 1950s and 1960s, economic growth throughout the
industrial world was powered by cheap oil.  In a mere two decades, a massive
change in the underpinnings of industrial society had taken place.  On a global
basis, coal had provided two-thirds of world energy in 1949.  By 1971, oil, along
with natural gas, was providing two-thirds of world energy.10
One of the most important consequences of this change was to focus the
minds of western leaders on the security of supplies from the Persian Gulf.  As
described above, the Cold War gave this an added impetus and the resources of
8 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p.41-2 and p.44-5
9 Yergin, The Prize, p.427
10 Yergin, The Prize, p.456
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the Persian Gulf an added weight.  This remained true even in the minds of
American policymakers, despite the fact that American oil production remained
substantial in absolute terms throughout the twentieth century.  This can be partly
explained by the fact that American oil production peaked in the 1960s, together
with a general trend for a growth in demand both in the US and worldwide.11 It
had been recognised among American policymakers as far back as the 1940s that
the centre of gravity of world oil production was inexorably shifting towards the
Persian Gulf.12 In fact, of all the oil discovered worldwide between 1948 and
1972, more than 70 percent was in the Middle East, raising the Persian Gulf’s
proven reserves from 28 to 367 billion barrels.13
The cutting-off of Persian Gulf oil supplies to the economies of the West
therefore represented a ‘nightmare scenario’ for Western policymakers, both
economically and strategically.  British Prime Minister Anthony Eden likened
the possibility to being ‘strangled to death’, and agreed with President
Eisenhower prior to an Anglo-Soviet summit in 1956 that he would warn Soviet
leaders that any attempt by them to interfere in the flow of oil from the Middle
East would likely lead to war.  Yergin argues that it was fears of this coming to
pass that prompted Eden to attack Egypt in the wake of the nationalisation of the
Suez Canal, to prevent either the waterway being closed to UK-bound tankers, or
Nasser’s defiance of the West inspiring other radicals in the region to take power
and embargo shipments.  Likewise, it was partly Eisenhower’s fears of the
consequences a nationalist, anti-Western backlash that prompted him to force
Britain, France and Israel to back down.14 It also demonstrates the complications
that America’s relationship with Israel caused to its attempts to maintain an anti-
Soviet consensus and secure the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.
While American goals regarding the Cold War and the global oil supply
were closely interconnected, the same cannot be said for either of these two goals
and the American-Israeli relationship.  While developments in the politics of the
11 Yergin, The Prize, p.567-8
12 Ibid, p.393
13 Ibid, p.500
14 Ibid, p.484-5
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region demonstrated that linkages existed between the traditional triad of
American goals, these were not mutually-reinforcing in the same way.  In aiding
Israel, the US alienated those Arab states that resent its dispossession of the
Palestinians and see it as an alien intrusion into the Arab/Islamic world, and
therefore complicates the American relationship with the major oil producers of
the Persian Gulf.  As stated, the US support for the littoral Gulf Arab states, and
pre-revolutionary Iran, preceded the foundation of Israel: prior the end of the
Second World War, President Franklin Roosevelt agreed to extend the Lend-
Lease programme to both Iran and Saudi Arabia, and his famous meeting with
King Ibn Saud aboard the USS Quincy in February 1945 was undertaken partly
out of the recognition that the US would play a role in the region following the
conclusion of the war against the Axis powers.15 The most significant example
of the friction between the US and the littoral Arab states was the oil embargo
that followed the 1973 October War, when the Organisation of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) states embargoed oil shipments to the US (among
others) in protest at its material support for Israel, and to pressure American
leaders to broker a peace agreement.  Simultaneously, the broader Organisation
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised oil prices sharply.  However,
although the immediate effects of this course of action were dramatic, the
embargo itself lasted less than a year and relations between Saudi Arabia and the
US, and between Israel and the US, remain strong to the present day.  Arguably,
both the Saudis and the US had too much invested in their relationship to allow it
to be undermined by this issue alone: Saudi Arabia’s economy is wholly
dependent on exporting oil, and the survival of its existing political system relies
on the profits. 16 An embargo (and alienating its superpower patron), or
prohibitive pricing policies, would have negative consequences in the long term,
motivating its customers to conserve energy and explore alternative fuels.  It
would also, from the Saudi perspective, jeopardise the security relationship it has
relied upon since the Second World War.
15 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p.24 and p.28
16 See Tim Niblock’s Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival (Abingdon: Routledge,
2006)
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In addition, while Israel was also seen during the Cold War as a ‘strategic
asset’, this did not come to the fore until twenty years after the state’s founding,
after its military successes in the 1967 Six Day War.17 However, this too was a
liability for the US, as it hampered American attempts to enlist Arab states in
anti-Soviet alliances, both because they saw Israel as the greater threat, and
ensured that they viewed the US, Israel’s patron, with suspicion.  Arguably, it
was Egyptian-Israeli antagonism that sunk any chance of an amicable
relationship between Nasser and Washington,18 which was one of the reasons for
Egypt’s ‘tilt’ towards the USSR.
3.2 American strategies in the Gulf
Given the nature of American interests in the Persian Gulf, and the
context in which it was made (the Cold War), we can therefore see that American
involvement in the region was likely to be enduring.  This proved to be the case,
as this section will describe.  Nonetheless, despite having the resources of a
superpower at its disposal, for much of the Cold War Washington opted to
maintain a relatively low-key presence in the Persian Gulf, especially in military
terms.  While the US did intervene directly in the Persian Gulf and the wider
Middle East at different times, it relied heavily on proxies, regional allies that
shared its goals (or at least had converging interests) and could be relied upon to
fulfil American objectives.
There are several plausible reasons for this. Firstly, the Cold War
imposed its own demands.  The nature of the American-Soviet rivalry was global
in scope, and so even a superpower like the US had to pick and choose where it
would involve itself with ‘boots on the ground.’  Compared to the huge
American military commitment to the defence of Western Europe and the
Mediterranean, the presence of permanent US forces in the Persian Gulf
17 Richard Falk, ‘U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Tragedy of Persistence’, in
Hooshang Amirahmadi (ed.), The United States and the Middle East: A Search for New
Perspectives (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993), p.70
18 Richard Cottam, ‘U.S. Policy in the Middle East,’ in Amirahmadi (ed.), The United States and
the Middle East, p.41; Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle
East, (London: Wiedenfield & Nicolson, 2008), p.20
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remained small until the 1990s.  Therefore, while the Persian Gulf was perceived
by Washington to be vital, the main focus of Cold War rivalry proved to be
Europe, balancing the Soviet presence in the eastern half of the continent.
Secondly, the Cold War ensured that the Soviet Union would attempt to match
American efforts in different regions of the world, in an attempt to prevent its
rival from pulling too far ahead.  It therefore made sense for American
policymakers to seek a trade-off between security and escalating rivalry to
dangerous levels,19 especially in a region like the Persian Gulf that was relatively
close to the south-western borders of the USSR, and where there was a minor
Soviet ‘footprint,’ which, as noted above, was marginal compared to the
European theatre.  Finally, regional states have been traditionally reluctant to
host large numbers of foreign troops on their soil, especially from Israel’s
principal ally, unless it was judged to be absolutely necessary for national or
regime survival.20 As we shall see below, the US also placed importance on the
British role in the Persian Gulf, which allowed Washington to minimise the
American role in the region, until the British withdrawal in 1971.  Nonetheless,
the US maintained a token permanent military presence in the Persian Gulf of
varying sizes between 1945 and 1991, as well as relying extensively on regional
allies to uphold the primacy of pro-western and anti-Soviet forces.
3.2.1 Regional proxies and a British junior partner
An important aspect of American Persian Gulf policy in the postwar era
was the reliance on Britain continuing its pre-war role in regional security.
Therefore, whatever the motivations of the British leadership in maintaining a
security role in the Persian Gulf, the UK arguably acted as a surrogate of the US
in purely functional terms.  Due to mutual interests, Washington recognised that
the defence of the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East was Britain’s
responsibility, until the UK finally surrendered this role in the face of mounting
economic problems in 1971, a move that forced Washington to reconsider its
Persian Gulf policy. Despite the Suez Crisis of 1956, the US and UK cooperated
19 Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations, p.126
20 Naef Bin Ahmed Al-Saud, ‘Underpinning Saudi National Security Strategy,’ Joint Force
Quarterly, no.32, 2002, p.125-6
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closely throughout this era to maintain pro-western forces in power and exclude
Soviet influence.21 As such, in the wake of the Second World War, the US
looked to Britain “to shoulder the near total military responsibility for the
region’s defense.”22 While this arrangement persisted, the US was ‘present’,
having made commitments to Saudi Arabia and Iran, but remained in the
background, playing a “distant secondary role.”23
The reliance on Britain to shoulder the military burden in the Middle East
and Persian Gulf is also connected to another important strand in American
policy in the quarter-century after 1945: the doomed attempt to create an anti-
Soviet regional defence system, as part of a world-wide containment policy.24 In
doing so the US failed to recognise the fundamental distrust that the populations
of many regional states viewed such a move.  Many saw Israel as a larger threat,
and the presence of British forces in the region was resented as an imperialist
intrusion.25 Nonetheless, an agreement was struck in 1955, between Turkey,
Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and the UK, and came to be known as the Baghdad Pact.
Although the US was not a full member, it backed the deal and did take part as
an observer.26 Significantly, the only Arab state to join was Iraq, which was
ruled by a pro-British monarchy.  It was overthrown in 1958, causing Iraq to
drop out, which essentially bankrupted the organisation.  Egypt (which had been
the focus of British military planning and presence in the Middle East) refused to
participate, an obvious outcome in hindsight given that it was the epicentre of
Arab nationalist movement under Nasser.  While the Baghdad Pact (renamed the
Central Treaty Organisation, CENTO, after the departure of Iraq) is widely
regarded as a failure in military terms, Palmer argues that it was never intended
to constitute a serious deterrent by American policymakers, who instead placed a
21 Mark Sedgewick, ‘Britain and the Middle East: In Pursuit of Eternal Interests,’ in Jack
Covarrubias and Tom Lansford (eds.) Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition or
Support for US Foreign Policy (London: Ashgate, 2007), p.5-6
22 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p.39
23 Steve Yetiv, Crude Awakenings: Global Oil Security and American Foreign Policy (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), p.61
24 Taylor, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p.30
25 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p.63
26 Marc O’Reilly, Unexceptional: America’s Empire in the Persian Gulf, 1941-2007 (Plymouth:
Lexington Books, 2008), p.78
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premium on its political and psychological aspects, the most important of which
was to create an anti-Soviet front and demonstrate Western commitment to local
elites. 27 Ultimately the move backfired for the reasons described above,
contributing to the 1958 Iraqi revolution, which replaced a pro-western regime
with a radical Arab nationalist one.  Consequently, rather than blocking Soviet
expansion, it “actually had the opposite effect of opening new areas of influence
to the USSR.”28
Following the British withdrawal from its commitments ‘East of Suez’
between 1968 and 1971, Washington (to the irritation of senior policymakers)
was forced to look elsewhere for proxies.  In doing so it sought to both maintain
a relatively ‘hands off’ approach and at the same time prevent the Soviets filling
the vacuum left by the British withdrawal.29 The US, mired in Vietnam, was
quick to rule out building up its own forces in the region and so looked to its
regional allies to take up the slack.30 This development also coincided with the
announcement of the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ in 1969, whereby the US would expect
regional states to contain the spread of communism, supplying only arms and
financial aid, rather than direct assistance.  In other words, it would “apply
strengths against weaknesses while leaving to allies forms of military activity
uncongenial to the United States.”31 The stage was set therefore for the adoption
of the ‘Twin Pillars’ strategy, in which the US supported the aspirations of Iran
and Saudi Arabia to supplant the UK and become the dominant powers in the
Persian Gulf.32 The relationship between the US and these states in this era is
examined in more detail below.
27 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p.73-4
28 Taylor, The Superpowers and the Middle East, p. 27
29 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945, 3rd
edition (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), p. 139-40
30 F. Gregory Gause, ‘British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf 1968-73,’ Review of
International Studies, 11 (4) 1985, p.259
31 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American
National Security Policy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.304
32 In contrast to the rulers of Oman, Qatar and what is now the United Arab Emirates, the rulers
of Iran and Saudi Arabia were eager to see British forces depart.  See Gause, ‘British and
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The ‘Twin Pillars’ policy collapsed in 1979 with success of the Iranian
revolution, and the coming to power of a viscerally anti-American regime.  It
also left the US with no candidate to take Iran’s place.  Despite its longstanding
relationship with Saudi Arabia, that state was substantially smaller in terms of
population and ability to mobilise military resources.  Iraq was a possibility, but
had a history of hostility towards traditional American allies and was a military
client of the Soviet Union.  The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 and the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan of the previous year made the formulation of a
new American policy more pressing from Washington’s perspective, as the
American position in the region now appeared under threat from both the Soviets
and regional sources. It was at this point that US policymakers became more
amenable to a deeper, more prominent American role in the region.
3.3 The ‘Twin Pillars’ and bilateral relations with Gulf States
In this section, we will examine the relationships between the US and the
largest and most influential states in the Persian Gulf, Iran, Iraq and Saudi
Arabia, from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War.  In
doing so, both the reliance of the US on proxies, and the nature of its interests in
the region will be demonstrated, as will the domination of the Cold War
framework in American policymaking.
3.3.1 US-Saudi relations
American policymakers were quick to identify Saudi Arabia as an
important ally even before the conclusion of the Second World War.  As already
stated above, President Roosevelt thought the post-war relationship between the
US and Saudi Arabia important enough to warrant a personal meeting with King
Ibn Saud on the Great Bitter Lake only weeks before the former’s death.  While
Roosevelt ruled out the search for new oil concession by American firms during
the war in order to prevent friction with the UK, he nonetheless extended the
Lend-Lease program to include Saudi Arabia in 1943, subsidising the rule of the
Saudi monarchy in order to ensure that American companies were not
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disadvantaged in post-war Saudi Arabia.33 Significantly, the wartime importance
of Saudi Arabia to American national security did not end with victory over the
Axis Powers in 1945, and “[v]arious American bureaucrats confirmed the
importance of Saudi Arabia to US commercial expansion and security.”
Consequently, the American airbase at Dhahran (designed to link the Anglo-
American and Russian war efforts and the Atlantic and Pacific theatres together)
was completed on the orders of President Truman despite the end of hostilities,
giving the US power-projection capability in the region after 1945.34
In 1947, Truman also went so far as to pledge to take “energetic measures
under the auspices of the United Nations to confront…aggression” against Saudi
Arabia,35 a move that predated the Eisenhower Doctrine by a decade, and came
only a year after the standoff with the USSR over Soviet support for the
separatist People’s Republic of Azerbaijan in northern Iran.  Therefore, although
it would be decades before the US would ramp up its involvement in the Persian
Gulf, policymakers had already asserted the importance of Saudi Arabia to
American national security by the end of the 1940s, and supplanted Britain as
Saudi Arabia’s chief financial and military patron.36 It was amongst those states
offered military assistance by the US following the passage of legislation
authorising the president to distribute foreign military aid, and agreement on the
terms of this assistance between the two countries in the late 1940s and early
1950s.  The US military has been active in training and liaising with the Saudi
armed forces since that time.37
Despite this, the US military presence in Saudi Arabia and the Persian
Gulf as a whole remained small in the subsequent decade, and the US was not
called upon by the Saudis to take any ‘energetic measures.’  Nonetheless,
tensions were rising in the region, and the stability and security of the Saudi state
33 Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi Books, 2000), p.324-5
34 O’Reilly, Unexceptional Empire, p.46 and 48-9
35 Steve Yetiv, The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States and the Persian Gulf, 1972-
2005 (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2008), p.28
36 Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia, p.37
37 United States Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia website,
http://www.usmtm.sppn.af.mil/, accessed 02-03-2010
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and its alliance with the US were threatened by the upheaval that accompanied
the rise of Arab nationalism and the fallout from the Suez crisis.  Accordingly,
the declaration of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 (in which the US pledged to
defend any Middle East state from international communism if requested to do
so) was welcomed by the Saudis, who also extended the lease on Dhahran
airbase until 1962. 38 The outbreak of the civil war in Yemen, Egypt’s
involvement in it and an escalating war of words with Nasser would lead the
Saudis to make an unprecedented request of the Americans: the despatch of
American military forces to the kingdom.39 The presence of Egyptian troops in a
warzone on Saudi Arabia’s borders, and the defection of some of its air force
pilots, led the Saudis to request American fighter squadrons be stationed in Saudi
Arabia.  While, as argued in chapter 4, this is an example of the US being
‘pulled’ into regional politics, Washington’s acquiescence demonstrates the
importance attached to relations with Saudi Arabia.
The next major development in the US-Saudi relationship came in 1969,
with the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine and the adoption of the ‘Twin Pillars’
policy.  While Iran was obviously the most senior partner in the enterprise, given
its larger population and the shah’s eagerness to make Iran a regional power, the
US included Saudi Arabia out of recognition of its central role, both in the region
and in American policy, and to offset Saudi fears of Iranian domination of the
Gulf.40 Saudi defence expenditure in the wake of the dramatic oil price rises
following the 1973 October War was enormous,41 eventually rising to amongst
the highest in the world.42 Much of this money, of course, went to US firms,
including the purchase of a fleet of modern fighter aircraft in the early 1970s,
which in turn necessitated a major support contract with a US firm to enable the
38 Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans (London: Saqi Books, 2002), p.58 and 67
39 Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p.372; Little, American Orientalism, p.238-9
40 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p.88
41 Total Saudi defence expenditure was almost $83 billion between 1969-81 (in 1984 US$),
Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military
Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1984), p.160, fig. 5.4
42 Saudi defence spending was the 9th highest in the world in 2008.  Stockholm Institure for Peace
Research 2009 Yearbook, Appendix 5A, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A, accessed
16-03-10
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Saudi military to operate and maintain them.  Despite this, it remained much less
visible than Iran’s concurrent military expansion, focusing more heavily on
importing expertise, infrastructure projects and the training and modernisation of
existing forces than on acquiring new hardware.43 Consequently, of the 30,000
American expatriate workers in Saudi Arabia in 1976, more than a fifth were
working on defence-related projects.44 The expansion of military links between
the US and Saudi Arabia was given added impetus by the collapse of the Iranian
pillar, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The early 1980s saw further arms purchase agreements between the US and
Saudi Arabia, chiefly advanced F-15 ‘Eagle’ fighter-interceptors (the most
sophisticated in the US arsenal) and Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) aircraft, for command and control purposes.  The sale of this
weaponry proved controversial in the US, and the delivery was delayed and
subject to modification by pro-Israeli forces in Congress.45 Nonetheless, these
weapons arrived in time and in sufficient numbers to enter service with the Saudi
military during the Iran-Iraq war, shooting down Iranian aircraft that strayed into
Saudi airspace.46 The fruits of the Saudi military build-up were apparent in the
1991 Gulf War, in which US and Coalition forces were able to use the extensive
military infrastructure built up in the preceding decades (probably with precisely
this kind of intervention in mind) to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait.47
3.3.2 US-Iranian relations
By far the most chequered relationship maintained by the US with any of
the Persian Gulf states was with Iran.  In the course of the Cold War era it went
from being America’s primary surrogate to supplanting the Soviet Union as the
bête noire of American Persian Gulf policy in the post-Cold War era.  In this
43 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p.91-2; Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic
Stability, p.159
44 C. Paul Bradley, Recent US Policy in the Persian Gulf (Grantham, NH: Tompson & Rutter,
1982), p.45-6
45 Vassiliev, A History of Saudi Arabia, p.398-9
46 Shireen Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1990), p.88
47 Steve Yetiv, America and the Persian Gulf: The Third-Party Dimension in World Politics
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), p.82; Yetiv, Crude Awakenings, p.79
72
regard it was both more visible and more intense than the American relationship
with Saudi Arabia.
Like Saudi Arabia, American policymakers recognised the strategic
importance of Iran at the dawn of the Cold War, and sought to keep it out of the
Soviet orbit.  As a result, Iran was one of the earliest arenas of Cold War
confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, although US attention was
sporadic, “focused as it was on a bigger, more important picture.”  Nonetheless,
in 1946 the US judged Iran important enough, and Soviet activities in northern
Iran provocative enough, to intervene to “prevent its friend, turned foe, from
establishing a permanent foothold in this most valuable of locations.”48 The US
military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently recommended the US extend a small
amount of military aid to Iran.49 Iran was therefore among those states named in
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which authorised President Truman
to “furnish military assistance as provided in this Act to Iran”.50
The Eisenhower administration deepened American involvement in Iran
substantially, once again motivated by the perceived exigencies of Cold War
rivalry.  The most notorious example of this was ‘Operation Ajax’, the CIA-
facilitated overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953,
following his nationalisation of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) operations
in Iran. 51 Although Eisenhower undermined British attempts to overthrow
Nasser three years later, the situation in Iran was sufficiently threatening that he
thought it necessary to assist the UK in its attempts to prevent Mossadegh
damaging western interests by bringing down his government.  Although many
US officials were unsympathetic to AIOC and the British position,52 the risk that
Mossadegh’s government would fall and be replaced by a communist regime that
48 Donette Murray, US Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations since the Islamic
Revolution (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p.1 and 2
49 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p.37-8
50 Title III, Section 301, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, The American Journal of
International Law, 44 (1) Official Documents Supplement, 1950, p.31
51 For a good account of the whole affair, see James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of
American-Iranian Relations (Binghampton, NY: Yale University Press, 1988), p.72-97
52 Ibid, p72-75; Little, American Orientalism, p.56-7
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would align Iran with the Soviet Union was judged to be too great, leading the
president to authorise covert action to intervene. 53 The US subsequently
sponsored the return of the shah to power.  While the major US oil companies
played a substantial role in the Iranian oil industry post-Mossadegh, they were
pressured into doing so by their government, being leery of further unrest in Iran
and already flush with Saudi oil.  The US government, in response, argued that
Iran needed oil revenues to prevent an economic collapse that would allow
communists to seize power, and which would in turn jeopardise the oil
companies’ concessions in the rest of the Middle East.54
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations continued to sponsor the
shah’s rule, with Kennedy in particular pressuring the shah into making some
political concessions and engaging in a socio-economic development program,
the ‘White Revolution.’ However, it was the announcement of the British
withdrawal from the Gulf in 1968 that presaged a dramatic shift in US-Iranian
relations.  The shah hoped to transform Iran into a regional superpower, and
therefore sought US sponsorship, primarily in the form of arms transfers, to
enable Iran to replace Britain as the primary military power in the Persian Gulf.
This coincided with the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine.  There was therefore a
new convergence of interests between the shah and Washington that ensured Iran
was the perfect candidate to assume the UK’s security role in the region, given
the US reluctance to do so and the fears of Soviet expansion into the vacuum left
behind.  Subsequently, the 1970s saw Iran become the cornerstone of the ‘Twin
Pillars’ policy, and was seen by Washington as its foremost surrogate in the
Persian Gulf.
The most obvious example of this close cooperation was the massive
surge in arms sales from the US to Iran, financed by the sharp rise in oil prices
after 1973 (despite the shah’s willingness to ignore the OAPEC embargo of the
53 Little, American Orientalism, p.216-7; Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p.67-70; Yetiv, The
Prize, p.468
54 Yergin, The Prize, p.470-1
74
US, and also to supply Israel, he was a noted ‘price hawk’ within OPEC).55 Bill
goes so far as to state: “the transfer of arms from America to Iran took place at
levels never before known in international political history.”56 This followed a
meeting in Iran the previous year between the shah and President Nixon and
Henry Kissinger, in which it was agreed to allow Iran to purchase virtually any
weapon system in the US arsenal, 57 excepting only the most sensitive
technologies and nuclear weapons.  This contrasted markedly with the policy of
previous American postwar administrations, who had carefully limited arms sales
to Iran.58 US arms sales to Iran subsequently rose from $513 million in 1972 to
$2.2 billion in 1973.  In 1974 they almost doubled this figure, reaching $4.3
billion.  In total, Iran spent almost $12 billion on importing US weaponry
between 1971 and 1976, making it the biggest customer of American weaponry
in the world.59 The flow of sophisticated weapons was so large it far outstripped
the ability of the Iranian military to operate it, so the shah’s government
contracted training and maintenance programmes to a number of American
firms.  As a consequence, the number of Americans living and working in Iran in
this period numbered in the tens of thousands, reaching 31,000 in 1976, of whom
half were from the private sector. 60 US-Iranian trade was not limited to
armaments: a 1975 economic agreement between the US and Iran saw the former
agree to supply nuclear power plants and fuel, as well as engage in major
infrastructure projects.61 US policymakers were correct in their judgement that
the shah’s goals were broadly compatible with American and western interests,
justifying Iran’s role as the senior partner in the ‘Twin Pillars’ policy.  The shah
was hostile to radical, Ba’athist Iraq, and sent troops to assist Oman in crushing
of the Marxist-inspired rebellion in the province of Dhofar, in what Bradley
called “an exemplary application of the Nixon Doctrine to the Gulf region.”62 He
55 Yergin, The Prize, p.625-6; Yetiv, Crude Awakenings, p.63; Kenneth Pollack, The Persian
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also allowed US intelligence agencies to set up facilities in Iran to monitor the
Soviet Union.63
The fact that the US invested so heavily in the shah made it all the more
catastrophic for American policymakers when the Iranian Revolution of 1979 led
to the downfall of his regime and the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The degree of support that the shah had enjoyed from the US demonstrated once
more an important aspect of its Persian Gulf policy- ignorance or disregard of the
local conditions in which American policy was carried out.  While Kennedy had
insisted that the shah embark on some reforms (which had ironically led to unrest
from conservatively-minded elements of the Iranian population), his government
had remained repressive and corrupt and backed up by a brutal internal security
apparatus that tolerated little in the way of real dissent.  The fact that the US had
become so closely identified with the shah’s rule was doubly unfortunate, as it
ensured that the new clerical regime was hostile to the US and its interests and
sought a total break with American policy.  The downfall of the shah was
therefore also the downfall of the ‘Twin Pillars’ strategy in the Gulf, with the
largest and most populous state in the region transformed from a reliable
American surrogate to a fierce opponent of its policies and presence.
3.3.3 US-Iraqi relations
Following the Iraqi revolution of 1958, the US viewed Iraq with
suspicion, in contrast to the era of the pro-Western monarchy that had previously
dominated the country.  With US policy centred on maintaining the status quo
and excluding the Soviet Union from the region, the existence of a radical Arab
nationalist, anti-western regime in control of such a critical state was a concern to
American policymakers.  Iraq was therefore seen in terms of its hostility to
American allies like Saudi Arabia and the shah’s Iran, and in its relations with
the Soviet Union.64
63 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p.254
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Marr describes the events of 1958 as a “fundamental change in Iraq’s
foreign policy orientation…The shift was to prove permanent, putting Iraq into
the Soviet orbit for decades and distancing it from the West and its regional
allies.”  The Soviet Union subsequently became the principal supplier to Iraq’s
military, 65 in contrast to the pre-revolutionary era in which Iraq had been a
founding member of the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact.  The seizure of power by the
Ba’th party in 1968 led to an intensification of the radical trends in Iraqi foreign
policy, with Iraq offering support to Marxist South Yemen and left-wing groups
in North Yemen and elsewhere in the Gulf states.  This angered Iraq’s
conservative neighbours in the Gulf, who were also disconcerted by border
disputes between Iraq and Kuwait that had led to military standoffs.66 These
tensions, and the military build-up undertaken in neighbouring Iran, led the Iraqi
regime to move closer to the Soviet Union, and the two states signed a Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation in 1972, followed by a visit to Iraq by Soviet
premier Kosygin a few months later.  This was preceded by the signing of an
oilfield development deal and a visit by Soviet naval vessels to Iraqi in 1969.67
These developments marked the “zenith” of Soviet-Iraqi relations.  However,
Iraq’s new relationship with the USSR backfired when it enabled the shah to
portray his border dispute with Iraq in terms of Western-Soviet rivalry, which
helped to persuade President Nixon and his national security advisor Henry
Kissinger to join the shah in backing Iraq’s rebellious Kurds, on the basis “that
any enemy of the Baghdad regime was a potential ally of the United States.”68
Iranian aid to the Kurds was cut off in 1975, when Iran and Iraq agreed to
re-draw their mutual border along the vital Shatt al-Arab waterway in Iran’s
favour. This also led to a less fraught phase in Iraq’s relationship with its
neighbours and the West.  Flush with oil revenue, Iraq turned to western
countries for imports of goods and services, as well as some weaponry, although
65 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p.108
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over 60 percent of the latter was still sourced from the USSR in 1979. 69
However, compared to Saudi Arabia and Iran, with their massive American and
Western arms purchases, thousands of American workers and military advisors,
and key role in the American Persian Gulf security policy, Iraq remained a Soviet
client state with a history of opposing American policy, hostility to its surrogates
and rejection of the American-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace process.  Moreover,
by the time of the outbreak of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the collapse of
American ‘Twin Pillars’ policy, it had not had diplomatic relations with the US
since 1967.70
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 and the success of the Iranian
revolution the previous year forced the US to reassess its Persian Gulf policy,
including its relationship with Iraq.  With the Soviet Union at war in
neighbouring Afghanistan and Iran now essentially hostile, the US no longer had
a militarily-strong surrogate to counterbalance Soviet power and deter Iranian
threats to the Gulf monarchies.  However, the outbreak of hostilities between Iran
and Iraq presented the US with both a threat and an opportunity, as did the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan.  While victory for either Iran or the USSR and its
Afghan clients appeared to threaten American interests in the region, they also
offered the chance to put pressure on Iran and the Soviet Union by aiding their
opponents, tying down both states in bloody wars and preventing them from
making mischief elsewhere.  The result was the US ‘tilt’ towards Iraq.
Diplomatic relations were restored in 1984, Iraq was removed from the State
Department’s list of terrorist-sponsoring states, it was provided with important
aid (including agricultural credits and crucial battlefield intelligence), and the US
acquiesced in Iraq’s armaments import programmes while taking steps to restrict
Iran’s.71 Iraq, if not an outright surrogate, became at least an American ‘asset’,
in the sense that cooperation between Iraq and the US fulfilled American policy
goals, and its defence became a matter of American concern.  The armaments the
US delivered to Iran during the bizarre events of the Iran-Contra affair were not
69 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p.168
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in the same order as the support given to Iraq, and did not represent a real change
in American policy. 72 Instead, they were an opportunistic response to
developments elsewhere, while the American support for Iraq was aimed at
securing long-term interests in the security of the Gulf states, which an Iranian
victory was judged to threaten.  An unanticipated consequence of this support
was the military power Saddam Hussein would be able to wield following the
end of the war, unchecked by an exhausted Iran, which would allow him to
invade Kuwait in 1990.73
3.4 Direct American intervention after 1979
Although American policymakers were not eager to intervene directly in
the affairs of the Persian Gulf, the interests examined in the previous section
ensured that the US military retained a small presence there and the US took a
keen interest in political developments in the littoral states.74 Although, as we
also saw above, the US preferred to rely on regional states to contain Soviet
expansion, when its ability to rely on regional states itself was in question, the
US was willing to act more directly to restore the status quo if it judged its
interests were sufficiently threatened.  We saw above how the US relied on
Britain’s willingness to maintain its dominant security role in the region, then
assisted Saudi Arabia and Iran in taking the its place once the British withdrawal
was completed in 1971.  However, we also saw how the US intervened quickly
to change the trajectory of Iranian politics once American policymakers feared
that that state was in danger of ‘going communist.’
The Iranian revolution and the consolidation of anti-American clerical
rule, coupled with the attendant hostage crisis, also ensured that after 1979
American policymakers perceived Iran as a regional threat to US interests, in
addition to the global challenge posed by the Soviet Union (fortunately for the
72 For a full account, see chapter 4 of James Blight, Janet Lang, Hussein Banai, Malcolm Byrne,
John Tirman, Becoming Enemies: US-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988
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73 Yetiv, Crude Awakenings, p.42; The Absence of Grand Strategy, p.77
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US, the two were not synonymous, given the new Islamic Republic of Iran’s
foreign policy orientation of ‘neither East nor West’).  The US had seen the
collapse of its surrogates policy at a time when its interests seemed increasingly
threatened.  This therefore dictated that either the US find another proxy, assume
a larger direct role in the regional security system (move from ‘over the horizon’
to ‘into the backyard’), or a combination of both.  Arguably, events dictated that
it would be the latter that was adopted by the US: the sponsorship of the Iraqi
war effort against Iran and the concurrent upgrading of the American presence
and power-projection capabilities in the Persian Gulf region.
The most public expression of this new trend in American policy was the
announcement, in the 1980 State of the Union Address, of what came to be
known as the ‘Carter Doctrine’, in which President Jimmy Carter unambiguously
stated: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including
military force.”75 To back up this claim, the US took several measures to ‘beef
up’ both its military presence in the region and the ability to project military
force into the Persian Gulf from elsewhere throughout the 1980s.  The most
obvious example was the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
(RDJTF), an inter-service military force that could be deployed into the Persian
Gulf without diverting American troops from other theatres.76 While this had
been mooted since 1977 thanks to increased Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa
and the Indian Ocean, it languished in the planning process for various reasons
until the events of 1979 made it a high priority.77 This process was continued
under the Reagan administration, which further reorganized the US military’s
Persian Gulf presence, placing the RDJTF under the newly-formed Central
Command (USCENTCOM), whose area of responsibility was centered on the
75 A transcript and video of the 1980 State of the Union Address is available on the website of the
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Persian Gulf, and which formally made the Middle East a discrete theatre of
operations.  The US also took steps to preposition equipment and supplies in the
region, upgraded its base facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia,
and reinforced its modest permanent naval presence in Persian Gulf waters.
Additionally, access agreements were negotiated with some regional states,
including Oman.78 There was also a marked ‘mission creep’ in the transition
from the Carter to the Reagan eras, illustrated by President Regan’s comment
that there was “no way” that the US would allow Saudi Arabia’s oil production
to be shut down.  This is sometimes referred to as the Reagan Doctrine (or
sometimes the Reagan Corollary), and is taken by many scholars to mark the
public expansion of the Carter Doctrine to regional threats like Iran.79
American fears were demonstrated dramatically by the US involvement
in the ‘Tanker War’ phase of the Iran-Iraq War.  As discussed in the following
chapter, Iraq, under pressure from Iran on the battlefield, sought to
‘internationalise’ the conflict by goading its opponent into threatening the flow
of oil through the Strait of Hormuz.  Iran responded by attacking the merchant
fleets of Saudi Arabia and Kuwaiti, who had been financing the Iraqi war effort,
in 1984.  This led US officials to warn that the US, in Palmer’s words, while not
as yet interested in intervening in the conflict, “was not prepared to see the gulf’s
oil traffic threatened.”80 The situation deteriorated over the next three years,
leading Kuwait to request US and Soviet naval assistance in 1987.  The US
responded, determined both to exclude Soviet forces from the region and to
secure the uninterrupted export of oil, dispatching substantial naval forces to the
area to escort reflagged oil tankers.  This led to clashes with Iranian forces when
US Navy escorts and US-flagged tankers were hit by Iranian mines and missiles,
which in turn led the US to conduct reprisal strikes against Iranian naval targets,
doing severe damage to the Iranian navy, and contributing to Iran’s decision to
accept a ceasefire in 1988.81
78 Bradley, Recent US Policy in the Persian Gulf, p.100-2
79 Yetiv, Crude Awakenings, p.66; Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p.118
80 Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf, p.119
81 See Chapter 7 of Palmer’s Guardians of the Gulf for a detailed account.
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The willingness on the part of the US to involve itself in the region more
overtly and on a larger scale was therefore dictated by its traditional interests, but
made necessary by the absence of a reliable proxy and the vulnerability of its
traditional allies.  This pattern was repeated in the Gulf crisis of 1990-1, when
the US deployed its military in massive force to expel Iraq from Kuwait.  In this
case, the effective end of the Cold War was an important factor that facilitated
this policy, though it obviously cannot be used to explain it.  Instead,
Washington feared that Saddam Hussein would use the prestige and economic
leverage gained by a successful annexation of Kuwait to dominate the Persian
Gulf’s oil supplies, something it was not prepared to countenance. 82 The
USSR’s unwillingness and/or inability to seriously challenge US intervention
undoubtedly contributed to the decision by US policymakers to do so, at least
indirectly.  The case of the ‘Tanker War’ is less dramatic in this regard, but still
illuminating, as the USSR opposed the reflagging of the tankers by the US, at
least in public.  However, the USSR was unwilling to take serious measures to
prevent it,83 and the fear of the consequences of an Iranian victory, coupled with
Iranian hostility, ensured that the Soviet Union was willing to make massive
arms sales to Iraq from 1982, which was in any case already a military client.84
The shrinking chance of superpower confrontation therefore also played a role in
enabling more overt forms of American intervention in the Persian Gulf, though
it by no means formed the impetus of this trend.  Ironically, although the Carter
Doctrine and the build-up of US forces in the Persian Gulf “were triggered by
concerns about potential Soviet actions, they eventually derived their importance
through enabling later responses to threats from within the region.”85
82 Yetiv, The Absence of Grand Strategy, p.82; Freedman, A Choice of Enemies, p.220-1;
Author’s interview with Ambassador Chas Freeman, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,
Washington DC, February 2012
83 Hunter, Iran and the World, p.71
84 Kazem Sajjadpour, ‘Neutral Statements, Committed Practice: The USSR and the War’, in
Farhang Rajaee (ed.), Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War (Gainesville, FL: University
Press of Florida, 1997), p.33-4; Hiro, Iran Today, p.220
85 Freedman, A Choice of Enemies, p.104
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3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have seen how the centrality of oil to the economy of
the developed world, together with the Cold War, ensured that the Persian Gulf’s
oil reserves occupied an equally central role in the security calculations of US
policymakers in a manner that transcended purely economic considerations.  This
comprises a vital ‘push’ that ensured that the US would concern itself with the
affairs of the region, over and above any other factor, pre- and post-dating the
Cold War itself and in parallel with the US commitment to the existence of
Israel.
The means by which American policymakers sought to secure this vital
asset, were, on the other hand, less consistent, even though the Cold War
framework proved to be an enduring prism through which US policymakers
viewed developments in the Persian Gulf.  Aside from the tensions inherent
between the US support for Israel and its desire to exclude the Soviet Union from
the Middle East and Persian Gulf, US policy also appears in hindsight to be
reactive and somewhat ad hoc.  Despite the importance attached to the region by
American policymakers, for most of the Cold War the US preferred to ‘contract
out’ regional security to its partners, firstly Britain and then Iran, all the while
maintaining a close relationship with Saudi Arabia.  In doing so the US ceded the
initiative.  This was held by its partners, and when they withdrew or became
hostile American policy was forced to change direction.  When the Iran-Iraq War
broke out, the US offered assistance to both sides for different reasons, but tilted
heavily towards Iraq.  The US was forced to react once again by Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait, in that instance with massive force, deploying a substantial fraction of
its own military now that Iraq’s military machine threatened to dominate the
littoral Arab states and no effective surrogates were available to counter it.
Where the US was more consistent was in defence of its fundamental
interests.  This can be seen in its willingness to intervene in Iran in the early
1950s and again in the Gulf as a whole in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  In the
former case, it was fear of the rise of a communist regime in Iran that motivated
the US to assist the overthrow of Mossadegh and the return of the shah- allowing
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one of the largest, most strategically placed and the most populous state to fall
into the Soviet orbit was plainly unacceptable.  Later, the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan and the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran motivated American
policymakers to actually consider extending the reach of American military force
into the region, which the US actually judged necessary in the so-called ‘Tanker
War’, and (on a much larger scale) the Gulf War of 1991, when American
policymakers feared for the security of the West’s oil supplies.  In these cases
however there were no effective surrogates, and thus the US was forced to
intervene directly.  Once the Soviet threat had diminished, this gave the US much
more room to use the capacities it had built-up in the region without raising
global tensions, ironically to meet regional threats to its interests.
Overall, then, we can see that US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf has
been largely concerned with the global implications of events in the region, to the
virtual exclusion of local developments.  Ironically, local forces did have a role
in shaping American policy, forces which had little to do with the Cold War and
more to do with regional and national issues, as we shall see in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4 The balance of power in the Persian Gulf, 1945-
1991
While the previous chapter examined the global context of American
foreign policy in the Persian Gulf, this chapter examines the power-politics of the
Persian Gulf that are directly relevant to American foreign policymaking during
the time period in question (1991-2001).  Its purpose within the thesis as a whole
is to describe and explain the distinct regional factors which contributed to the
adoption by the US of a policy of ‘dual containment’, as opposed to factors
stemming from global and/or American politics.  In so doing, it will describe and
explain the dominant regional security trends among the Persian Gulf’s littoral
states, through the examination of both the geopolitical factors and the role of
history and ideology, and explain how this ensures that the system is an
essentially anarchic one that is prone to mutual suspicion and realist balance of
power politics.  Following on from this point, it will also argue that there were
endogenous factors in the regional sub-system (i.e. ‘pull’ factors) that enabled
and to some degree encouraged US intervention in the Persian Gulf once the
system ceased to function.
The era (from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold
War and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait) is examined because it marks the withdrawal
of outright colonial, imperial presence from the Persian Gulf’s major states, and
the formal assumption of their own sovereignty and control over their foreign
policies.  It was also the era in which the idiosyncratic dynamics that characterise
the Persian Gulf’s security system emerged: a scalene tripolar system,
comprising three poles: Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (and the member states of
the Gulf Cooperation Council).  It is therefore the era that requires examination if
we wish to understand the interactions of the regional states and how they relate
to American Persian Gulf policy, rather than the extra-regional factors that
facilitated this.  Without an understanding of the modern history of the region,
and the most important underlying trends in its politics, it is impossible to
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understand why the US found itself supporting Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf
monarchies, and opposing Iran and Iraq.
The chapter is divided into the following sections: (i) geopolitical
structure; (ii) the nature of the sub-system of the states of the Persian Gulf; (iii)
the nature of the states themselves; (iv) the relevant diplomatic history of the
Persian Gulf in the second half of the 20th century, and (v) consequences of these
factors.
4.1 The Persian Gulf: geopolitical structure
As mentioned, the littoral states of the Persian Gulf can be viewed as a
‘scalene’ tripolar balance of power system with three major poles: Iraq, Iran and
Saudi Arabia.1 These three states are to all intents and purposes the ‘major
players’ in the sub-region, being the largest, most populous and (at least
potentially) the wealthiest.  They therefore in theory possess the most latent
politico-military power, and speaking broadly can assert their will in the politics
of the region most effectively.  This is of course a somewhat crude simplification
of a complex and multifaceted situation, but the fact remains that these are
undeniably the largest and most influential states in the area.  This is true both for
the era that is the focus of this study (1991 - 2001), and the era that is the focus
of this chapter.  Consequently, the figures quoted are drawn primarily from the
former.
Iran, as many observers concede, possesses the potential to become the
regional hegemon.2 Its coastline dominates the northern shore of the Persian
1 The term ‘tripolar’ is used here rather than ‘triangular’ because it better captures the balance of
power aspect, but the meaning is largely the same.  The term ‘triangular’ is used by Gregory
Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2010); Henner Fürtig, ‘Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and
US Policy,’ Middle East Journal, 61 (4) 2007, pp.627-640; Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the
International Relations of the Persian Gulf: Diplomacy, Security and Economic Coordination in
a Changing Middle East (London: IB Tauris, 2011).  The term ‘scalene’ is taken from Legrenzi.
2For instance,  John Mearsheimer & Stephen Walt, The Israeli Lobby and US Foreign Policy
(London: Allen Lane, 2007), p.281; Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the
Gulf, p.75
86
Gulf (hence the waterway’s name)3 with a territory of 1,648,195 km sq, making
it the 18th largest country in the world.4 In terms of population, its ranking is
similar (16), and was estimated by the United Nations to be almost 67 million in
1999.5 Saudi Arabia lies at the other end of the relative scale in population, with
a total of almost 21 million, i.e. less than a third of that of Iran, ranking 48th in
the world.6 However, by size it is comparable: 2,149,690 km sq.7 Iraq falls
between the two in terms of its population, though it is much closer to Saudi
Arabia, with a population of approximately 22.5 million in 1999. 8 Iran’s
population outnumbers both that of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states
combined.  This relationship has remained roughly stable, with some exceptions,
since 1950, and Saudi Arabia has always had the smallest population of the
larger Gulf states.9 On paper, at least, Iran therefore has the potential to be more
militarily formidable than the other regional states, by dint of its demographic
superiority and its commanding strategic position as fully half of the Persian
Gulf’s coastline, while Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia individually exceed the other
Gulf states on these measures.  Iran also possesses somewhat more ‘strategic
depth’ than Iraq, as most of its major urban centres are located in the interior of
the country.10 In comparison the next largest state, Oman, is 70th in the world in
terms of size, and 136th in population.  Yemen is comparable to Saudi Arabia in
population, but is poor and plagued by political instability.  Geographically, it is
also located on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula from the Straits of
Hormuz, and is therefore more remote from the Persian Gulf.
3 While this term is contested by some Arab states, the name ‘Persian Gulf’ has been consistently
upheld by the International Hydrographic Organisation and the various arms of the United
Nations Organisation.  For instance, see United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical
Names, Working Paper No.61: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/gegn23wp61.pdf accessed 31-
12-2009
4 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html,
accessed 10-11-2009
5 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Population Division, The World at
Six  Billion, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/sixbillion/sixbilpart2.pdf, accessed
10-11-2009
6 Ibid
7 CIA World Factbook
8 UN DESA, The World at Six Billion
9 UN DESA, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp, accessed
31-12-2009
10 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, p.75
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These are crude measures, and fail to take into account other significant
factors which may help or hinder these states in any attempt to translate their
human and geographical resources into military power.  Arguably the most
substantial amongst these are economic factors.  The Persian Gulf is the site of a
majority of the world’s proven oil reserves, and the export of this resource is a
tremendous source of revenue for the Gulf states.  As of 2008, Saudi Arabia led
the world in proven reserves of oil, with 264.06 billion barrels, followed (in the
Middle East) by Iran with 137.05 billion, and finally trailed by Iraq with 115
billion.11 The latter alone amounts to more than 11 per cent of the world’s
proven reserves. 12 Although there is a great disparity in relative terms, in
absolute terms these statistics represent enormously lucrative revenue streams.
Given their size, population and mineral endowments, these three states
therefore figure most prominently in the security calculations both of each other
and other regional states, and dominate the security dynamics of the region.
Irrespective of the policies and stances of their governments at any one time in
their modern history, they possess the potential to threaten each other, should
they choose to try to translate their resources and population into military force
and use it coercively.  Bearing the power disparities between these three states, it
is no surprise to see the recurrence of certain patterns of interaction between
them.  For one, the fear of regional domination/hegemony by Iran on the part of
the other two, and their combination against it by various means.  Secondly, the
attempt to play off one state against another by the third, which is the weakest
and/or most threatened.  Finally, the weakest/most threatened state enlisting
extra-regional allies to protect it against the other two.  The latter is most marked
in the case of Saudi Arabia, which for various reasons lacks the latent military
potential of the other two states: “According to the main factors…that determine
the regional balance of power, the centre of the political and strategic system of
the Persian Gulf does not consist of three, but, at best, of two and three-quarter
11 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008,
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/ASB2008.pdf
accessed 19-03-2009
12 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 2004,
p.295
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states.  Even the involvement of Saudi Arabia in the new security measures of
the Arabian Peninsula, in the form of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] could
not remove this disparity completely.”13 The relative weakness of Saudi Arabia,
in comparison to its neighbours, is therefore one of the most important defining
characteristics of the system itself, and the origin of one of its defining features –
its lop-sidedness, hence its description as ‘scalene.’
The interactions between the three major Persian Gulf states are therefore
three-sided, in that they tend to be dominated by the interactions between Saudi
Arabia, Iraq and Iran, which leads Fürtig to characterise them as “triangular”.  He
argues that this system of relations has held since the Second World War, and
that “If one of the mentioned countries gains too much weight, the other two try
to compensate.”  Consequently, in general, “whether conflict or cooperation
prevailed between certain countries was due to the actual state of the overall
balance of the triangular system.”14 This does not, of course, guarantee the
occurrence of conflict and rivalry between these states, but these factors were
necessary, if not sufficient, conditions, for the presence of these phenomena in
the relations between Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.  These other conditions are
examined in the following pages.
4.2 The nature of the regional sub-system
The Persian Gulf possesses a peculiar set of political dynamics, which are
derived in part from the nature of the regional sub-system of states, and which
both affects and is affected by them.  The most visible of these factors is the
potential for irredentism, which is ‘built in’ to the system, and is relatively high
in the case of the states of the Middle East and Persian Gulf.15 This stems in part
from the legacy of colonialism and the domination of the region by outside
13 Henner Fürtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia Between the Gulf Wars (Reading, Ithaca Press,
2002), p.150
14 Fürtig, ‘Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US Policy,’
p.627
15 See Chapters 3 and 4 of Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East,
(Manchester; Manchester University Press, 2003)
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powers, and from the nature of the regional states themselves.  The former is
dealt with first.
While Saudi Arabia was never colonised or occupied by external actors in
the post-Ottoman era and Iran has a long history as a formally independent state,
the other states of the Persian Gulf are to some degree products of the era of
European imperial control, at least in terms of their systems of government and
borders.  Following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the First
World War, Britain in particular adopted a more explicit security role, especially
in regards to Iraq, stationing military forces in the country and taking a major
role in the formation and running of its state institutions and the installation of a
friendly Hashemite monarch.  This took place first under the terms of  a League
of Nations Mandate, and then the re-occupation of the country during World War
II, with Iraq enjoying only a brief interlude of formal independence in the
1930s.16 Britain played a similar role in many of the other Gulf monarchies, such
as Kuwait, with the major exception of Saudi Arabia.  The installation of client
regimes by European empires, and the following quasi-independence of their
states, was a marked trend within the Middle East in the immediate postwar
era.17 This followed a lengthy period of British domination of regional security
issues in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as a consequence of earlier
rivalry with other colonial, imperial powers and as a consequence of British
strategic interests in regards to lines of communication with its extensive colonial
possessions in the Indian subcontinent.18
The nationalist backlash that this engendered within some of these states
as their citizens became progressively more politically mobilised led to the rise
of radical, revisionist forces to power, or their effective co-option and/or
destruction by the nascent state’s pre-existing rulers.  This tended to send states
16 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945, 3rd
edition, (Chapel Hill, NC; University of North Carolina Press, 2008), p.199
17 Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, London: Saqi Books, 2002, p.19
18 See J. E, Peterson, ‘Britain and the Gulf: At the Periphery of Empire,’ in Lawrence Potter (ed.),
The Persian Gulf in History (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)
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down either revisionist or status quo paths in regards to their foreign policy,19
depending on which side took control of the state in question.  Perhaps the best
example is the Iraqi revolution of 1958, which overthrew the British-installed
Hashemite monarchy and set Iraq on a ‘revisionist’ course in regards to regional
politics, in an attempt to match its foreign policy and borders to its own political
identity.
At this point it is necessary to define the terms ‘revisionist’ and ‘status
quo’ as they are used in this chapter.  These terms refer to the foreign policy
orientation of the leadership of a state, specifically in its attitudes to the
legitimacy of the regional system and the regimes of its neighbours.  A state is
‘revisionist’ if its leadership holds that: a) the currently-existing borders and
character of interstate relations within the region are fundamentally illegitimate
and in need of revision to bring them into accord with a more authentic political
identity, and b) in practice disapproves of cooperation with, and intervention by,
the West.  A good example, once more, is the post-1958 revolutionary regime in
Iraq, which had a strong Arab nationalist, anti-imperialist character.  It asserted
that the pre-existing borders of Iraq were illegitimate and should encompass both
Kuwait and the ethnically Arab area of Iran.20 It also voiced disapproval of the
Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf, on the grounds that they were reactionary,
corrupt and pro-Western.  In contrast, a ‘status quo’ state adopts a foreign policy
orientation that aims at the opposite of a) and b).  Saudi Arabia has consistently
been in favour of the status quo.  It has sought to minimise the impact of
revisionist forces in the region, and frowned upon developments, such as the
Iraqi and Iranian revolutions, that have threatened the equilibrium of pre-existing
states and governments.
Secondly, the role of external forces in the construction of the regional
sub-system also contributed to the fact that the new states have been relatively
porous, in that they are more amenable to the appeal of transnational phenomena
19 This typology is also accepted by Matteo Legrenzi, building upon the work of NCR scholars
like Randall Schweller.  See Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Persian
Gulf, p.48
20 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p.158-9
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that can ‘cut out the middleman’ and appeal to the people as a more authentic
ideology or way of life.  The two dominant strands of this phenomenon in the
Middle East have been Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamism, rooted in the
common religious, linguistic and ethnic heritage of the Arab states.  This has
threatened the legitimacy of both ruling elites and states themselves, and has
contributed to the security dilemma they have faced, forcing them to consider
what the impact of both their own and the policies of neighbouring states will be
in this regard.  David calls this phenomena, in which elites must consider threats
to their rule from different sources, domestic and foreign, ‘omnibalancing.’21
The more-or-less arbitrary drawing of some state boundaries, as well as the more
‘natural’ borders evolved over the course of time, has exacerbated this in some
cases, with religious and ethnic minorities present (and in some cases, ruling) in
states with a majority of a different character.  In other words, “[b]ecause
religious, ethnic and national boundaries in the Gulf are not synonymous with
state boundaries, geopolitical competition is easily transferred into domestic
politics.”22 Sariolghalam, for one, concedes that the ‘weakness’ of the Arab
states has had a profound impact on Persian Gulf relations, particularly those
between Iran and the Arab states.  The fact that the authenticity of ruling elites is,
if not contested, then questionable, is inherently limiting to their policy-making
autonomy.  In his view, the Middle East, and therefore the Persian Gulf, is highly
‘internationalised’ and the state structures of the Arab states is endemically
weak.23
A good example is the challenge posed to the Saudi monarchy by the
wave of Arab nationalism embodied by Nasser in the 1950s and the first half of
the 1960s.  Saudi Arabia at that time had not developed the institutions of a
modern state, and still relied on patrimonial forms of rule.  The threat posed by
this phenomenon was therefore particularly acute, as Nasser’s pan-Arab message
21 This concept is introduced in Steven David, ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’, World
Politics 43 (2) 1991, pp.233-256
22 Richard Herrmann & R. William Ayres, ‘The New Geo-Politics of the Gulf: Forces for Change
and Stability,’ in Gary Sick & Lawrence Potter (eds.) ‘The Persian Gulf at the Millennium:
Essays in Politics, Economy, Security and Religion (New York, NY: St. Martin’s, 1997), p.49
23 Mahmood Sariolghalam, ‘Arab-Iranian Rapprochement: the Regional and International
Impediments’, in Khair el-Din Haseeb (ed.), Arab-Iranian Relations (Beirut; Centre for Arab
Unity Studies, 1998)
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resonated amongst the Saudi populace through shared ethnicity and language,
while the Saudi state could at first muster only a weak response.  By the late
1950s, relations between the Saudi regime and Nasser had deteriorated, and
“King Saud…saw the main threat to his throne as emanating from the UAR
[United Arab Republic].  Nasser’s reforms were having a strong impact on the
nascent public opinion in Saudi Arabia and his popularity was growing among
the Saudis.”24
4.3 The post-war littoral states
This section examines the three dominant littoral Gulf states, Iran, Iraq
and Saudi Arabia, from the perspective of their idiosyncratic features as states, as
distinct from their physical endowments and features, and the geopolitical
consequences arising from these. It examines the posture of each state towards
the regional system and its neighbours, as determined by the specific
characteristics of its statehood.  These features derive in part from the varying
levels of state formation and consolidation that were present in Saudi Arabia,
Iran and Iraq at the start of the 1990s.  This, in turn, goes some way towards
shaping the attitudes of the rulers and populace towards developments in
international politics.  Overall, then, it seeks to explain their individual
trajectories through regional politics in light of their formative experiences, and
the result this has had on the Persian Gulf sub-system.
4.3.1 Saudi Arabia
In some ways, Saudi Arabia has enjoyed the most continuity of the three
in terms of its internal politics, and its approach to regional issues.  In most
respects, Saudi Arabia has consistently adopted a pro-status quo posture in its
foreign policymaking.  This stems in part from the fact that since the country’s
founding it has remained an absolute monarchy with an economy centred around
the lucrative export of oil.  The foreign policy goals of its rulers are minimalist:
to preserve the state’s current character and prevent changes that would lead to
24 Alexei Vassiliev, A History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi Books, 2000), p.353
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the downfall of its current political system.25 As it lacks the potential to mount a
serious military challenge to the existence to its rivals, Iran and Iraq, it also
therefore has a stake in ensuring that the regional system remains stable, and that
regional tensions do not result in the outbreak of tensions that could lead to
outright confrontation.
The fact that its political system has been an absolute monarchy since its
inception as a state has resulted in a longstanding aversion to the existence of a
large and efficient military, as this could become an alternate centre of power
that could threaten royal rule.  As Legrenzi notes, “All the GCC states felt that
military efficiency had to be sacrificed for the sake of regime security.”26 This is
echoed by Anthony Cordesman, who states, “The Gulf states face the difficulty
that their goal is not simply one of creating a viable defense or deterrent, but
doing so in a way that does not in the process destroy their political system.”27
This fear is to some degree justified.  Conspiracies within the Saudi military’s
officer corps were reportedly uncovered and destroyed in the late 1960s, for
example.28 These fears are reflected in the structure of the armed forces.  The
majority of Saudi Arabia’s military personnel serve in two separate land-based
branches, the regular army, known as the Royal Saudi Land Forces, and the
Saudi National Guard.  The latter exists ostensibly to maintain internal security
as opposed to defending the state from external foes, but also acts as a
counterbalance to the regular army, and vice-versa.29 This has deepened the
Saudi Arabian bias towards the status quo, given its mistrust of military force.
This explains Fürtig’s claim that Saudi Arabia represents “three quarters” of a
25 Gregory Gause, ‘The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia,’ in Anoush Ehtashami & Raymond
Hinnebusch (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
2002), p.193
26 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Persian Gulf, p.48
27 Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the
Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1984), p.69-70
28 Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, p.68; Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy
Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Oxford, OUP, 2005), p.109
29 GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/sa.htm, accessed 11-11-
2009, Tim Niblock, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival (Abingdon: Routledge,
2006), p.66
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state in balance of power terms. 30 Nonetheless, as we saw in the previous
chapter, Saudi Arabia has made enormous investments in its defence forces and
military infrastructure since the end of the 1960s, particularly its air force, that
demonstrate its monarchy’s fears of their neighbours and for regional stability,
and arguably as a form of ‘insurance’ to obtain Western security assistance.31
This status-quo bias is deepened by Saudi Arabia’s unique position in the
Islamic world, as it encompasses the geographical area that saw the birth of the
Muslim faith.  Mecca and Medina, the two holiest sites to the world’s Muslims,
are located in Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi royal family bases its legitimacy to a
great degree on the support of the country’s religious establishment.32 Famously,
the official ideology of the Saudi state, popularly known as ‘Wahhabism’, relies
on a radical and puritanical interpretation of the Hanbali school of Islamic
jurisprudence, and has done since the Al-Saud dynasty’s patronage of the
founder of the movement, Muhammad ibn Adb-al-Wahhab, in the 18th century.
This leaves it vulnerable to claims from religiously-inspired extremists both
inside and outside the Kingdom (the former including the late Osama Bin Laden)
that the rule of the royal family is spiritually debased, and to others (such as the
late Ayatollah Khomeini) that the institution of monarchy is un-Islamic, and that
because of this and the fact that the Saudi monarchy is deeply corrupt means that
it is not a legitimate custodian of the holy places.33 Allegations that the regime is
corrupt and not sufficiently pious are therefore highly damaging, and are a
persistent and recurring threat: “At a number of times in history, which includes
the contemporary period, salafis [religious radicals] have challenged the House
of Saud, deeming the royal family to have failed to establish or practice the
puritanical norms which they believe to be warranted.”34 The most dramatic
example would be the seizure and subsequent siege of the Grand Mosque in
Mecca in November 1979.35
30 Fürtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia, p.150
31 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Persian Gulf, p.76
32 Niblock, Saudi Arabia, p.29 and 31
33 Ibid, p.69 and 80
34 Ibid, p.5
35 For a full account, see Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising
(London: Allen Lane, 2007)
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The composition and consolidation of the state of Saudi Arabia by its
rulers has had a moderating influence on its foreign policy, especially in regards
to regional politics.  As the creation and consolidation of the state was largely the
work of an indigenous elite, the state of Saudi Arabia as it currently exists does
not suffer from a legitimacy deficit resulting from the installation of an external
power’s clients as its rulers.  This is also true of Saudi Arabia’s borders and the
composition of its citizenry, which largely correspond with its dominant political
identity, which Hinnebusch for one argues biases a state towards a pro-status quo
direction, as there is little latent demand to reconfigure these amongst the mass of
the population.36 Nevertheless, a minority of the citizenry, perhaps 5–10%, are
Shia, clustered in the Eastern province, traditionally known as al-Hasa.  This
element of the Saudi population is regarded with some suspicion by the
authorities, and is largely excluded from employment in the upper echelons of
the military, civil service and other branches of government.  This is, in all
likelihood, motivated by two fears: firstly, that the Saudi Shia represent a
potential ‘fifth column’ for Iran or a future Shia-dominated Iraq, and secondly
(and probably most importantly), the inability to openly acknowledge the
equality of Shia citizens, given the views of this sect held by the Saudi religious
establishment and the necessity of keeping them on-side.37 The Saudi Shia will
therefore remain second-class citizens, and therefore a potential source of
conflict and instability.  The fact that the Eastern province is the site of a
substantial fraction of the kingdom’s oil reserves makes this more troubling for
the Saudi authorities.38
Overall, Saudi Arabia outwardly appears to have been a stable, constant,
moderate force in the flux that is the politics of the Persian Gulf.  Considered
more broadly, however, we can see that it is strongly incentivised to exert itself
to maintain a constant equilibrium in regional affairs, tacking one way and then
another like a sailing ship in order to maintain a favourable course.
36 Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East p.74
37 Niblock, Saudi Arabia, p.29
38 See Yitzhak Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), and Graham Fuller & Rend Francke, The Arab Shi’a: The
Forgotten Muslims (New York, NY: St Martin’s Press, 1999)
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4.3.2 Iran
As stated above, Iran represents a potential regional hegemon in light of
its population, size, mineral endowments and location.  This goes some way
towards conditioning its leaders’ view of its role in the regional sub-system of
the Persian Gulf, and fears amongst the other states of its predominance.  There
is something approaching a consensus amongst observers that Iran has, in some
ways, acted consistently since the end of the Second World War and the
withdrawal of colonial powers.  Specifically, Iran has sought a position as the
leading state in the Persian Gulf, either as the ‘regional policeman’ under the
Shah, or as a primus inter pares in the era of the Islamic Republic.  This stems
from a multitude of factors, including a ‘primal’ nationalism derived from
Iranian self-perception as the largest state in the region,39 and the understanding
that the Persian Gulf represents Iran’s economic lifeline to the outside world,
being reliant on the seaborne export of its oil.40 Ehteshami argues that the former
has been a perennial feature of Iranian foreign policy, and to some extent, its
leaders’ worldview: “Derived from Iran’s long history and its geography, Iran
sees itself as uniquely qualified to determine, at the very least, the destiny of the
Gulf subregion.”41 As Hashin wrote in the mid-1990s: “Iran’s current policy in
the Persian Gulf is dictated by nationalism, and economic and politico-strategic
interests.  These are the three constants in Tehran’s Persian Gulf policy, and in
this respect, the policy of the Islamic Republic is similar to that of Mohammed
Reza Shah.” 42 Overall, Dilip Hiro offers a blunt but not fundamentally
inaccurate assessment that holds true for both eras:
Iran under the ayatollahs wanted to be the regional superpower, a position it
thought it deserved: it was the most strategic country in the area, its shoreline
covered not only the Persian Gulf but also the Arabian Sea, its population was one-
39 Christin Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (London,
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p.3-4
40 Shahram Chubhin, Iran’s National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions and Impact
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), p.10
41 Anoush Ehteshami, ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’, Anoush Ehtashami & Raymond Hinnebusch
(eds.), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p.286
42 Hashin, Crisis of the Iranian State, p.43
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and-a-half-times the total of the remaining seven Gulf states, and it shared the same
religion – Islam - with its neighbors.43
Consequently, categorising Iran as either a pro-status quo or revisionist
state in either the pre- or post-revolutionary eras is problematic.  While these are,
of course, relative terms, they hold more true for some states than others.  As
discussed above, Saudi Arabia can be described as pro-status quo thanks to the
essential consistency of its posture and its relatively weak position in balance of
power terms, which does much to define the limits of its role in the Persian
Gulf’s security system.  In contrast, Iran could be construed as either pro-status
quo or revisionist depending on the makeup and beliefs of its government.  As a
potential hegemon, an attempt by Tehran to make this a reality could be
perceived as pro-status quo if its interests coincided with the leadership of the
other Gulf states, or revisionist if it threatened them.  At the same time, any
attempt by Iran to assert its predominance, irrespective of the character of its
government and ideology, would also probably be viewed as unwelcome by the
other Gulf states, who fear for their independence and the security of their
interests in the face of Iranian hegemony.44 Nonetheless, it is possible to argue
that “Iran under the shah was, in essence, a status-quo power and served as an
element of stability in the Persian Gulf.”45 There exists, therefore, scope for both
geopolitical and ideological rivalry between Iran and its Arab neighbours.
In the case of Saudi Arabia, this geopolitical rivalry is exacerbated by the
differing religious identities of both states and Saudi Arabia’s unique role as the
birthplace of Islam.  Following the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the
transformation of Iran into an Islamic Republic, revisionism became a much
stronger aspect of Iran’s foreign policy outlook.  The new clerical leadership, led
by Ayatollah Khomeini, branded monarchical political systems ‘un-Islamic’,
attacked the Saudi custodianship of Mecca and Medina, and announced its
43 Dilip Hiro, Iran Today, London: Politico’s, 2005, p.344
44 This was even true under the rule of the shah.  Hermann Frederick Eilts, ‘Saudi Arabia’s
Foreign Policy’, in L. Carl Brown (ed.), Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International
Relations of Regional and Outside Powers (London: IB Tauris, 2004), p.237
45 Shaul Bakhash, ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy under the Islamic Republic, 1979-2000,’ in Brown (ed.),
Diplomacy in the Middle East, p.247
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intention to export its revolutionary ideology throughout the Islamic world,
thereby posing “a direct challenge to the regional status quo and the political
integrity of Iran’s Arab neighbors.” 46 As previously noted, the Saudi
government relies heavily on its association with a radical Sunni movement,
Wahhabism.  Wahhabist clerics maintain an ‘official line’ which states that
Shi’ism is heretical, which sets the Saudi state at odds with the official ideology
of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Neither side can therefore acknowledge the
validity of each other’s’ religious beliefs or system of government without
undermining their own legitimacy, yet each aspires to a position of leadership in
the Islamic world, creating the potential for serious friction.  In addition, while
Iranian attempts to export its revolution during the infancy of the Islamic
Republic were spasmodic and uncoordinated (reflecting the upheaval in the
Iranian government), they nonetheless inspired genuine alarm in the Gulf
monarchies, and doubtless reflected the firmly-held worldview of powerful
factions within Iran.47 Consequently, while both states have successfully co-
existed, there have been periods of deep antagonism between Iran and the Arab
monarchies on the opposite shore of the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, even
though there was a general trend towards pragmatism and away from radicalism
in Iranian foreign policy a decade after the revolution.48
Furthermore, while the other states of the Persian Gulf have traditionally
been dominated by Sunni Arabs (either politically, demographically or both),
Iran is linguistically, ethnically, religiously and culturally different, dominated by
Persian Shia.  This is yet another potential source of conflict, and resurfaced once
the Gulf states perceived a threat from the Iranian revolution. 49 It was
subsequently used in propaganda by Saddam Hussein’s regime in the Iran-Iraq
war.50
46 Ehteshami, ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’, p.287
47 Bakhash, ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy under the Islamic Republic’, p.251-2
48 Ehteshami, ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’, p.287, p.298-9
49 David Long, ‘The Impact of the Iranian Revolution on the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf
States’, in John Esposito (ed.) The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami, FL: Florida
International University Press, 1990), p.111
50 Andrew Cockburn & Patrick Cockburn, Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession (London:
Verso, 2002), p.59
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4.3.3 Iraq
Iraq represents a different kind of state, with its trajectory of development
more influenced by external colonial rule.  Unlike either Saudi Arabia or Iran, its
origin as a modern state can be traced back to the era of European colonialism, as
it was formed by the amalgamation of three Ottoman provinces at the end of the
First World War.  Its rulers have therefore struggled both with attempts to
establish the legitimacy of their rule and to consolidate Iraq as a state, which has
affected its foreign policy significantly.  The most obvious aspect of this colonial
legacy is in the ethnic and sectarian cleavages that have done much to define and
dominate Iraq’s politics, and indeed its political system.  From the inception of
the modern state of Iraq after the First World War to the American-led invasion
of 2003, the political system of Iraq was based on the centralised, authoritarian
rule of a series of relatively small and homogenous groups of Sunni Arabs,
despite the fact that this ethnic and confessional group has likely never composed
more than approximately 20% of the population in modern times.51 In the case
of the Hashemite monarchy, the government was dominated by a ruling class
composed of the retainers of the royal family, former Ottoman civil servants and
army officers, and large landowners,52 and relied on “the army and bureaucracy
as the mainstay of the state rather than political bargaining.”53 Following the
overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 (which was more of a military coup than a
popular revolution) the Sunni Arabs who dominated the Iraqi army’s officer
corps became the arbiters of political power, and it was their world-view that
came to be dominant in Iraqi political discourse. 54 This was not changed
significantly by the rise to power of the Ba’th Party and Saddam Hussein, except
in the important sense that the base of the regime became narrower, centred
ultimately on Saddam Hussein and “his close family members and cohorts.”55
51 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p15
52 Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the
Middle East (London: IB Tauris, 2004), p. 22; Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3rd edition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p44-51
53 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p.78
54 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p.153 and 186
55 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p. 139 and p.177
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The majority of the population of Iraq was and is composed of Arab Shia,
leading to persistent fears of a Shia ‘takeover’ on the part of the Sunni elite given
their domination of the political system and its undemocratic character.  The
other large minority in Iraq are the Kurds, who are clustered in the north of the
country, and have consistently agitated for autonomy or independence in the face
of Arab domination of the state.  This has led to recurring bouts of civil conflict
and repression on the part of the Iraqi authorities, determined to centralise power
and fearful of the appeal of transnational ideologies and secession.  However,
despite the fact that no single state existed in the area of modern day Iraq prior to
the 1920s, and despite sharp ethnic and confessional differences amongst its
population, Iraq was relatively successful in developing the institutions of a
modern, unified state.  The military, in particular, was seen by many of the early
Iraqi elite as a central institution in the consolidation of the state, which they
believed could be achieved in a top-down, authoritarian manner.56 Iraq’s rulers,
particularly Saddam Hussein, were subsequently able to use Iraq’s oil wealth,
superpower patronage and relatively large population to create a formidable
military machine following the dramatic oil price rises of the 1970s, making it a
major player in Gulf politics and a potential threat to its neighbours, as Kuwait
and Iran learned to their cost.  Consequently, the size of Iraq’s military forces
grew continuously between 1969 and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980,
when Iraq had almost a quarter of a million men under arms.57 In fact, Iraq
emerged even stronger from the 1980-88 war, if only in purely military terms,
and “almost immediately made a bid for regional hegemony and expansion.”58
At different times throughout the post-war era, Iraq has been variously
status quo and revisionist, albeit with some important qualifications.  In the
immediate post-war period Iraq was a western-aligned monarchy (it was the sole
Arab member of the Baghdad Pact), and so found itself allied with Iran and
Saudi Arabia against the forces of Arab nationalism (on a regional level) and the
Soviet Union (globally).  Following the revolution of 1958, the situation was
56 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p.76 and p.92
57 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, fig 5.3, p.156
58 Vasiliev, A History of Saudi Arabia, p.472
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changed, becoming more complex.  As we saw in the previous chapter, Iraq
‘changed sides’, becoming a client state of the USSR, and more significantly,
adopted an Arab nationalist ideology that set it at odds with Tehran and Riyadh.
Deriving its legitimacy from its radical, pan-Arab credentials, the rulers of
modern Iraq have played an unusual role in the power politics of the Persian
Gulf.  Firstly, they have at various times sought to assert hegemony over the
‘Arab ‘side’ of the region: the littoral states on the southern shore of the
waterway.  At the same time, Iraq has attempted to assert itself vis-à-vis Iran, as
a Sunni Arab bulwark against Persian Shia Iran.  It has therefore simultaneously
represented both a threat and a champion to the Gulf monarchies.  The policies
that this has given rise to, and their effects on the dynamics of the regional
system, are addressed in the following section.
4.4 Tripolar dynamics in the Persian Gulf since World War II
This section discusses the most significant events in regional politics in
the post-war Persian Gulf up to 1991, primarily in balance of power terms, and
the factors which have affected this the most.  This is necessary to demonstrate
how the factors described above have played out, and how this has facilitated
American intervention.
Following the end of the Second World War, and the withdrawal of
explicit colonial control from the Gulf region, the rulers of the three most
consequential states had, at least on paper, relatively similar outlooks and
objectives, in that all three were conservative monarchies.  In this period, the
primary threat was perceived to be radical Arab nationalism, symbolised by
Nasser’s Egypt, which appealed directly to the people of the Arab states,
bypassing their rulers.  There were also active communist parties in most Middle
East states, but these proved to be much weaker in comparison.  Although Iran
was of course less open to pan-Arab rhetoric, it was the first to ‘break ranks’,
under the leadership of Prime Minister Mossadegh, nationalising the British-
dominated Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951, in a move that reflected an
equally intense Iranian nationalism and scorn for external interference in Iranian
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affairs, stemming at least in part from Iran’s history of domination by Britain and
Russia from the 19th century onwards.  Mossadegh was removed from power by
a western-backed coup in 1953, and the Shah subsequently ruled as a dictator and
maintained a broadly pro-western foreign policy until his overthrow in 1979.  As
described in the previous chapter, while he remained opposed to Soviet presence
in the Middle East his American patrons were content to support his ambitions to
make Iran a regional superpower, allowing him to purchase vast amounts of
military hardware in the 1970s, following the oil price rises which gave him
access to the resources to make large-scale arms purchases.59
The shah subsequently despatched troops to suppress the Dhofar rebellion
in Oman and sought changes in the Iran-Iraq border to favour Iran, going so far
as to give military support to Kurdish insurgents inside Iraq.  He eventually
achieved this goal in the 1975 Algiers agreement, which redrew the border along
the thalweg (median point) of the Shatt al-Arab waterway.  He also ordered his
armed forces to occupy some Gulf islands, the Tunbs, in 1971.  Despite pursuing
an aggressive foreign policy from the 1960s onwards,60 Iran basically remained
‘status quo’ in its policies, not seeking to fundamentally alter the existence and
political systems of other regional states.  While the shah did offer military aid to
Kurdish rebels inside neighbouring Iraq, therefore threatening its existence as a
unitary state, this was immediately cut off when he achieved his goals.  The shah
therefore sought Iranian predominance, rather than to re-draw the map of the
region.
Iraq remained in the ‘conservative’ camp throughout much of the 1950s,
becoming a founding member of the ‘Baghdad Pact’ (latter renamed the Central
Treaty Organisation (CENTO) following Iraq’s withdrawal), which was designed
to contain the Soviet Union in the Middle East and central Asia as NATO did in
western Europe.  The unpopularity of this alliance, perceived as another form of
imperialist intrusion, was one of the reasons for the Iraqi revolution of 1958, a
military coup which led to the downfall of the Iraqi monarchy and the rise of
59 Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, p.482-3.  See also James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The
Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 1989)
60 Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, p.465
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more radical, revisionist forces to power.61 The new government, dominated by
military officers and led by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim, was in turn
overthrown by a more pan-Arabist faction of the same group in 1963 together
with the Baath party, and was in turn supplanted by the Baath party alone in
1968.  Despite this rapid turnover of leaders, Iraq pursued a much more
revisionist foreign policy with relative consistency following 1958, expressing
hostility towards both existing colonially-imposed borders and foreign influence
in the region, and pursued a friendly relationship with the Soviet Union, signing
a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972.  Most important of all, it had
antagonistic relationships with Iran and the Gulf monarchies. 62 Qasim’s
government laid claim not only to both the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzistan
(which is ethnically Arab), but also to the state of Kuwait only days after its
formal independence from Britain,63 the latter sparking a regional crisis.64 The
Iraqi cabinet also passed a resolution to rename the Persian Gulf the ‘Arab Gulf’.
The results of this grandstanding were exacerbated by Iraqi demands to
renegotiate the delineation of the Iran-Iraq border, especially along the vital Shatt
al-Arab waterway.  Following the Baath takeover in 1968, the situation became
more tense, as “the new regime was eager to assert its Iraqi nationalist and pan-
Arab credentials…It adopted socialism at home, a stridently anti-Western foreign
policy, and a revolutionary rhetoric directed at conservative Persian Gulf and
Arab regimes.”  It also supported ‘national liberation’ movements in Iran and
Oman, and leftists in Yemen, as well as the Popular Front for the Liberation of
the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). 65 This set Iraq at odds with Saudi
Arabia and the other Gulf Arab monarchies, as well as the Shah’s Iran.  The
border between the two countries along the Shatt al-Arab was a particularly
heated point of contention.  As already stated, Iranian support for Iraq’s restless
61 David Commins, The Gulf States: A Modern History (London, IB Tauris, 2012),p.133
62 Shaul Bakhash, ‘The Troubled Relationship: Iran and Iraq, 1930-80’, in Lawrence Potter &
Gary Sick (eds.), Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (New York, NY; PalgraveMacmillan,
2004), p12; Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p.146-8; Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf, p25
63 Bakhash, ‘The Troubled Relationship’, p.16
64 Tripp, A History of Iraq, p.159-60, Marr; The Modern History of Iraq, p.109-111
65 Bakhash, ‘The Troubled Relationship’, p.17
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Kurds persuaded Iraq to agree to the Shah’s demands in 1975.  Overall, during
the 1970s the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Iran co-operated to contain Iraq.66
The next major change in the sub-region was the Iranian Revolution in
1979.  The outlook and goals of the leadership (and the leadership itself) of the
area’s largest and arguably most powerful state changed dramatically.
Previously a status quo power, the newly-formed Islamic Republic of Iran
became fiercely revisionist, denouncing both superpowers and the governments
of its neighbours.  While the Shah had sought to build up Iranian military power,
Iran under his rule had co-existed with republican, nationalist Iraq and the other
monarchies.  In contrast, Iran’s new leaders denounced both systems of
government.  While revolutionary Iran posed a threat to Iraq because of the
latter’s Shia majority and their shared border, it threatened Saudi Arabia because
it undermined the legitimacy of the ruling dynasty: “After the revolution, Iran’s
strong Islamic-universalist approach and her demands for a leading position
within the umma as well as its assumed role as a model for the world’s Muslims
challenged the very roots of the identity of the Saudi Arabian state and its ruling
family as the heart of the Islamic world.”67 As stated above, this was made more
acute by the presence of a downtrodden Shia minority in Saudi Arabia.
The consequences of the 1979 Iranian revolution for the Persian Gulf’s
systemic dynamics were also profound, producing a new set of incentives which
affected the members of the system.  The fragile triangular system of the Persian
Gulf was highly sensitive, and the abrupt about-face of Iran had a significant
impact.  Generally speaking, it drove the Arab states together, as the differences
between them became less important than the perceived threat of revolutionary
Iran.  This catalysed the foundation of the GCC in 1981 and the alignment of the
members of this body with Iraq against Iran,68 a reversal of the trends of the
previous decade.  Saudi Arabia was therefore forced into a U-turn, having
previously aligned with Iran to contain radical Iraq; now that Iran was the most
66 Henner Fürtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia Between the Gulf Wars, p.62, and ‘Conflict
and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf’, p. 628
67 Fürtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia, p. xiv
68 Henner Fürtig, Iran’s Rivalry with Saudi Arabia, p.73
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radical state and the biggest threat, Iraq became a viable ally, because it too was
threatened by the Iranian revolution.  Consequently, upon the outbreak of the
Iran-Iraq war in 1980, Saudi Arabia gave Iraq extensive financial and logistic
assistance, becoming, in effect, one of the chief ‘financiers’ of the Iraqi war
effort, lending it a large proportion of the $35-50 billion it received from the
Arab states.69 This was also true to some extent of the other members of what
would become the GCC, with Kuwait as roughly the most pro-Iraqi/anti-Iranian
and some of the sheikdoms of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) leaning more
towards neutrality, thanks to pressures arising from geography, trade links and
other factors.70
The most concrete manifestation of the fears of the Gulf states was the
foundation of the GCC, comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the
UAE and Oman.71 This signalled a realisation that some form of consolidation
was necessary, clustering together for mutual reinforcement even as they tried to
play one side off against the other.  The fact that Iraq was not considered for
membership, and never was a realistic candidate, is illuminating: despite their
reliance on it as a counterweight to Iran, Iraq was never trusted enough to be
allowed a say in the security affairs of the six members.72 The GCC was also
formed in the face of fears of the smaller members of Saudi domination.73
However, this was outweighed by the perceived danger of the Iranian revolution
and the momentum the idea of the GCC had gained.  Mistrust and balance of
power dynamics therefore continued, despite the shock the system had endured.
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71 Steve Yetiv, Crude Awakenings: Global Oil Security and American Foreign Policy(Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), p.54-5; Anwar-Ul-Haq Ahady ‘Security in the Persian Gulf
after Desert Storm’, International Journal, 42 (2) 1994, p.224, David Long, ‘The Impact of the
Iranian Revolution on the Arabia Peninsula and the Gulf States,’ p.113
72 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Gerd Nonneman, & Charles Tripp, War and Peace in the Gulf:
Domestic Politics and Regional Relations into the 1990s (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991), p.45
73 Nonneman, ‘The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War’, p.176; Scherazade Daneshkhu, ‘Iran and
the New World Order’, in Tareq & Jacqueline Ismael (eds.), The Gulf War and the New World
Order: International Relations of the Middle East (Gainesville, FL; University Press of Florida,
1994), p.304; Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf, p.25-6
106
The general pro-Iraqi turn of the GCC endured for the course of the Iran-
Iraq war, which dragged on in a bloody, brutal stalemate for eight years.74 Initial
Iraqi successes against a chaotic post-revolutionary Iran were quickly reversed,
as Iran’s revolutionary fervour found a new outlet in the war against Iraq.
Following the recapture of Iranian territory, the Iranian leadership took the
fateful decision to take the war into Iraq, with the aim of (at the least)
overthrowing Saddam Hussein.  Iraq subsequently found itself on the defensive,
and relied on aid from the West and other Arab states to keep its economy and
military functioning.  While the other Gulf states consistently sought to keep
channels of communication with Iran open, attempting to broker ceasefires and
peace agreements, they generally maintained their pro-Iraqi policy out of fear of
the consequences of an Iranian victory.  Iranian successes on the battlefield
intensified both these fears and willingness to aid Iraq, in particular the capture
of the Fao Peninsula by Iranian forces in 1986, which sent “shock-waves all over
the Gulf and the Arab world”.75
The decision to form the GCC, the military weakness of its members and
their mistrust of Iran and Iraq also led to dramatic developments in another
important facet of the members’ foreign and security policies: their reliance on
the United States as an ally of last resort.  This had always been present, but the
pressures of the Iran-Iraq war brought it to the forefront of Gulf politics.  Iraq
had begun what became known as the ‘Tanker War’ in 1984 by launching air
attacks against Iranian oil facilities and tankers in the Gulf.  In doing so Baghdad
hoped not only to damage Iran’s ability to wage war, but also to provoke Iran
into taking radical action, such as closing the Straits of Hormuz, which would
(Iraq hoped) cause the US to intervene to stop the war.76 This gambit was only
partially successful, goading Iran into attacking Saudi and Kuwaiti shipping
bound for Iraq in late 1986.  This led Kuwait to appeal to the superpowers to
escort its tankers, which the US agreed to do, on the condition that they be
‘reflagged’ with US colours.  This, in turn, led to a substantial build-up of
74 A concise  overview of the conflict can be found in Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War 1980-88
(Oxford, Osprey, 2002)
75 Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War, p.48
76 Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War, p.50
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American naval power in the Gulf, along with some ships from other Western
navies.  Repeated clashes between the US and Iranian forces led the US Navy to
launch ‘Operation Praying Mantis’, which led to the destruction of much of
Iran’s navy.77
While the US obviously had its own reasons for intervening, it should not
be forgotten that it was also invited into the region by some regional states, who
were willing to host its forces in order to ensure their own security from regional
dangers.  This was made even more apparent by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in
1990.  The Saudi government quickly requested American assistance, leading to
the build-up of a quarter of a million US troops in the kingdom.  This figure rose
to half a million, plus allied Western and Arab contingents, for the shift to
offensive operations that drove the Iraqi military out of Kuwait.  While most of
these forces were withdrawn at the conclusion of hostilities, a substantial
American military presence remained in the Gulf throughout the 1990s to contain
Iraq and safeguard the Gulf states.  Despite some financial problems,78 Saudi
Arabia retained its unofficial dependence on the US as a security guarantor (no
formal defence agreement exists between the US and Saudi Arabia),79 with up to
5,000 US troops stationed in the country.80 Formal security ties were established
between the US and the other states of the GCC, especially Kuwait, and the US
Navy’s Fifth Fleet established its forward headquarters in Bahrain.81 The 1980s
and especially the 1990s therefore saw a massive increase in the American
military footprint in the region, with the consent of a number of regional states,
who lacked the capability to defend themselves.
The American military build-up stemmed at least in part from the
breakdown of the triangular, tripolar system described by Fürtig et al.  While
77 An detailed description of US military operations in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88 can be found
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Saudi Arabia and Iran were unwilling to put their ideological differences aside,
they could not make common cause against an aggressive Iraq.  Nor could Saudi
Arabia and Iraq resume their old anti-Iranian alignment while Saddam Hussein’s
regime was in power, thanks to his attack on Kuwait.  The Saudis, and the other
members of the GCC, were therefore forced to look further afield for allies to
provide them with an overarching security guarantee, once their traditional
security policies became untenable and they remained militarily weak.  An
attempt to enlist Arab allies from outside the Persian Gulf after the 1991 war, the
Damascus Declaration, proved to be a failure.  This was partly due to the fears of
the Gulf states of the effects of a permanent Egyptian and Syrian military
presence in their territory, and partly because of the costs involved, Iranian
hostility to the idea and the questionable military value of such a scheme.82 The
US therefore remained the ultimate guarantor of GCC security.  Other precedents
existed within the modern history of regional politics for this turn to external
forces, especially the US, on the part of local states, albeit on a much reduced
scale.  As described above, the Saudi leadership found itself threatened by the
tidal wave of Arab nationalism that found its initial expression in Egypt in the
1950s.  Domestic unrest, especially in key sections of the military, panicked the
monarchy into requesting American help.  While the Saudis did make some
gestures aimed at appeasing Nasser and the forces of pan-Arabism, King Saud
nonetheless accepted (in private) the Eisenhower doctrine in 1957 and extended
the lease on the American airbase at Dharan until 1962, as well as agreeing to
large increases in arms procurement and American training of Saudi forces.83
From the Saudi perspective, the situation worsened after the outbreak of the war
in Yemen in 1962, in which both Egypt and Saudi Arabia backed different sides.
While Egyptian troops were present in Yemen in large numbers, several Saudi
air force pilots defected to Egypt, creating serious doubts about the
trustworthiness of the Saudi military.  Subsequently, the Saudis requested the
despatch of American combat aircraft to the Kingdom to bolster its air defences,
a request which was granted, albeit reluctantly. 84 Again, help was not
forthcoming from the most militarily-powerful Arab states, Egypt and Iraq,
82 Ahady, ‘Security in the Persian Gulf after Desert Storm’, p.219-23
83 Vassiliev, A History of Saudi Arabia, p.352
84 Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, p.58 and 67, Douglas Little, American Orientalism, p.238-9
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because they were ideologically hostile.  As would be the case in the 1980s and
1990s, regional divisions and issues conspired to motivate Persian Gulf states to
rely on American forces.
4.5 Conclusions
The Persian Gulf sub-region’s politics was dominated by a tripolar
balance of power system in the era following the Second World War, which saw
the maturation and consolidation of the most significant regional states: Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Iraq.  The foreign policies pursued by these states were
dominated both by the ambitions of their leaders (especially in the case of Iran)
and the need to maintain domestic legitimacy, according to the shared and
idiosyncratic features of each state.  This was also strongly affected by the
geopolitical situation in the Persian Gulf, the fact that the system of the three
states encompasses a major religious and ethnic divide, and the presence in these
states of a significant proportion of the world’s known oil reserves.
Specifically, certain dynamics persisted within the system: the balancing
of status quo states against revisionist ones, and attempts by the most powerful
state, Iran, to assert its predominance and establish its own vision of the regional
system, under the rule of both the Shah and the clerics.  While this system
persisted, and states could ally with one of the others to check the power and
influence of the other(s), the penetration of external powers into the region was
minimised.  When the system broke down and the three states became mutually
hostile, external powers, specifically the United States, were invited in to ensure
the survival and interests of regional allies.  This was also the consequence of the
military weakness of Saudi Arabia and the GCC states, which could not or would
not rely on their own resources to defend themselves.  There were therefore
‘pull’ factors which contributed to drawing in the United States, factors which
were generated by regional politics that were arguably only indirectly linked to
wider, global political trends and phenomena.
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The next chapter examines the American response to the strategic
challenges its policymakers faced in the 1990s, and the conception and
implementation of dual containment in the rest of the decade.
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CHAPTER 5 Dual containment: Conception, evolution,
implementation
In this chapter the foreign policy of ‘dual containment’, both its
introduction and implementation in the 1990s, will be examined.  This is a
necessary step in the examination and analysis of this policy, given its
application to two countries within the Persian Gulf sub-region and the differing
nature of the containment regimes of each.  The relationship between Iran and
Iraq on the one hand and the US on the other also developed in different,
complex ways in the decade in question, necessitating a detailed study of the
resulting shifts and alterations in policy.  It will also illustrate the nature of the
continuing American interest and concern for the security of the Persian Gulf in
the 1990s and how this was reflected in its dual containment policy: the
prevention of the domination of the Persian Gulf by a single hegemon, especially
one hostile to the US and its perceived interests in the region.
The chapter argues that American policy towards Iran and Iraq in the
1990s was in many ways a continuation of earlier trends apparent in the Bush
(1988-1992) administration, namely the preservation of a central US role in the
Gulf security system, and the exclusion of Iran and Iraq.  Nonetheless, the
approach taken by the administration to each state was very different, and
changes in the situation in Iran, Iraq, and domestic American politics led to shifts
in policy throughout the decade.
The first section provides a ‘strategic overview’, describing the Persian
Gulf as it appeared to American policymakers in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War
and some of the dilemmas they faced.  It also examines the rationales given for
its adoption by senior officials in the Clinton administration.  It is followed by a
short description of the objections to the policy raised by some scholars and
commentators, while the following two sections detail the actual measures taken
by the US to ‘contain’ both Iran and Iraq, which are dealt with separately
because of the differing nature of the containment regimes: multilateral in the
case of Iraq, and unilateral in the case of Iran.
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5.1 The Persian Gulf after 1991 and the birth of a new policy
As we saw in the previous two chapters, it was a combination of regional
and global factors that simultaneously ‘pushed’ and ‘pulled’ the US into a close
political and military engagement with the Persian Gulf in the second half of the
twentieth century.  As the century drew to a close, all of these factors remained
pertinent, with the major exception of the perceived Soviet threat to the world’s
oil supplies, which disappeared with the collapse of the USSR.  Nonetheless, the
US remained committed to its traditional policy: “to prevent any one country
from establishing hegemony in the Persian Gulf.”1 It was to this end that it
reversed the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait and sought, through the UN, to disarm
Saddam Hussein’s regime and thereby eliminate the threat he posed to the other
Gulf states.  Additionally, the US was concerned by the potential of Iran to
exercise a dominant role in Gulf security, given its size, position, population and
mineral endowments, as described in Chapter 4.  Given the potential power of
both of these states, and the behaviour they had recently exhibited (especially
Iraq) these were therefore the obvious candidates for this role.  The US would
therefore take steps to ensure that this did not come to pass in the years after
1991, and the particular policy that was created and implemented was dubbed
‘dual containment’ by Clinton administration officials. In the words of one of the
principal architects of the policy, “the United States needed to prevent each of
the stronger regional powers from achieving a hegemonic position in the Gulf
that would enable it to dictate the policies of the lesser states.”2
The shape of American policy prior to the announcement of dual
containment by the Clinton administration can be seen in the approach adopted
by Clinton’s predecessor, George Bush. The factors discussed above – the desire
to maintain a favourable balance of power in the Persian Gulf region – can be
seen in the decision not to ‘go to Baghdad’ and overthrow Saddam Hussein, or
1 John Mearsheimer & Stephen Walt, The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (London: Allen
Lane, 2007), p.281
2 Martin Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the
Middle East, (New York City, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2009), p.30
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support the uprising of the Iraqi Shia after the ceasefire and the expulsion of Iraqi
forces from Kuwait.  The war was fought to return the region to the status quo
that had endured before the invasion of Kuwait, and the Bush administration did
not desire to make radical changes to the regional security architecture.3 It did
not wish to see either Iraq or Iran increase their regional influence. The winding
down of the Cold War and the Iran-Iraq War also decreased the importance of
the region and the intensity of American interest in it.  Accordingly, when
George H W Bush took office in 1989, the Persian Gulf remained an area of
critical importance, thanks to its oil reserves, but occupied the attentions of area
specialists within the US government, rather than senior policymakers.
Consequently, Bush decided to retain the earlier policy of balancing against Iran
by trying to maintain the relationship previously built up with Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq under Reagan, ostensibly in the hopes of moderating Iraqi foreign policy.4
As for Iran specifically, Bush did make some overtures to the Iranian
leadership which appeared to be aimed at improving the antagonistic relationship
between the two states and gaining assistance in freeing American hostages in
Lebanon. He famously said that ‘goodwill begets goodwill’ during his
inauguration speech but, as we shall see, these ultimately had little impact and
President Bush did not choose to push too far, as the US did not respond to
Iranian assistance on the hostage issue and seemed instead to view Iraq as a more
congenial partner.5 President Bush’s defeat in 1991 at the hands of Bill Clinton
rendered any intentions he had about pursuing this course further moot.
The policy of ‘dual containment’ was first defined and announced
publically by Martin Indyk, who would serve as special assistant to President
Clinton on Middle East affairs, Senior Director for the Middle East and South
3 F. Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, (Cambridge, Cambrdige
University Press, 2010), p.88
4 George Bush & Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York City, NY: Vintage Books,
1998), p.305-6
5 Shireen Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International
Order (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), p.46-7
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Asia on the National Security Council, US Ambassador to Israel and Assistant
Secretary of State for the Middle East for Near Eastern Affairs.6 It originated in
a review of Persian Gulf policy conducted by the incoming Clinton
administration, and overseen by Anthony Lake, Clinton’s first National Security
Advisor.  In practice, the interagency working group which considered options
for policy towards Iran and Iraq was chaired by Indyk, 7 and he is credited by
many as the principal architect.8 Indyk announced the new administration’s Gulf
policy to the world at large at the annual Soref symposium of the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) in May 1993.9 According to Indyk, the
phrase ‘dual containment’ emerged almost by accident in a conversation with a
journalist.  Originally, the interagency review recommended a policy of
‘aggressive containment’ towards Iraq and ‘active containment’ towards Iran
(both are described in detail below).  The journalist, Elaine Sciolino of the New
York Times, told Indyk that it sounded like the US was set on a policy of ‘parallel
containment’, a term Indyk adopted, after changing to ‘dual containment.’
Additionally, the policy was also outlined by the then-National Security Advisor
Anthony Lake in an article in Foreign Affairs in 1994.  Although in this article
Lake identifies ‘backlash states’ as the focus of American concern, a category
that includes Cuba, North Korea and Libya as well as Iran and Iraq, he dedicates
the bulk of his article to discussing the latter two and the nature and application
of ‘dual containment’, and uses that term in particular when referring to them.10
The content of Indyk’s speech at WINEP and Lake’s article are very
similar, and it is therefore possible to draw out some common ideas that
constitute the unique features of ‘dual containment.’  Among the most important
of these was the decision to attempt the containment of Iran and Iraq
6 An Australian-born former academic, he had previous worked for the pro-Israel lobbying group
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), before founding the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP).
77 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, p.36
8 Author interview with Ellen Laipson, former CIA, NSC, National Intelligence Council and
State Department official, Washington DC, February 2011
9 Martin Indyk, ‘The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East’ speech to the
WINEP Soref Symposium1993. The text of his speech is available here:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=61, accessed 11-08-2010
10 Anthony Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States’, Foreign Affairs 73 (2) 1994, pp. 43-55
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simultaneously, rather than relying on one of these states as a counterweight to
the other, breaking with previous American policy in the Persian Gulf.  The
inevitable consequence of this decision was the assumption by the US of a more
active role of the management of security in the region than hitherto, given the
scalene nature of the sub-region’s tripolar system (discussed in the previous
chapter), arguably making the US almost a regional state.  Both Lake and Indyk
argued indirectly that this was necessary, not by stating that this entailed the US
was to become the predominant security actor in the sub-region, but that it
needed to construct a favourable balance of power in the Persian Gulf.  Indyk
argued that with the assistance of its traditional allies and as long as Iran and Iraq
remained ‘contained’, the US will be able to “preserve a balance of power in our
favor in the Middle East region”. 11 Likewise, Lake stated that the “basic
principle in the Persian Gulf region is to establish a favourable balance of power,
one that will protect critical American interests in the security of our friends and
in the free flow of oil at stable prices.”12 Both stated that one of the reasons for
this decision to exclude both Iran and Iraq is that they are simply not necessary
parts of any American-dominated security architecture: “we don’t need to rely on
one to balance the other.”13 In other words, neither state possessed the military
power to give the US pause, or necessitate the enlistment of allies, stemming
from the fact that both states were much weaker than the US and had been
devastated by wars in recent years that enervated their armed forces, lowering the
costs of American containment.  This stemmed partly from the collapse of the
USSR, which meant that for Iran and Iraq “their ability to play the superpowers
off each other has been eliminated.”14 Lake also argued that since the 1991 Gulf
War, the GCC states were more willing to co-operate with and host American
forces, which “provide our military forces with an ability to deploy in the Persian
Gulf against any threat that either Iraq or Iran pose to these states.”15 Both left
unmentioned the massive arms purchases made by the GCC states from the US
11 Indyk, ‘The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East’.
12 Lake ‘Confronting Backlash States’, p.47-8
13 Indyk, ‘The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East’.
14 Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States’, p. 48
15 Ibid, p.49
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and others in the 1990s, aimed undoubtedly at deterring Iran and Iraq, and
‘locking in’ a US and Western role in regional security.16
In terms of the aims of the new American policy, both Lake and Indyk
stressed that while ‘dual containment’ was designed to contain both states
simultaneously, the means and objectives of the containment regimes differed, as
did the nature of each state’s political system (this would lead the then-Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Edward Djerejian to attempt to
remove the term ‘dual containment’ from the text of Indyk’s original address
during the approval and drafting process.  He was unsuccessful). 17 The
difference, as stated by Indyk, was that Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was
“criminal…beyond the pale of international society and, in our judgement,
irredeemable.”18 Not only had it attacked both Iran and Kuwait, it was also used
brutal methods to maintain itself in power.  Iran, on the other hand, was also
perceived by US policymakers as troublesome but not nearly to the same degree.
With regards to Iran, the US objected to what it saw as Iran’s pursuit of missile
and non-conventional weapons technology, sponsorship of terrorism, opposition
to the Arab-Israeli peace process, subversion of US-allied governments and
conventional military build-up.19 It had, however, not launched any aggressive
wars of conquest.  Consequently, both Lake and Indyk stated that Washington
was willing to negotiate with Iran if it altered its behaviour, and did not have
fundamental objections to the character of the Iranian regime, meaning its
avowedly ‘Islamic’ character and constitution.
The recognition of the differences between Iran and Iraq was reflected in
the American approach to each state.  As we shall see in the following sections,
the Clinton administration continued the multilateral approach it had inherited
from the Bush administration, working through the medium of the UN Security
16 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, Security
and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East, London: IB Tauris, 2011, p.76-7
17 Email correspondence between author and Ambassador Djerejian.  See also  Barbara Slavin,
Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation (New
York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2007), p.181
18 Indyk, ‘The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East’.  Lake described Iraq as
“an international renegade” in ‘Confronting Backlash States,’ p.50
19 Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States’, p.52-3
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Council to impose and maintain a sanctions and inspection regime aimed at
disarming Iraq.  This process was backed by the threat of force under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, and which was used on several occasions.  This approach
was viable in light of Iraq’s past behaviour, and remained so while the other
members of the Security Council were willing to, if not participate, then at least
not object or actively frustrate it.  Iran, on the other hand, was not subject to any
UN resolutions ordering it to disarm and cease oppressing its population, and
Iran policy was therefore pursued unilaterally, through US-based sanctions and
diplomatic pressure on its trading partners.  This, too, continued in the same vein
as the policy pursued by President Clinton’s predecessor, who had hinted at a
rapprochement with Iran, but had not ultimately followed-up despite acquiring
Iranian help in freeing American hostages in Lebanon.20
The tern ‘dual containment’ itself proved to be a controversial one, and it
disappeared from official discourse quite quickly.  Indyk himself concedes that it
was easy to misconstrue, especially the use of the word ‘dual,’ which suggests
that the containment of Iran and Iraq was conducted in a similar fashion.  As
stated, there were substantial real differences between the containment regimes
imposed by the US.  The logic of the policy itself was also criticised by scholars
and former officials as misguided, though it also found some defenders.21 Gause,
in particular, highlighted the geostrategic problems inherent in the containment
of a state as large as Iran without international consensus, and the assumption of
a dominant role in the management of the Persian Gulf security system on the
part of the US.  In contrast, he advocated a policy of selective engagement with
Iran on regional issues.22 His calls for echoed by some former executive branch
officials, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy, who also
advocated a move towards a strategy they dubbed ‘differentiated containment,’
and called for the resumption of trade links between the US and Iran.23
20 Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era, p.46-7; Giandomenico Picco, Man
Without a Gun: One Diplomat’s Secret Struggle to Free the Hostages, Fight Terrorism, and End
a War (New York, NY: Times Books, 1999), p.3-7
21 For instance, see Patrick Clawson, ‘The Continuing Logic of Dual Containment,’ Survival, 40
(1) 1998, pp.33-47
22 F. Gregory Gause, ‘The Illogic of Dual Containment,’ Foreign Affairs, 73 (2) 1994, pp.53-66
23 Zbigniew Brzeziksnki, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, ‘Differentiated Containment,’
Foreign Affairs, 76 (3) 1997, pp.20-30
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Several scholars argue convincingly that the decision of the Clinton
administration to seek the simultaneous containment of Iran and Iraq also stem in
part from its concern with the issue that overshadows Middle East politics: the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically the ‘Oslo Process.’  Pollack, in particular,
argues that “Throughout the Clinton administration, but especially early on, it
was often Israel’s security concerns and the interrelated needs of the peace
process that were the main prods to US action on Iran.”24 This arose because a
peace deal with the Palestinians and the ‘front-line’ Arab states would mean that
“Israel’s other security concerns…had to be addressed.  In other words, the
administration had to do something about Iran.”25 Mearsheimer and Walt echo
this view, claiming that much of the rationale behind dual containment can be
found in Washington’s desire to appease both its close ally, Israel, and the
formidable pro-Israeli lobby in the United States itself.  As a consequence, when
it came to Iran, the Clinton administration “was willing to go along, largely
because it was focusing on the Oslo peace process, and wanted to make sure
Israel felt secure and that Iran, a potential spoiler, did not derail the process.”26
Trita Parsi argues that Iran became an increasingly serious concern for Israeli
policymakers following the 1991 Gulf War for various reasons, involving both
domestic politics and national security.27 He also describes the efforts of Israeli
leaders to impress upon the Clinton administration their concerns about Iran,
with the result that, given its investment in the Oslo Process, “[t]he Clinton
administration was willing to go to great lengths to convince the Israelis and the
Palestinians to remain on the path to peace, even if it meant escalating tensions
with Iran.”28 This was undoubtedly facilitated by the poor state of relations
between the US and Iran since the revolution of 1979, which imposed no
domestic political price in the US for pursuing a tough line against that state: if
anything, the opposite was more likely to be the case.  The closeness of bilateral
24 Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York,
NY: Random House, 2004) p.261
25 Ibid, p.260
26 Mearsheimer & Walt, The Israeli Lobby and US Foreign Policy, p.287-8
27 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007)
28 Ibid, p.184-5
119
relations between the US and Israel also played a part, which made lobbying
Congress to pursue the containment of Iran through sanctions much easier.
These issues are discussed in more detail in chapters 6, 7, and 8, which deal
exclusively with the impact of these variables on dual containment.
With the conceptual origins of the policy now dealt with, we can now
turn to the details of its application towards both Iran and Iraq.  In a sense, the
case of dual containment is one in which ‘the devil is in the details,’ as how the
policy was implemented reflects aspects of the broader context in which US
foreign policy objectives are operationalized, in particular the impact of domestic
political forces and concerns about the American relationship with Israel
discussed above.
The following sections therefore describe the evolution of American
attempts to contain Iraq and Iran, as the policy developed in Washington runs
head first into the difficulties of the real world and is the stretched and pulled
into different shapes by the intervention of other actors within the American
political system. It subsequently forms the basis for the examination of these
underlying factors shaping this evolution of policy discussed in subsequent
chapters.
5.2 Dual Containment and Iraq
Though Iraq was by far the most visible target of American ‘dual
containment’ policy, the sanctions that state was subjected to in the 1990s were
implemented under the auspices of the UN Security Council rather than the US
government.  As stated above, Washington’s decision to pursue the
‘containment’ of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was based on the traditional American
geostrategic principle for the security of the Persian Gulf, namely “to establish a
favorable balance of power, one that will protect critical American interests in
the security of our friends and in the free flow of oil at stable prices.”29 This was
endangered by the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which was interpreted by many
29 Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States,’ p.47-8
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American policymakers as an attempt by Saddam Hussein to seize a preeminent
role in the Arab world in general and military predominance in the Persian Gulf
in particular.  This jeopardised America’s interests as the first Bush
administration perceived them, leading to the US involvement in the 1991 Gulf
War to restore the status quo.30 Iraq’s attempts, uncovered by UN inspectors, to
acquire nuclear and biological weapons and missiles to carry them (alongside its
proven chemical arsenal) exacerbated this threat enormously.  Though it was
pursued through the UN, the rationale of American strategy in this instance was
therefore obvious, and made both more urgent and more palatable to the rest of
the world by the fact that Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein had attacked
both Iran and Kuwait in the space of a decade.
5.2.1 Iraq, the US and UN sanctions
The authorisation for the ‘containment’ of Iraq through sanctions, at least
in regards to its non-conventional weapons programmes, originally stemmed
from the adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolutions 687 and 688 in
April 1991, and reinforced by Security Council Resolution 707 in August,
following the end of the 1991 Gulf War.  The first required Iraq to destroy its
chemical and biological weapons and any missiles with a range greater than
150km.  It also required Iraq to reaffirm its commitment to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), and foreswear the development of nuclear weapons.  Furthermore,
it required Iraq to provide details of its development programmes for these items,
and authorised the creation of the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) to oversee this process, together with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).31 It was the longest resolution on record at that point in
time,32 and “held momentous implications for the future of Iraq.”33 Resolution
707 was a response to Iraqi attempts to obstruct and deceive the UN’s inspectors,
30 F. Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), p.88
31 Anthony Cordesman & Ahmed Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1997), p.290-1
32 Yetiv, The Absence of Grand Strategy, p.92
33 Cockburn & Cockburn, Saddam Hussein, p.94
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and revelations about the state of its nuclear weapons programme, 34 and
demanded that the Iraqi government comply with this resolution, allow
UNSCOM and the IAEA to operate without interference, and allow overflights
by reconnaissance aircraft to check on Iraq’s compliance and look for evidence
of infractions.  Resolution 688 condemned Iraq’s repression of its population, in
particular the Kurdish population in the wake of the 1991 uprising, and
demanded that it cease.  It would be used as justification for the creation of the
‘No-Fly Zones’ (NFZs) in the north and south of Iraq, which were enforced by
the American, British and French air forces, which in turn led to frequent clashes
with the Iraqi military.  These came on top of earlier resolutions passed following
the original Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 that placed a comprehensive
embargo on all trade with Iraq, excepting only foodstuffs and medicines supplied
on humanitarian grounds.  This, of course, prevented Iraq from exporting oil, its
main source of income.  The economic sanctions were to remain in place until it
was determined that Iraq was in compliance with the resolutions.35 Iraq would
therefore remain an international pariah until it was judged to have complied
with UN resolutions.  As a permanent member of the Security Council, and
essentially the primus inter pares, the US had a great deal of influence over this
process.36
In many ways the adoption of resolutions 687 and 707 set the pattern of
the process that would follow over the next decade.  The Iraqi regime attempted
to wear down and eventually disband the sanctions regime while retaining the
ability to manufacture non-conventional weapons, and only grudgingly co-
operated with both the inspections process and the systems set up to manage to
sanctions and distribute aid.  In what became a regular pattern, “[t]he Iraqi
government engineered confrontation after confrontation and backed down only
after it had provoked a crisis or the UN Coalition responded with force.” 37
Ultimately, Saddam Hussein’s regime was unsuccessful at challenging both the
34 Dilip Hiro, Neighbours Not Friends, p.48
35 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004),
p.240
36 As to whether or not the US intended to use sanctions to topple Saddam Hussein, this issue is
discussed below.
37 Cordesman & Hashim, Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond, p.292
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sanctions and the inspections.  The sanctions remained in force until the
American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the weapons inspectors from
UNSCOM and the IAEA supervised the dismantling of Iraq’s non-conventional
arsenal, despite the Iraqi government’s attempts to frustrate them.38 Nonetheless,
as we shall see, the consensus on maintaining the sanctions against Iraq
eventually broke down, and the weapons inspectors withdrew from Iraq before it
was officially certified to be fully compliant with the relevant Security Council
Resolutions.
After various altercations, the final crisis that led to the withdrawal of UN
inspectors from Iraq and scrapping of UNSCOM began in 1998, when Iraq
announced that it was suspending cooperation with the inspectors, and demanded
changes to the oversight and composition of UNSCOM itself in August of that
year.  This crisis represented Iraq’s final ‘big push’ to lift the sanctions that
crippled the Iraqi economy, and exploit the divisions in the permanent five
members of the Security Council that had grown sharper as time had worn on.
For instance, France refused to cooperate in the extension of the southern NFZ in
September 1996 and pulled its forces out of the enforcement of the northern NFZ
in December, whilst Russia had taken the lead in negotiating with Iraq during the
previous crisis that Saddam Hussein had manufactured in 1997, agreeing to press
for the end of sanctions if Iraq cooperated39 (this proved insufficient and UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan intervened personally to defuse the crisis).  The
permanent five members of the security council had also divided over the
interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1154 of March 1998, which
formalised the agreement reached between Saddam Hussein and Kofi Annan a
month before.  The US and UK argued that the phrase “severest consequences
for Iraq” authorised military action in the case of Iraqi violation, while China,
Russia and France disagreed.40 Furthermore, Security Council Resolution 1198,
adopted in September, which called on Baghdad to resume cooperation with the
inspectors, also left the door open to compromise, offering in return for
cooperation the promise of a comprehensive review of sanctions and the drawing
38 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, p.288
39 Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, p.121
40 Ibid, p.141-2
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up of a ‘roadmap’ “describing what exactly Baghdad had to do to meet the UN
requirements.”41
Iraq was confident enough in October of 1998 that it “coupled its
decision to stop cooperating with Unscom and the IAEA in inspecting and
monitoring with a call for a rapid, comprehensive review of Iraq’s compliance in
disarmament linked to a timetable to lift sanctions.”42 However, it was not
successful, and was seen even by sympathetic members of the Security Council
as going too far.43 The US (as before, with the UK as junior partner) responded
by launching the biggest bombing campaign of Iraq since the 1991 war, 44
‘Operation Desert Fox,’ which took place from December 16-19.  If its intention
was to force Iraq to allow the inspections to resume, it was unsuccessful.  It was
also the deathblow to the public consensus on maintaining sanctions amongst the
Security Council, with both France and Russia calling for them to be lifted or
modified substantially in the wake of the attacks.  However, as the US was
willing to use its veto to maintain the sancions they remained in force.45 In
response to the calls to end the sanctions, the US and UK persuaded the Security
Council to adopt Resolution 1284 in December 1999 (China, Russia and France
abstained).  It replaced UNSCOM with the UN Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), and allowed Iraq to sell unlimited
quantities of oil for humanitarian purposes, as well as easing the regulations on
the import of agricultural, educational and medical supplies and equipment.  Iraq
rejected the resolution, which meant no change in the sanctions regime.
Resolution 1284 also addressed another issue that had caused enormous
complications for American ‘dual containment’ policy: the effect of years of
strict sanctions on Iraq’s population and infrastructure.  Though the extent of the
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damage done to Iraq, and who was ultimately to blame for it, quickly became a
bitterly-contested political issue, it was by all accounts catastrophic.  This
developed despite the creation of an ‘oil-for-food’ programme under Security
Council Resolution 986 of April 1995, which allowed Iraq to sell a $2bn worth
of oil every six months to meet the humanitarian needs of its population.  The
limit was subsequently raised by Resolution 1153 in February 1998 to $5.256bn,
while Resolution 1284 proposed abolishing the limit altogether.  It also
addressed complaints stemming from the adoption of Security Council
Resolution 1051 in March 1997, which required that all imports into Iraq of
potentially ‘dual-use’ items (that is, items which could be used either for strictly
civilian applications or in the creation of banned non-conventional weapons) be
approved by a UN sanctions committee.  This was an extensive list, which, for
instance, made it extremely difficult for Iraq to import spare parts and upgrades
for its sewage treatment systems and other parts of the state infrastructure critical
for public health.  As a result, it is well-documented that the economy of Iraq and
the well-being of the majority of its people declined drastically.  Socio-economic
indicators declined “from the economic and social level of Greece to that of the
barren sub-Saharan wasteland of Mali.”46 This in turn created a groundswell of
support for the lifting or easing of sanctions amongst Arab and Western publics
as the suffering of the Iraqi people became increasingly well-publicised.
5.2.2 ‘Containment’ vs. ‘Regime change’
Some debate exists amongst scholars and observers as to the extent of
American desire for ‘regime change’ in Iraq during the Clinton administration:
was it always present, or did it eventually crystallise into its final form after a
period of time?  Yetiv, for instance, asserts that this was an implicit, unspoken
goal of American policy, and which became much more appealing and thus more
openly discussed by American policymakers after 1998, after the sanctions
regime began to fray.47 This is made more credible by the passage of the Iraq
Liberation Act (ILA) through Congress in that year, though as we shall see the
46 Andrew Cockburn & Patrick Cockburn, Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession (London:
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legislature and executive were at times at odds over Persian Gulf policy during
the Clinton administration.  Covert American attempts to unseat Saddam Hussein
can be traced back to 1996, though these were not overt, unilateral efforts on a
par with the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.48 Wright maintains that the
Clinton administration had two Iraq policies, one tactical (multilateral
containment), and one strategic (regime change). 49 However, the latter was
obviously not achieved, and the US went to considerable lengths to maintain and
enforce the sanctions.  Even if we accept that ‘regime change’ in Iraq became
official American policy thanks to Congressional legislation in 1998, it was not
undertaken during the timeframe examined in this thesis.  The aforementioned
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 appropriated US$97million and obliged the
President to nominate opposition groups for the receipt of training, funds and
equipment to overthrow Saddam Hussein, not to intervene with the US military
to oust him from power.  Moreover, this legislation did not originate from within
the executive branch, but rather from Republican legislators in Congress, who
had become frustrated with US policy towards Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s
continued hold on power.50 Although Clinton signed the act and subsequently
declared after the conclusion of Operation Desert Fox that American policy was
now to overthrow Saddam Hussein, he was still unwilling to do so unilaterally
and with military force. 51 The declaration of an official policy of ‘regime
change’ was also a part of, in the words of Madeleine Albright, a shift of policy
“from containment with inspections to an approach we called containment plus.
We counted upon allied military forces in the region to keep Saddam in his box,
while we took other steps to weaken him.”52 This dovetailed with the opinion of
the President’s military advisors and the head of US Central Command
(CENTCOM), General Anthony Zinni, who stated that containment was, in his
48 Cockburn & Cockburn, Saddam Hussein, p.219-230; Hiro, Neighbours Not Friends, p.106;
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words, “a pain in the ass”,53 but represented the least worst option.  This attitude
was itself reflected in the national security establishment as a whole: “The
Saddam Must Go School…was a dissident minority voice, generally disdained
by those holding power in the US government.” 54 The relatively recent
revelation that President Clinton signed presidential findings authorising the CIA
to attempt to topple Saddam Hussein upon reaching office does little to change
this picture.55
Overall, Gause’s view of this issue is the most convincing: “It [the US]
did not like Saddam Hussein’s regime, but was not willing to do much to get rid
of it.”56 Despite some covert action programmes, the US did not escalate the
drawn-out confrontation with Iraq beyond what its leaders believed was
necessary to keep Saddam Hussein’s regime, to use Albright’s phrase, ‘in his
box’.  Even if the sanctions regime the US insisted on enforcing was aimed at
undermining it to the point that it would collapse or be overthrown, this was the
upper limit of what the Clinton administration was willing to countenance during
its tenure, and either couldn’t or wouldn’t change when it became clear that
Saddam Hussein was able to cling onto power.  National Security Advisor Sandy
Berger summed up this attitude in 1998, while being profiled by The Washington
Post:
I’ve always said containment is aesthetically displeasing but strategically
sufficient…You wake up in the morning and [Saddam Hussein] is still there and it
would be preferable if he wasn’t.  As for ‘getting Saddam’, most Americans would
recognize that option would be emotionally gratifying, but the costs of it would be
greater than our national interests.57
5.2.3 Was Iraq successfully contained?
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In the case of Iraq, American ‘dual containment’ policy was a relative
success.  Even if Saddam Hussein remained in power, his ability to threaten
American interests in the Persian Gulf was minimal by the end of 2001.  The
successes that UNSCOM had in seeking out Iraq’s arsenal substantially reduced
the threat it posed, and the continuing sanction regime ensured as far as possible
that his government was denied the means to reconstruct it.  Irrespective of the
damage done to the Iraqi people, and the public image of the US, Iraq arguably
represented less of a security threat to American interests in the Persian Gulf at
the end of the Clinton administration, as they were defined by American
policymakers, than it did at the start.  The downfall of Saddam Hussein, while
always desired by the US government, was regarded as too troublesome to
undertake under Clinton, given the likely costs and consequences.
5.3 Dual Containment and Iran
As stated above, American policymakers regarded Iran as a potential
danger to US interests in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. The anti-
American and anti-monarchical legacy of the 1979 revolution was still strong,
and this was reflected in official Iranian discourse and the decision of the Reagan
administration to ‘tilt’ in Iraq’s favour during the Iran-Iraq War.  The ensuing
hostage crisis and the Iran-Contra affair also cast a long shadow over American-
Iranian relations.  While US policymakers stated that the US did not have a
policy of ‘regime change’ for Iran, they were determined to limit Iran’s ability to
threaten the status quo in the Persian Gulf, especially by building an arsenal of
non-conventional weapons.  A more detailed description of American
perceptions of Iranian (and Iraqi) threats to US interests is given in the following
chapter.  The account that follows attempts to remain as close to a simple
enumeration of the extensive measures enacted by American policymakers to
isolate and pressurise Iran, and detail the means by which it differed from that of
the policy towards Iraq.  This account also describes the evolution of the
American containment regime towards Iran, and the ways in which it evolved to
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adapt to the changing situation in Iran and the Gulf, and within US domestic
politics.
In contrast to Iraq, American ‘containment’ of Iran was not conducted
through the UNSC.  Unlike Iraq, Iran had not launched any aggressive wars that
had drawn the ire of enough of the world to make mobilising the ‘peace
enforcement’ mechanisms of the UN Charter feasible.  The other littoral states, in
particular Saudi Arabia, maintained defence cooperation with the US but also
renewed and deepened diplomatic relations with Iran during the 1990s, though
they still desired American protection, seeing Iran primarily as a rival.  The
measures that the US took to limit the influence of Iran and frustrate its attempts
to rebuild its armed forces reflected this.  However, as well as seeking to contain
Iran, the Clinton administration also sought to improve relations when it
perceived the opportunity to do so, recognising that it was unwise to remain in an
antagonistic relationship with the largest state in the region.  Nonetheless, their
attempts to do so were heavily circumscribed: by other players in the American
policymaking process outside the executive branch with differing agendas, by
groups opposed to this in the Iranian body politic, and ultimately by the
poisonous legacy of previous US-Iranian relations.  This meant that the moves
towards reconciliation by the Clinton administration were fitful, and punctuated
by intercessions by the legislative branch of the American government, which
went some way towards determining the tone and the timing of American policy
and complicated the process.  In particular, activism by some members of
Congress forced the executive branch into retrograde motion in its policymaking.
This also had a ‘chilling effect’, making American attempts to reach any
accommodation with Iran slower and more difficult (which will be discussed
more fully in the following chapters).  Nonetheless, despite the difficulties
experienced by American policymakers, the Clinton administration did
eventually make efforts to improve relations with Iran once it perceived the
chance to do so.
5.3.1 Iran and US sanctions
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It would be an understatement to say that the Iranian half of ‘dual
containment’ was not without precedent in recent American foreign policy.  In
fact, “When President Clinton assumed office in 1993, he inherited a wide array
of executive and legislative constraints imposed by Presidents Jimmy Carter,
Ronald Reagan, and George Bush on Iran to block most military and many
economic transactions between the two states.”58 These measures proliferated in
the following years.  The story of US sanctions on Iran in the 1990s begins with
the Iran-Iraq Non-proliferation Act of 1992.  It many ways it clearly summed up
the concerns that US policymakers held about Iran, and prefigured later measures
in the Clinton administration.  Despite its name, the act (sponsored by Senators
John McCain and Al Gore) was aimed primarily at Iran, given that “Iraq was
under the most comprehensive embargo ever imposed by the UN” at the time it
was passed. 59 It “suspended the ability of the United States government to
engage in trade with Iran, issue trading licences and provide economic and
technical assistance”, and explicitly banned the transfer of technologies that
could be used in non-conventional weapons development, as well as advanced
conventional weapons “of a size or type that would have a destabilising impact
on the region.” 60 Although it was enacted during the Bush (senior)
administration, there were some features of the act that would recur in measures
enacted under Clinton: it was extra-territorial, extending its provisions to non-US
states and firms, and it was introduced by Congress without any substantial
direction from the executive branch.  In fact, it became law despite disapproval
from the executive branch, and was criticised by President Bush for impinging
upon the Presidency’s responsibility for foreign policy.61 In addition, it took aim
at two developments that were of particular concern to American policymakers
in these branches of the federal government: the fact that US-Iranian trade links
were relatively strong (considering the circumstances), and the willingness of
post-Soviet Russia to sell advanced weapons systems to Iran.  Overall, it
arguably “marked the onset of a clear unilateral containment strategy towards
58 Fawaz Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures of Clash of Interests?
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Iran”62 as well as symbolising American determination to ‘manage’ the security
system of the Persian Gulf.
The next significant sanctions imposed by the US were a pair of
‘Executive Orders’ introduced by President Clinton, numbers 12957 of March
1995, and 12959 of April of the same year.  The first forbade US citizens from
working or investing in the Iranian petroleum industry.  The second essentially
forbade US-Iranian trade, shutting down economic ties with Iran.  The context in
which these were introduced requires some examination, as it illuminates an
important aspect of American-Iranian relations in this era.  While the use of
executive orders would, on first sight, suggest that this was a unilateral measure
by the executive branch, this would be incorrect.  In fact, they represented an
attempt by President Clinton to retain the initiative in American policymaking
with regards to Iran, and were designed to ‘head off’ stricter measures that were,
at the time, being debated in Congress.  More specifically, the first order, barring
American involvement in the Iranian oil industry, was a response to
Congressional disapproval of a deal struck between Iran and a subsidiary of the
American DuPont Corporation, Conoco, to develop Iran’s Sirri A and E oilfields.
At the time this reflected another fact that sat uncomfortably alongside official
American disapproval of Iran: the fact American companies bought 30% of
Iran’s exported oil63 (a legal transaction provided it was not subsequently sold in
the US)64, and an increasingly-important importer of American goods.65 The
order was also introduced a day before debate was scheduled to begin to begin in
Congress on Senator D’Amato’s Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Bill,66 which the
White House opposed.  The order was unsuccessful at shutting down legislative
attempts to direct American Iran policy.  In response to presidential opposition,
Senator D’Amato tabled the Iran Foreign Sanctions Act, which included
provisions for extra-territorial sanctions on foreign bodies that traded with Iran,
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in late March.  Clinton’s second Executive Order was therefore another attempt
to pre-empt legislation working its way through Congress and retain the initiative
in foreign policymaking, at least where Iran was concerned. 67 He duly
announced that he was severing American trade links with Iran at a meeting of
the World Jewish Congress in April 1995, which was swiftly followed by the
promulgation of Executive Order 12959.
However, the executive orders banning US-Iranian trade still fell short of
the measures proposed in Senator D’Amato’s bill, as it lacked the extra-territorial
aspect.  As a result of this pressure, President Clinton announced that he would
seek the assistance of the G7 in introducing new sanctions against Iran at the
scheduled meeting of the group in Nova Scotia in June 1995. In return, Senator
D’Amato and his allies agreed to postpone the reading of their legislation.  The
unwillingness of the other members of the G7 to co-operate in sanctioning Iran
was not altered by Clinton’s entreaties.  Consequently, Senator D’Amato and
other legislators in both the House and the Senate pressed ahead with their
legislative programme for Iran.  This would result in the passage of another act
of Congress that strongly influenced American-Iranian relations, the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996.  In September 1995, Senator D’Amato
introduced the Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act, which was specifically directed at
non-American firms, in contrast to the earlier bill (the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions Act), and in the face of stated unwillingness of the executive branch to
sanction foreign entities trading with Iran. 68 The bipartisan support this
legislation attracted forced the White House to compromise (intervention by
Senator Edward Kennedy ensured that the act also targeted Libya in an attempt
to force Gaddafi to cooperate with the investigation into the Lockerbie bombing).
ILSA was passed by Congress in June 1996, and signed into law by President
Clinton in August.  It gave the President the authority to impose two of the
following sanctions on any foreign entity that invested more than $40m in the
Iranian or Libyan energy industries: “import and export bans; embargoes on
lending by US banks, a ban on US procurement of goods and services from
67 Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security, p.109
68 Ibid, p.111
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sanctioned companies; and a denial of US export financing.” 69 In addition,
sanctioned companies would not be permitted to receive American technology
that required an export licence.70 As a compromise gesture it allowed the White
House to issue waivers on the grounds of national security, or that the sanctioned
company’s home country had introduced sanctions of its own that made
American measures unnecessary.
ILSA proved to be extremely controversial internationally, though it
passed through Congress with majorities large enough to make a presidential
veto impossible.  The international controversy, with close allies, contributed to
making it highly unpopular in the executive branch, so much so that “for many,
“hated” was too mild a word”, given that it contradicted the stated American
policy of advancing international free trade (the extraterritorial sanctions violated
WTO rules), and jeopardised American attempts to gain the cooperation of the
EU, Japan and others in advancing this agenda. 71 This was not the only
Congressional intervention in American-Iranian relations.  In between the tabling
of ILSA in its original form in September 1995 and its entry into the statute book
in mid-1996, the House of Representatives appropriated $18m to fund anti-
regime activities in Iran in a confidential resolution at the end of December
1995.72 Representative Newt Gingrich, the Speaker of the House, was largely
responsible, adding it to the classified section of the yearly appropriation for
intelligence operations.  It became a sticking point in negotiations over the
budget between the Senate and the White House, leading to the leak of its
existence to the media and a predictably furious response from the Iranian
government.  Representative Gingrich had previously called for the overthrow of
the Iranian regime in a series of newspaper columns.73 Eventually, the White
House decided to compromise on this issue also, and ensured that the money was
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allocated to changing the policy of Iran, and not overthrowing the regime,74
which was considered impossible and too dangerous to attempt by the American
intelligence services.75 The Iranian government publically allocated an equal
amount to counteract American efforts in Iran and announced that it intended to
register official complaints against the US with international legal bodies.76
ILSA was the catalyst for a serious disagreement with America’s
European allies (as well as Japan and Canada), who almost immediately
announced that they would not abide by its restrictions (despite these claims,
Pollack argues that the sanctions contained in ILSA were in some measure
successful in that some firms chose not to invest in Iran in order to maintain their
ability to operate in the US market).77 Nonetheless, it seriously degraded the
goodwill that the US required to persuade other states to put economic pressure
on Iran, leading Martin Indyk, one of the principal authors of ‘dual containment’,
to label them ‘a disaster.’78 Unsurprisingly, the UK, France and Germany and
the rest of the EU chose to continue to pursue their own approach to Iran, despite
US pressure, which was dubbed ‘critical dialogue.’ 79 This “consisted of
encouraging trade and other interactions with Iran for the purposes of generating
interdependence and giving Iran a vested interest in the status quo while
promoting dialogue over Iran’s problematic behavior.”80 despite looming bones
of contention between Iran and the UK, France and Germany: the Salman
Rushdie affair with regards to the UK, and the assassinations of former Iranian
PM Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris in 1991 and several Iranian Kurdish leaders in
Berlin in 1992 by agents of the Iranian state.  Consequently, the EU Commission
threatened retaliation if the US actually sanctioned any European companies
under ILSA and Germany renewed its export-credit guarantees with Iran.  ILSA
also proved ineffective at checking the behaviour of America’s other allies:
Japan threatened to lodge a complaint with the World Trade Organisation
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(WTO), and shortly after ILSA was signed into law the Islamist Prime Minister
of Turkey, Erbakan travelled to Iran and signed a $20bn deal for natural gas.81
Overall, the economic relationship between Iran and the EU was
considered too important by both parties to be jeopardised by any of these issues.
When a German court ruled in 1997 that complicity in the 1992 assassinations
went all the way to the top of the Iranian government, the EU states (except
Greece) briefly withdrew their ambassadors from Iran in protest but did not
contemplate cutting trade ties.82 The EU also wrung concessions from the US
regarding the application of ILSA.  Following the passage of the act, Iran signed
a $2bn investment contract with Gazprom of Russia, Petronas of Malaysia and
Total SA of France in September 1997 to develop an offshore gas field.  The EU
subsequently lodged a formal complaint against ILSA at the WTO in Geneva at
the end of that year, although both sides subsequently agreed to settle the matter
bilaterally.  They finally did so in May of 1998, at a meeting of Jacques Santer,
British prime minister Tony Blair (at the time presidents of the European
Commission and the European Council respectively) and President Clinton.83
Here, the EU extracted a waiver for the Total SA deal, and future deals, under
section 9 (c) of ILSA (on the grounds that it benefited US national interests), in
return for the promise to “work harder to prevent the transfer to Iran of materials
and technology” that could be used for non-conventional weapons.84
The US also used other channels to put pressure on Iran.  One of these
was the policy of restricting Iranian access to financing and debt-restructuring
from international organisations.85 This was matched by attempts to prevent Iran
from buying modern armaments to re-equip its military after the Iran-Iraq War.
One example was the 1997 purchase by the US of the bulk of the Moldovan air
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force’s inventory of combat jets, ostensibly to prevent their sale to Iran.86 The
Clinton administration also pressured Russia not to export weaponry to Iran, with
mixed success.  Wright states that “The degree of concern about Iran’s
procurement of Russian armaments and technology was so high within the
Clinton administration that Clinton raised it as a serious concern with President
Yeltsin at their summit meetings.”87 As a result of this pressure, Vice-President
Al Gore reportedly reached an agreement with Russian PM Victor Chernomyrdin
in 1995 which stated that Russia would honour its existing arms contracts with
Iran, but refrain from further exports.  Consequently, the US was unable to
prevent Iran from acquiring some modern weaponry, such as Russian Kilo-class
diesel-electric attack submarines for its navy.88 This was followed in 1998 by the
sanctioning of several Russian organisations by President Clinton through an
Executive Order under the 1992 Iran-Iraq Non-proliferation Act, following an
Iranian ballistic missile test.89 This move was also partly a response by more
pressure from Congress, which Alikhani argues was itself a response to Clinton’s
decision to waive sanctions on Total and its partners.  This measure, “a new
unilateral sanction against Iran”, was the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act
(IMPSA) of 1998, which passed in the Senate in May and the House in June,
before being vetoed by President Clinton. 90 It was likely the threat of a
Congressional override of this veto that led to the 1998 sanctions, which were
extended to three more Russian firms in 1999.91
As stated above, Iran’s development of nuclear technology was a major
concern of the US.  Russia was a prominent target of congressional and White
House ire because of its involvement in Iran’s nuclear power programme.  As
early as August of 1992, Russia agreed to construct a nuclear power plant near
the Iranian city of Bushehr and supply uranium fuel enriched to 20%.  This was
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followed two years later by an $800m deal between Russia and the Iranian
Atomic Energy Authority to build two light-water nuclear reactors and
generators, each capable of generating 1,000MW of electricity.92 Although this
was the same technology that the US had agreed to export to North Korea,93 it
led to threats by senior figures in Congress to cut off aid to Russia over the
issue,94 indicating that “the US was willing to risk a crisis with Russia by putting
the Russian-Iranian reactor before its priorities for the May US-Russia
summit.” 95 China, another of Iran’s international partners on its nuclear
development programme, was also subjected to American pressure.  Warren
Christopher, his successor as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the
administration made strenuous efforts to persuade the Chinese government to
downgrade its cooperation and commercial dealings with Iran’s nuclear
authority, reportedly going so far as to making it a condition of continued US-
Chinese trade in nuclear technology.96 As a result of these concerns, the final
sanction imposed under the Clinton Administration in this area was the Iran
Nonproliferation Act, signed into law by President Clinton in March of 2000,
after two years of political pressure from Congress following his veto of the
IMPSA in 1998.  This time, Clinton relented on the stated grounds that this Act,
in contrast to IMPSA, gave the executive branch enough flexibility: while it
required the President to ‘name and shame’ proliferators to Congress and gave
the President the power to sanction them, it did not compel the imposition of
sanctions, or require the issue of a formal waiver if they were not imposed.97
This followed a further congressional measure to put pressure on Iran’s nuclear
programme from the previous year, in August of 1999, when the House of
Representatives “cut US funding for the IAEA by the exact amount that the
Agency was assisting Iran with the construction of Bushehr.”98
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In reviewing all of these measures in totality something important
becomes obvious: one thing many of the measures discussed above had in
common, aside from the fact that they were all unilateral measures adopted by
the US rather than the ‘international community’ (as in the case of Iraq), is that
they were either heavily influenced or created by political actors outside the
executive branch.  Some cases are obvious.  ILSA, for example, a piece of
legislation conceived and implemented by the legislature in the face of
disapproval from the White House.  Even in cases of presidential sanctions, such
as Executive Orders 12957 and 12959, these were reactions to pressure from
Congressional sources, and attempts to forestall legislation and thus retain the
initiative in regards to foreign policymaking.  The Conoco case is an illuminating
one in this regard.  The US State Department was aware that Conoco was
negotiating with Iran, and had not objected to the deal.99 On the Iranian side, the
awarding of the contract to an American firm was a signal by the government of
Hashemi Rafsanjani that it sought improved relations with the US.100 All of this
proved to be irrelevant.  When the first executive order failed to dampen
criticism of Clinton’s Iranian policy and the march towards legislative sanctions,
the second was introduced in the hope that this would be sufficient.  While they
did completely bar trade with Iran, as executive orders rather than legislation
they theoretically left the power to overturn the ban in the hands of the president,
rather than the legislature.  This was also the case with the Iran Nonproliferation
Act of 2000, which, as described above, reached the statute book only after a
two-year rearguard action by the executive branch, and was only deemed
acceptable because it conceded the decision to apply the Act in each case to the
White House.  This leads Wright to argue that, in regards to Iran, Congress
“restricted the options available to the executive branch and, in
essence…usurped the foreign policy prerogative of the President.” 101 The
implications of this are discussed more fully in chapter 7.
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5.3.2 US-Iranian attempts at reconciliation: 1997 onwards
The reluctance of the executive branch to impose sanctions on Iran
(relative to that of some members of Congress) was equalled by a desire to
achieve a reconciliation with a state that was too important to ignore and too
expensive to contain, at least if there was an alternative.  Madeleine Albright (US
Ambassador to the UN and Clinton’s second Secretary of State) summed up this
attitude when she wrote that both she and President Clinton “were intrigued by
the possibility of better relations with Iran, whose strategic location, cultural
influence, and size made it a pivotal state in one of the world’s most combustible
regions.” 102 This drive was given an added impetus following the surprise
election of Mohammed Khatami to the presidency of Iran in May 1997, when it
seemed that American-Iranian relations had reached a nadir following the
passage of ILSA and the imposition of other sanctions.  The administration made
several attempts to ‘break the ice’ with Iran under Khatami, especially in the
wake of a now-famous interview he gave to CNN journalist Christiane
Amanpour at the beginning of 1998 in which he called for a ‘dialogue of
civilisations’, spoke of his respect for the US and its values, and called for the
forging of links between the two countries.103 The timing of this was favourable
in an important sense- it followed Clinton’s re-election in 1996, so the political
risk of being accused of being ‘soft’ on Iran was lessened, given that he no
longer had to consider the effect on a re-election campaign.  This may also have
been influenced by personnel changes in the US government, with Madeleine
Albright replacing Warren Christopher as Secretary of State in January of 1997.
Christopher had been Deputy Secretary of State under President Carter, serving
through the hostage crisis that did so much to poison US-Iranian relations.  Some
sources argue that his experiences in this position inculcated an implacable
hostility to the Islamic Republic which coloured the formation and execution of
American policy.104
102 Albright, Madam Secretary, p.319
103 Mohammed Khatami, ‘Transcript of an interview with Iranian President Mohammed
Khatami’, January 7 1998, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html accessed
01-10-10
104 Gerges, American and Political Islam, p.124-6; Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, p.213;
Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran, p.136
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The first overtures from the US to Iran quickly followed Khatami’s
election, and took the form of a series of letters sent to Iran via third parties over
a series of months beginning in June, proposing direct talks by authorised
representatives of both governments.  The US also dropped its opposition to the
construction of a gas pipeline for Central Asian natural gas through Iran, and
placed the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK), the opposition group perhaps most feared
and hated by the Iranian government, on the State Department’s list of proscribed
terrorist organisations, forbidding it from raising funds in the US.105 This, in
turn, was followed by some encouraging rhetoric from Khatami, culminating in
his appearance on CNN.106 The next two years would see a cautious series of
gestures, each individually small, by the US.  For instance, shortly after
Khatami’s statements on CNN, Clinton broadcast a goodwill message to Iran to
mark the Iranian new year, which was re-played on Iranian state radio, and
American officials also ceased to openly accuse Iran of complicity in the 1996
Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, which had killed several American
servicemen.107 The State Department’s annual report on terrorism worldwide
accused Iran of being the single-biggest state sponsor in 1997, though by 1999
this was judged to have changed.108
A delicate diplomatic dance also began at the United Nations, where both
Iran and the US were members of the ‘6+2 Group’, which periodically convened
to discuss the situation in Afghanistan.  At the first meeting of the group attended
by Madeleine Albright in 1998, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Kharrazi, avoided
meeting her by sending his deputy, on the orders of Iran’s Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Khamenei.109 However, he did respond to American overtures in a
speech to the Asia Society, and both Albright and Kharrazi did meet in person at
a later 6+2 meeting in 2000.110 More explicit American attempts to begin the
105 Murray, US Foreign Policy and Iran, p.106
106 Ibid, p.107
107 Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, p.233
108 Murray, US Foreign Policy and Iran, p.111
109 Ibid, p.110
110 Albright & Woodward, Madam Secretary, p.323-5
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reconciliation process with Iran had begun shortly before, in an address by
Albright to the Asia Society in New York in June of 1998, in which she called
for the rebuilding of ties between the US and Iran, leading to eventual
normalisation of diplomatic relations.  Her comments were echoed by President
Clinton the next day, in remarks which Hiro argue “buried Clinton’s own…”dual
containment” policy”. 111 More followed in January of 1999, when Albright
stated that Iran was too important to be isolated, effectively pronouncing the
containment of Iran as “officially dead.”112 President Clinton followed up in
April, issuing a veiled apology for the 1953 CIA-backed coup, and then signed
an executive order allowing the export of food and medical supplies to Iran.113
Finally, in March 2000, Albright made a more explicit apology for American
involvement in the 1953 coup, offered to help with the unfreezing of Iranian
assets in the US,114 and announced the lifting of import restrictions of some
Iranian goods (pistachios, carpets, caviar and dried fruit) into the US.115
Despite these attempts by the US to re-establish something akin to a
publically-acknowledged dialogue with Iran, no breakthrough was made and the
relationship between the two states remained adversarial.  There are many
obvious reasons for this, including the fact the US and Iran simply didn’t see
eye-to-eye on a number of important issues, such as the presence of the US
military in the Persian Gulf and Iran’s close relationship with Lebanese
Hezbollah.  It also reflected the fact that the relationship between the two states
had a huge amount of ground to cover before it could reach anything like
‘normality,’ most significantly the bad blood between the two states stemming
from events such as the hostage crisis.  As described above, the American
government was divided on the issue: despite its rhetoric the executive branch
was lukewarm in its commitment to pursue the ‘containment’ of Iran
aggressively and unilaterally, never imposing sanctions under ILSA, while forces
within the legislature were determined to push the administration into turning the
111 Hiro, Iran Today, p.271
112 Murray, Foreign Policy and Iran, p.111
113 Hiro, Neighbors, Not Friends, p.244
114 Ibid, p.257
115 Albright & Woodward, Madam Secretary, p.324
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screws on Iran.  This was mirrored on the Iranian side.  Many sources attest to
the fact the Khatami was reluctant to push too far and too fast to break through
what he called the “bulky wall of mistrust”116 between the US and Iran, and run
the risk of deepening the rifts between reformers and conservatives in Iranian
government and society to a dangerous degree.  Consequently, in general he was
able to make some gestures to signal his intentions to the US,117 but unable to
follow through.  This also, like the American case, illuminates some facets of the
Iranian political system, with the President in both countries required to reconcile
his policies with those of other powerful political actors and institutions.  This is
more apparent in Iran, where the office of President is subordinate to that of the
Supreme Leader.  This led Khatami to declare in 2000 that he lacked the power
to carry out his constitutional responsibilities, after a series of gruelling
confrontations with his political opponents. 118 Ansari concurs with this
assessment, stating that “neither President possessed sufficient authority to
transcend their critics at home.”119 The importance of the domestic aspect of US
politics is discussed more fully in chapters 7 and 8.
5.4 Conclusions
Overall, we can draw several lessons from the features of ‘dual
containment’ examined in this chapter.  Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, the
use of the term ‘dual’ is in some ways a misnomer, and does not accurately
reflect the true relationship between American policy towards Iraq on the one
hand and Iran on the other.  While the two states border each other, and both
were the target of sanctions, the differences between the two states and the
respective sanctions regimes were glaring, as was the American approach to
maintaining them and the ultimate rationale for doing so.  While the US sought
the ‘containment’ of both states, in effect it pursued two separate policies
116 Khatami, CNN interview
117 Such as clamping down on sanctions-busting trade with Iraq, ruling out official Iranian action
against Salman Rushdie, and ending opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process.  Slavin, Bitter
Friends, Bosom Enemies, p.186
118 Quoted in Murray, US Foreign Policy and Iran, p.114
119 Ali Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Policy and the Roots of Mistrust
(London: Hurst & Co, 2006), p.178.
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simultaneously, a fact that became more obvious as, in his second term, Clinton
sought to mend fences with Iran while Washington’s attitude towards Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq remained consistently hostile.  This was recognised by some
officials: as stated, Edward Djerejian attempted to prevent the term ‘dual
containment’ from being used in the first place.  He would later go so far as to
describe it as “a rhetorical flourish that did more to confuse United States Middle
East policy than serve realistically our national security interests” in light of the
differences between Iran and Iraq.120 The consequence of this decision, to pursue
a process of containment of both states, was the assumption by the US of a quasi-
hegemonic role in the management of Persian Gulf security.  The breakdown of
the tripolar system described in chapter 4, and the longstanding American policy
of preventing the domination of the region by any state it considered hostile, as
described in chapter 3, made the US the predominant actor in Persian Gulf
security, but had the unintended side-effect of making American domestic
politics major factors in the functioning of the Persian Gulf’s security system.
Secondly, the nature of the policymaking process was different in each
case.  In the case of Iran the White House was forced to deal with a great deal of
legislative activism, and, as we saw, Congress seized the initiative on more than
one occasion, and succeeded in particular in severing the economic relationship
between the US and Iran near-totally.  Through ILSA, the legislative branch also
threatened to damage US relations with its traditional allies and the
administration’s attempts to promote global free trade.  Though the White
House’s appetite for confrontation with Iran was limited, relations nevertheless
reached a true nadir under Clinton, so much so that Gerges argues the US
“waged an undeclared economic, political, and covert war against Iran’s cleric-
dominated regime.” 121 In contrast, relations with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
remained consistently hostile at the highest levels, and the only real opposition to
this stemmed from a groundswell of public sympathy for the suffering of the
Iraqi people amongst Western publics.  However, it must be acknowledged that
120 Correspondence with author
121 Gerges, America and Political Islam, p.115
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even in the Iraqi case Congress found a way to ‘raise the stakes’ by passing the
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.
The reasons for Congressional intervention in American Persian Gulf
policy (and the theoretical implications of this), through legislations and other
means, are the subject of the following chapters.  In particular, they shall attempt
to demonstrate why dual containment can best be understood as an example of
neoclassical realism in action.  It has been argued that while the US pursued the
neutralisation of Iraqi and Iranian power in the Persian Gulf through various
means from a ‘traditional’ geostrategic rationale, the means themselves were
determined by other factors bound up in the nature of the American political
system, the nature of the relationships between the US and Israel and the US and
Iran, and domestic American politics.  It is to these that we now turn our
attention.
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CHAPTER 6 Perception as an intervening variable: A
triumphant America and a villainous Iran
“Wherever you look, you will find the evil hand of Iran in this region.”  Warren
Christopher, US Secretary of State, 1993-19971
As discussed in chapter 2, many adherents of NCR argue that an
understanding of the perceptions of threat and power held by policymakers is a
critical component that goes far in determining a state’s foreign policy.  As the
previous chapter discussed the details of American dual containment policy, we
are now in a position to examine the role of perceptions in forming and shaping
the policy.  This chapter therefore examines the role of the perceptions of power
and threat on the part of key American policymakers.  It argues that Iran was
perceived as a threat to American interests thanks to the legacy of mistrust
between the two states, stemming back to 1979, and sharpened acutely by the
American commitment to Israeli security and the Arab-Israeli peace process.
Iraq under Saddam Hussein, on the other hand, was seen as a threat to American
interests thanks to the aggressive wars waged in the previous decade.
Perceptions of American power in the wake of the Cold War also played an
important role, given the absence of superpower competition.
This chapter examines the evolution and nature of the perception of the
threat posed by Iran in some detail as it is a more puzzling and more complex
case than that of Iraq, and can be traced to the history of the interactions between
the two states and the image of Iran in the minds of Americans, rather than
primarily to Iran’s behaviour in the Persian Gulf (as in the case of Iraq).  As a
necessary corollary, it also examines the debate about the threat posed by ‘radical
Islam’ in the US in the wake of the Cold War (given the link between Iran,
radical Islamic forces, and terrorism perceived by American policymakers, as
postulated by Gerges, amongst others). 2 This chapter begins with a short
1 Quoted by Elaine Sciolino, ‘Condemning Iranian Oil Deal, US May Tighten Trade Ban,’ The
New York Times, 10 March 1995
2 Fawaz Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999)
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discussion of how perceptions have been analysed by other scholars working
within NCR, particularly some of the more recent scholarship that follows on
from the ‘third wave’ works discussed in chapter 2.  This is followed by a section
each on the role of perceptions of power and threat on the part of American
policymakers, and a section on the impact of the Iranian Hostage Crisis and the
Iran-Contra scandal on the latter.  The role of American perceptions of political
Islam is then discussed, as is the impact of the Arab-Israeli peace process in the
1990s.
6.1 Perception and neoclassical realism
Perception is a key variable in many theories of neoclassical realism, and
several scholars emphasise its role in the formation of foreign policy in their
work.  As stated, within the existing literature of neoclassical realism, perception
as an intervening variable tends to be broken down in two ways: perceptions of
threat, and perceptions of relative power.  Rose traces this to the ‘third wave’ of
works in NCR, with the first and second ‘waves’ focusing on shifts in the relative
power of different states, 3 and the ‘third’ and following wave moving more
towards studies of the interactions of shifts in power and perceptions of power
and threat.4 Regarding the former, Wohlforth, for instance (as seen in Chapter
2), discusses the role of perceptions of relative power in Soviet foreign
policymaking in the final stages of the Cold War. 5 Elsewhere, he writes
regarding the decline of Soviet power that: “perceived relative decline was a
necessary condition for the adoption of perestroika and “new thinking” and
decline was connected to the burdens imposed by the Soviet Union’s
international position.”6 Also influential are perceptions of ‘state power’ held by
policymakers, namely their perceptions of their ability to mobilize resources to
3 For example, Aaron Friedberg’s The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative
Decline (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988)
4 Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,’ World Politics, 51 (1)
1998.  For a comprehensive list, see: Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan, British Foreign Policy, National
Identity, and Neoclassical Realism (Plymouth, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), chapter 2, note 28
5 William Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993)
6 William Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, International Security, 19 (3)
(1994/1995), p.108.
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carry out their objectives.  In the same chapter, we saw that Zakaria holds that
this factor was definitive in explaining why US foreign policy remained
somewhat out of step with its growing economic power: it was only when
presidents believed that they finally enjoyed the preponderance of power in the
foreign policy-making process that they began to expand their conceptions of the
‘national interest’ and pursued more ambitious goals.7
The other major theme is that of the perception of threat on the part of
policymakers.  This conditions how they respond to threats and what threats they
respond to, according to research by scholars of neoclassical realism. Schweller,
like Wohlforth, argues that policymakers’ perceptions of the international
environment and the balance of power are an important explanatory variable, and
goes some way towards explaining why states sometimes ‘underbalance.’8 This
theme is further explored by Steven Lobell, who creates an intricate model of
threat identification by elites within states across international, regional and
domestic levels.9 In other cases, it forms an important component in broader
theories about the impact of the autonomy of FPEs on foreign policy, such as in
Dueck’s study of the variables affecting presidential decisions about military
intervention abroad, and his assertion that “the US was forced to intervene in
[Korea, Vietnam and Iraq] due to some intolerable external threat, but in fact the
crucial immediate variable was the perception of it on the part of senior officials,
and not the international system as such.”10
7 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
8 Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p.1
9 Steven Lobell, ‘Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model,’ in
Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
10 Colin Dueck, ‘Neoclassical realism and the national interest: presidents, domestic politics,  and
major military interventions,’ in Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman & Jeffrey Taliaferro (eds.),
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), p.149-50
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6.2 Perceptions of power and opportunity
Perceptions of relative power play a significant role in the formation of
foreign policy, and ‘dual containment’ proved to be no exception to this rule.
American policymakers stated at several points throughout the 1990s that the end
of the Cold War and its superpower rivalry gave the US more latitude to pursue
its objectives, and that the reconfiguration of global power structures resulting
from the end of the Cold War required a new approach to international relations
that recognised this fact.
As stated in Chapter 5, Martin Indyk’s announcement of ‘dual
containment’ policy at the Soref Symposium in 1993 included the following
point: “in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, the
United States stands as the dominant power in the region, uniquely capable of
influencing the course of events.”11 American policymakers therefore perceived
that the US enjoyed a position of unchallenged global and regional pre-eminence.
This is echoed in a statement from the following year, in an article attributed to
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who states that “the end of the Cold
War simply eliminated a major strategic consideration from our calculus.  We no
longer have to fear Soviet efforts to gain a foothold in the Persian Gulf by taking
advantage of our support for one of these states to build relations with the
other.”12 The importance of this point should not be underestimated, given the
pre-occupation of US policymakers with the Soviet threat during the previous 45
years.  As we saw in Chapter 3, this led them to frequently view the Persian Gulf
primarily as an arena in which the wider global struggle was fought out, when
they did turn their attentions to the region.  Numerous examples are on display in
even the most cursory examination, such as facilitating Iran’s build-up of arms
under the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ in the 1970s, the formation of the Rapid Deployment
Force and the Carter Doctrine in 1980, and President Regan’s decision to ‘re-
flag’ Kuwaiti oil tankers in order to pre-empt Soviet involvement during the Iran-
11 Martin Indyk, ‘The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East’, Soref Symposium,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 1993, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/the-clinton-administrations-approach-to-the-middle-east accessed 08-07-2012
12 Anthony Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States,’ Foreign Affairs, 73 (2) 1994, p.48
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Iraq War.  The necessity of maintaining a substantial American presence in the
Persian Gulf remained, however, given the long-standing American commitment
to Israel, and the continued centrality of the Persian Gulf’s oil and gas to the
smooth running of the global economy.
Additionally, both Lake and Indyk highlighted the degradation of Iran
and Iraq’s military power following the 1980-1988 and 1991 wars, which
enabled the US to pursue a parallel-track containment policy in the Persian Gulf.
As Indyk put it in 1993, “we are fortunate to inherit a balance of power and a
much reduced level of military capability to threaten our interests.”13 Together
with the absence of a superpower competitor, this made the Persian Gulf a
permissive environment for the US to exercise its power.
6.3 Perceptions of threat
Examination of the perceptions of the threat posed by Iran and Iraq held
by American policymakers reveals a complex mosaic of interlocking threat
perceptions, all derived from interconnected sources.  The first, and perhaps most
obvious of these, is the perception of Iran and Iraq as threats to American
geostrategic interests in the Persian Gulf.  Chapter 3 examined how US
policymakers came to view the Persian Gulf and its energy supplies as a critical
element in Western security in the wake of the Second World War and the onset
of the Cold War, given the industrialized world’s dependence on fossil fuels,
especially oil.  This dependence did not change appreciably with the collapse of
the Soviet Union, meaning that any perceived threat to the export of oil and gas
from this region remained synonymous with a threat to Western security as a
whole, determining the persistence of US involvement in the Persian Gulf.
Although the US had not depended on the Persian Gulf for the bulk of its oil
imports, the integration of the global oil market ensures that it remains a key
node in the global economy, which is in itself a key American security interest,
as the interruption of the Gulf’s oil exports would cause an immediate global oil
price spike and serious economic disruption.  From a more local perspective, the
13 Indyk, ‘The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East’
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final collapse of the regional tripolar security system with the 1991 Gulf War
created a demand for the presence of an external security guarantor, the United
States, given the on-going hostility between Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, and the
inability, unwillingness (or unacceptability to the Arab monarchies of the Gulf)
of other states to fulfil this role.
When the Clinton administration entered office, it inherited the
infrastructure and many of the preconceptions and preferences of the American
foreign policy ‘establishment’ up to that point, and as discussed in the previous
chapter chose to pursue a Persian Gulf policy that did not stray too far from the
mainstream of previous American policy.  It would therefore have been
“remarkable” if the new administration had undertaken a wide-ranging re-
alignment of Persian Gulf policy, especially considering the links that had been
built up with the Gulf Arab states, including defence agreements.14 An example
of the possible political fallout from such a measure can be seen in the reaction to
president-elect Bill Clinton’s comment in a newspaper interview shortly before
his first inauguration that he was a believer in ‘death-bed conversions’, and was
willing to countenance the rehabilitation of Saddam Hussein if Iraq gave up its
non-conventional weapons development programs and complied with UN
sanctions.  The negative reaction of much of the press and the American political
class prompted Clinton to make a swift U-turn.15
The US therefore has therefore consistently sought to prevent the
domination of the Persian Gulf by an ‘unfriendly’ power, be it the Soviet Union
in the Cold War (leading to the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine), or a hostile
regional state like Iran or Iraq, which threatened to upset the regional status quo
in a fashion that threatened American interests.  As Mearsheimer and Walt argue,
“America’s main interest in the Middle East is oil, and protecting access to this
commodity mainly depends on preventing any single country from controlling
14 Interview with Bruce Riedel former CIA, Defense Department and National Security Council
official, Washington, DC, February 2011.
15 Interview with Ambassador Chas Freeman, former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Defense
Department official, Washington, DC, February 2011; Martin Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An
Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East, (New York City, NY: Simon
& Schuster, 2009), p.31
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the entire region.”16 The centrality of this resource may also have had a high
priority for the incoming administration because of its focus on globalisation and
international trade.  This therefore defined the targets of ‘dual containment’: Iran
and Iraq, which possess the latent power resources to attempt to establish
hegemony over the Persian Gulf, as described in chapter 4.  This led, amongst
other things, to the ‘tilt’ towards Iraq and against Iran during the 1980-88 Iran-
Iraq war and the decision to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990-91: the
US was determined to prevent either Iran or Iraq from developing the means to
amass sufficient influence to dictate the policies of other Persian Gulf states.
Iraq is a more straightforward case: under Saddam Hussein, it was widely seen as
a dangerous and opportunistic regime that relied upon poorly-conceived military
adventurism to build up its regional power and influence, invading first Iran and
then Kuwait.  Its use of conventional military forces in an aggressive way
seemed to place it beyond the pale of diplomatic engagement, and required
coercive measures to keep it in check.
The Iranian case is more troublesome: Iran has not invaded any other
state (the historical record is, arguably, one of a state more sinned against than
sinning: the 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement, the allied invasion in the Second
World War, the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan, ‘Operation Ajax’ and the 1953
coup), yet was perceived as a threat nonetheless requiring of ‘containment.’  Iran
is the largest state in the Persian Gulf region, as detailed in chapter 4, and
therefore poses a ‘latent’ threat to American domination of the security system of
the Gulf.  As detailed in chapter 5, the US has subsequently sought to choke off
Iran’s access to technology and military equipment (except, like in the Iran-
Contra affair, when it has supplied Iran with weapons for its own purposes), for
example by buying up military hardware to prevent it falling into Iranian hands.
In addition, Washington pressured Russia and China (two of Iran’s major
suppliers) not to sell it military equipment, to prevent it from building up the
kind of military power enjoyed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or achieve the Shah’s
ambitions of regional domination, however unfeasible this may be in reality.  It
also formed a part of the decision not to actively support the 1991 uprising
16 John Mearsheimer & Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (NY; Farrar,
Strauss and Giroux, 2007), p.142.  See also p.141-2 and p.281.
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against Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party in 1991, out of fear that Iran would
emerge as the main beneficiary and enhance its regional influence.17 Ironically,
it would also emerge as one of the key reasons for the eagerness of the US to re-
establish ties to Iran, a feature of the contemporary US-Iranian relationship that
recurs periodically.  Iran is too good an opportunity to miss: it is strategically
placed and rich in hydrocarbons, and it was a valuable ally before 1979.  The two
states also shared a common enemy in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.  Overall, the
antagonistic relationship between the US and Iran is a problem for both parties,
one too large to ignore, but is not one that can be easily or quickly solved.  In
other words, “The United States would certainly welcome strategic changes that
would bring it closer to a millennium-old civilisation: a huge market, and
educated population and a geographically appealing location.”18
While Adib-Moghaddam’s claim that “Together with their allies in the
Likud party in Israel…[a] neoconservative coterie has manufactured an image of
Iran, which has made the country’s ‘aggressive nature’ an established fact
amongst influential strata of international society”19 is an exaggeration, it is clear
that the antagonistic relationship between the US and Iran is deeply rooted and
persistent, and based in part on a strikingly negative perception of Iran on the
part of many Americans.  An important element in this perception is the history
of antagonism between the US and Iran.  Since the 1979 revolution and the
foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the two states have been at odds over,
for one, the role of the US in the regional security system, and the US has
consistently sought to marginalise and reduce Iran’s regional influence (despite
occasional attempts to persuade its leaders to be more accommodating, such as
the Iran-Contra affair, and President Bush’s (1988-1991) overture.  This
perception is also complicated (if not intensified) by the Islamic character of the
revolution, which puzzled the Carter administration officials who were the first
17 F. Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), p.118.
18 Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, Security
and Economic Cooperation in a Changing Middle East (London: IB Tauris, 2011), p.129.
19 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic
(London, Hurst & Co., 2007), p.125.
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to be tasked with dealing with it,20 and coloured much of the thinking of officials
towards Islamist movements in the Middle East, with which the US has had, at
best, an ambiguous attitude towards.  Within the US, the rise of political Islam in
the Middle East has been characterised as a threat, albeit one that has not been
fully understood, or thoroughly conceptualised.  Instead, it is seen as a
potentially-dangerous ‘other’, a hostile force that endangers American interests
by threatening the survival of existing pro-American governments.  In this sense,
the Iranian revolution served as the template for the generalised, more-or-less
diffuse antipathy towards political Islam that has marked American policy
towards this phenomenon since 1979.  As Fuller and Lesser argue, “Despite the
awareness, certainly in expert circles, that Islam is hardly monolithic and that
Islamic politics can take varied forms, there remains – especially in the United
States – a concern that the Iranian model is more likely to be the norm rather than
the exception where Islamic regimes come to power.”21 This has perhaps been
exacerbated by the natural human tendency to see patterns and connections
where they may not necessarily exist, or draw unjustified and fallacious historical
parallels based on superficial resemblances.  In Moussali’s words, “Under the
influence of the Islamic revolution Islamism replaced secular nationalism as a
security threat to US interests, and fear of a clash between Islam and the West
crystallized in the minds of many Americans.”22 This also stems from the fact
that the revolution that overthrew the Shah came very much as a shock to US
policymakers, and became widely perceived as an enormous strategic reverse
that endangered the American position in the Persian Gulf, and rendered its
previous preferred policy of relying on proxies obsolete.23
20 Gary Sick, All Fall Down, p.192-7
21 Graham Fuller & Ian Lesser, A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press/RAND, 1995), p.22
22 Ahmad Moussali, US Foreign Policy and Islamist Politics (Gainesville, FL: University Press
of Florida, 2008), p.17.
23 Gerges, American and Political Islam, p.43-4.
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6.4 The hostage crisis and Iran-Contra
The hostage crisis played a significant role in institutionalising a degree
of hostility into American policy towards Iran, both at the elite and the popular
level, and is cited by many scholars as a ‘watershed’ moment that entrenched the
issue of bilateral relations into the respective politics of each state. Writing in the
late 1980s, James Bill stated that the hostage crisis “left a legacy of distrust,
misunderstanding, and hatred that will plague Iranian-American relations for
years.”24 Marr also argues that the effect of the hostage crisis was strong and
enduring, stating that it “poisoned” US-Iranian relations.25 This is echoed by
Henrikson, who argues that “it marked the turning point in American-Iranian
relations.  It constituted a watershed demarcation that to this day afflicts the
policies of both nations.”26 For others, it is the ‘original sin,’ the event that
ensured Iran’s relationship with the US would be qualitatively different, on the
American side, from all the other ‘rogue states.’27 At the same time, it represents
something of a problem for the scholar seeking to get to the bottom of its effects
on American foreign policy, as its impacts, while widely-held to be substantial,
are relatively difficult to quantify, given that they primarily impacted on
individuals’ perceptions and feelings towards Iran.  As Gary Sick observed, “not
very much happened.  The hostages were taken, held for fourteen and a half
months and then released…for the most part it was political shadowboxing, more
form than substance.”28 Nonetheless, there are a certain number of significant
effects that a wide range of scholars argue have had an enduring effect on
relations between Iran and the US.
24 James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1989), p.302
25 Phebe Marr, ‘US Strategy towards the Persian Gulf: From Rogue States to Failed States’. In
Markus Kaim (ed.), Great Powers and Regional Orders: The United States and the Persian Gulf
(Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008), p.14.
26 Thomas Henrikson, America and the Rogue States (New York, NY: PalgraveMacmillan,
2012), p.72.
27 James Blight, Janet Lang, Hussein Banai, Malcolm Byrne, and John Tirman, Becoming
Enemies: US-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 (New York, NY: Rowan &
Littlefield, 2012)
28 Sick, All Fall Down, p.259
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Although the original seizure of the US embassy in Tehran was carried
out by student protestors with a variety of motivations, including anger at the
admission of the Shah into the US for medical treatment and fear of another
1953-style coup, their actions were subsequently endorsed and co-opted by the
new revolutionary government (after some factional division), which held several
dozen embassy staff hostage in Iran for 444 days.  The failure of a military
rescue mission and the deaths of eight American military personnel in the
collision between a helicopter and refuelling plane was an additional blow that
deepened the sense of powerlessness and humiliation engendered by the hostage-
taking itself.  Many scholars argue that the fact that the whole episode was
carried on in the public gaze, and given exhaustive coverage29 (especially by
American TV networks) in the world’s media was an additional factor,
increasing the pressure on the American government and helping fuel public
outrage over the issue of the hostages, which became “an overwhelming national
obsession.”30 According to some accounts, it received the most media coverage
of any single event since the Second World War.31 The crisis dragged on for
over a year, unlike many other crises which flare up and are quickly forgotten by
the public, leading to the forging of an enduring negative image of Iran in the
minds of Americans, and became, according to many, a deciding factor in the
1980 election, giving it an added importance for American political elites.  Sick
also argues that this was exacerbated by the fact that “Americans knew little
about [Iran], cared less, and – despite the massive television exposure and the
spilling of millions of gallons of printer’s ink – managed to emerge from the
ordeal with their basic ignorance surprisingly intact.”32 Afterwards, as far as
Americans in general ‘knew’ anything about Iran, it tended to be highly negative.
It was therefore an experience “that burned itself into the popular imagination
and became part of the political landscape.”33 Pollack, in his study of US-Iranian
relations, is explicit in his claim that it had an enormous impact, arguing that
29 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, p.296
30 Barry Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York
City, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980), p.363
31 Henrikson, America and the Rogue States, p.72
32 Sick, All Fall Down, p.258
33 Ali Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of
Mistrust (London: Hurst & Co., 2006), p.93
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“The hostage crisis has left a terrible scar on the American psyche…few
Americans have ever forgiven the Iranians for it.  It is America’s great
underlying grievance against Iran…We never discuss it openly, but the residual
anger that so many Americans feel toward Iran for those 444 days has colored
every decision made about Iran ever since.”34
In the short term, the seizure of the embassy and its staff marked a
decisive break in US-Iranian relations, with the severance of diplomatic relations
between the two states, the imposition of sanctions and an economic embargo,
and the freezing of Iranian assets in the US after a short period of confused and
fruitless negotiations between the two states over the hostages.35 Prior to this
event, the US had attempted to reach out to ‘moderates’ in the new Iranian
government, but this was frustrated by the hostage crisis and the consolidation of
power in Iran by more anti-American factions.36 In the long term, it appears to
have created a deep reservoir of bitter animosity and vitriol that has never fully
dissipated, giving factions hostile to US-Iranian rapprochement on both sides a
resource to draw upon when needed.  It therefore did much to set the tone of
subsequent interaction between the US and Iran.  Diplomatic relations were not
re-established and the economic sanctions would only multiply with time,
especially after Iran was designated a sponsor of terrorism by the Reagan
administration in 1984. 37 Afterwards, both the US and Iran consistently
demonized each other in official discourse, and were to some degree mutually
uncomprehending of each other’s motives and outlook, something which failed
to improve, thanks in part to the absence of diplomatic relations between them.
Overall, “the Islamic revolution in Iran and the hostage crisis had a devastatingly
negative impact on Americans’ perceptions of Islam and Muslims in general.”38
It cemented an enduring suspicion amongst some Americans that Iran as a
34 Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York,
NY: Random House, 2004), p.172
35 Barry Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1980) p.330
36 Babak Ganji, Politics of Confrontation: The Foreign Policy of the USA and Revolutionary Iran
(London: IB Tauris, 2006), p.5
37 Blight et al, Becoming Enemies, Appendix I
38 Gerges, America and Political Islam, p.68
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fundamentally ‘rogue’ state, in that it is essentially anti-American, and radical in
that it refuses to acknowledge the niceties of diplomatic protocol and
international law, and is therefore untrustworthy and unable to be negotiated with
rationally, and can only be dealt with coercively, from a position of strength.  In
Ansari’s words, “there is no point negotiating with an irrational interlocutor.”39
Consequently, in “official Washington, the Iranians are theocratic, cruel,
determined to develop a nuclear weapons capability to increase their capacity to
blackmail their many enemies in the region and the West, and to threaten the
very existence of Israel.”40
The repercussions of the hostage crisis were reinforced by the Iran-Contra
affair, which also injected another degree of caution and hesitance into the
institutional memory of the US foreign policy apparatus regarding attempts to
reconcile with Iran.41 Ansari, for one, argues that, following President Carter’s
misfortunes, Reagan’s troubles transformed animosity towards Iran into a
“bipartisan affair that ruptured the intimate relationship between the elites [of the
US and Iran].” Iran subsequently “transcended regular politics and became a
myth, part of political folklore.”42 Hunter concurs with this assessment, and
argues that “it hardened the US position toward Iran, and discredited any idea of
reconciliation, until and unless Iran’s regime was changed or at least its
behaviour was altered to such a degree that, in effect, transformed the character
of the regime.”43
The strength of the legacy of the hostage crisis and the Iran-Contra
scandal can be seen in the nature of the subsequent interactions between the two
governments at the elite level, which were carried out via intermediaries and
through public messages in the media that were easy to ignore or misunderstand
39 Ansari, Confronting Iran, p.82
40 Blight et al, Becoming Enemies, ‘Prologue’
41 “[Iran-Contra] was still fresh in people’s minds [in the Clinton administration]…everyone
remembers it, no-one wants to get burned again.”  Kenneth Pollack, former CIA and NSC
official, interview with author Washington DC, March 2012
42 Ansari, Confronting Iran, p.72-3 & p.112
43 Shireen Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International
Order (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), p.42
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because of their vague nature.  For instance, in 1989, the US government hinted
that it might be willing to re-consider re-opening the question of Iranian assets
frozen in the US if Iran provided assistance with American hostages in Lebanon,
but denied that any ‘deal’ was on offer.  Iran responded by suggesting that its
assistance could be gained if some Iranian assets, frozen in the US after the 1979
revolution and the hostage crisis, were returned.44 Although two of the hostages
were released, reportedly thanks to Rafsanjani’s intervention with the
kidnappers, the US did not reciprocate in the way that Iran desired. 45 An
intermediary, the Italian diplomat and UN hostage negotiator Giandomenico
Picco, who broke this news to Iran’s then-president Rafsanjani, was apparently
warned to leave Iran for his own safety after delivering the bad news.46 Despite
his assertion in his inaugural address that “goodwill begets goodwill,” President
Bush seems to have been either unable or unwilling to take more decisive steps
towards improving relations with Iran.  This mistrust was also visible in the
decision not to invite Iran to the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991.  According
to Dennis Ross, the American diplomat who played a key role in attempting to
mediate in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Rafsanjani’s overtures to Bush
regarding a willingness to compromise on Israel were dismissed thanks what
seems to have been a case of ‘selection bias’, in which evidence that contradicts
existing beliefs (in this case, that Iran was implacably hostile and untrustworthy)
is dismissed, while evidence that supports it is not.47
6.5 Iran and Political Islam: the new Communism?
The most charged aspect of the vitriol expressed between Iran, Iraq, the
US, and other ‘rogue states’ in the Middle East has been the sectarian, religious
dimension, with some figures on both sides of the divide alleging that the other is
engaged on a religious crusade or jihad.  Given the incendiary nature of this kind
44 For instance, see Maureen Dowd, ‘Iran is reportedly ready for a deal to recover assets,’ The
New York Times, August 9, 1989.
45 Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, .p.163
46 Giandomenico Picco, Man Without a Gun (New York, NY: Times Books, 1999), p.5-6;
Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era, p.49;
47 Quoted in Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United
States (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), p.152
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of accusation, and the prominence of it in the 1990s (for example, the great
attention given to Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis),48 it is necessary
to examine the degree to which this formed a part of American perceptions of the
threat from Iran and other Islamist states and groups, and how far this impacted
upon policymaking, as well as other ideological clashes between the US and its
enemies.
6.5.1 Accomodationists vs. confrontationalists
Following the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the events of the 1980s,
American attitudes to political Islam can be divided into two broad strands,
defined by Gerges as ‘confrontationalist’ and ‘accomodationist.’49 These are
useful terms, and valuable in attempting to understand the debates surrounding
American foreign policy, as long as the fact that they are ideal types rather than
empirical categories is borne in mind.  Both of these strands were on display with
regards to Iran and different movements in the 1990s.  The ‘confrontationalist’
strand has been most visible in some quarters of the media and in Congress.
With regards to Iran specifically, Beeman sums up this situation as one in which
“Iran continues to be demonized and despised in legislative halls – and the Mad
Mullah image provides an overly facile, dismissive argument to anyone in
government who suggests that meaningful negotiations with Iran on matters of
mutual interest might be pursued.”50
Gerges separates this camp from specific worries about the impact of the
rise of political Islam as a political phenomenon would have on American
foreign policy in the Middle East, and argues that it, in contrast, is predicated on
the idea that democracy and Islam are incompatible, and that for some it is also
inherently violent.  He argues that Huntington’s (in)famous ‘clash of
civilisations’ thesis falls into this camp, given his claim that “Islam has bloody
borders.”51 The idea of the ‘clash of civilisations’ is in turn borrowed from
48 Samuel Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilisations?’ Foreign Affairs, 72 (3) 1993, pp.22-49
49 The terms are introduced and defined in chapter 2 of Gerges, America and Political Islam
50 William Beeman, The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: How the United States and Iran
Demoize Each Other (Westport,CT: Praeger, 2005), p.86
51 Samuel Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilisations?’ p.35.
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Bernard Lewis, who Gerges argues is also a ‘confrontationalist.’52 Some, such as
journalist, commentator and pundit Charles Krauthammer, specifically identify
the Islamic Republic of Iran as a malevolent force responsible for some of
political Islam’s most troublesome manifestations, accusing it of being
“implacably hostile to Western liberalism” and determined to seize control of the
Persian Gulf and destroy Israel out of religious conviction. 53 The view of
‘confrontationalists’ was strongly linked with the belief that political Islam
represented the next ‘great enemy’ after the end of the Cold War and the collapse
of the Soviet Union, a ‘Green Menace’ in the place of the ‘Red Menace.’
Krauthammer, for one, explicitly made this link, arguing that “Iran is the center
of the world’s new Comintern”, and that “As with Soviet communism, this new
messianic creed must be contained.”54
‘Accomodationists’, on the other hand, repudiated this reasoning, and
denied that there was a monolithic ‘Islam’ that was inimical to the US and
democracy, and that it therefore was not the next ‘great threat’ that the US had to
confront now that international communism had vanished.  Many also advocated
a policy of ‘benign neglect’ with regards to the growth of Islamism in states with
strong ties to the US, such as Egypt, or promotion of civil society and democratic
norms and practices as the antidote to extremism and radicalisation. 55 Leon
Hadar, for instance, advocated an American policy of ‘constructive
disengagement’, in which the US would seek a much more low-key involvement
in the Middle East, and downgrade its ties to repressive allies.56 Some also
highlighted the incentives that existed for some foreign governments to play up
the dangers of a ‘Green Peril’ in order to win American support, in a similar
tactic to that of “the way Third World countries exploited the US obsession with
the Red Menace during the Cold War despite their own scepticism about its long-
term threat.”57
52 Bernard Lewis, ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’, Atlantic Monthly, September 1990.
53 Charles Krauthammer, ‘Iran: Orchestra of Disorder’, Washington Post, 1 January 1993
54 Ibid.
55 For instance, see Ghassan Salame, ‘Islam and the West’, Foreign Policy, no.90, 1993, p.22-37.
56 Leon Hadar, ‘What Green Peril?’, Foreign Affairs, 72 (2) 1993, p.40-42
57 Ibid, p.30
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The contention between these two viewpoints has been complicated by
the division of power in the American political system (which will be discussed
further in chapter 7), which allows for different power centres in the US
government to hold different threat perceptions and different strategic and
tactical preferences, over and above bureaucratic wrangling over tactics or the
definition of national interests (such as a ministry of trade promoting trade with a
state defined as a threat by the ministry of defence).  As stated above, the
‘confrontationalist’ strand has been most apparent in the legislative branch of the
US government, while the executive branch, including the State Department,
adopted “the symbols and terminology of accomodationists to delineate their
stance on political Islam.”58 This was also true of the Bush (1988-1992) and
Clinton administration’s official rhetoric.59 The most significant example was
the ‘Meridian House address’, delivered by the Assistant Secretary of State for
Near East and South Asian Affairs Edward Djerejian in June of 1992, which has
subsequently come to be regarded as the closest thing to an ‘official’ policy on
political Islam.60 Originally entitled ‘The US and the Middle East in Changing
World,’ it outlined two major policy goals: progress towards a negotiated
solution to the Arab-Israeli peace process (which became especially important in
the subsequent Clinton administration) and unimpeded commercial access to the
region’s oil reserves (which we dealt with above).  In addition, it stated that “the
US Government does not view Islam as the next “ism” confronting the West or
threatening world peace…the Cold War is not being replaced with a new
competition between Islam and the West.”61
Subsequent statements by President Clinton and his officials re-affirmed
the same reasoning and policy.  In the same speech in which he announced the
58 Gerges, America and Political Islam, p.35
59 Ibid, p.35-6
60 Edward Djerejian, Danger and Opportunity: An American Ambassador’s Journey Through The
Middle East (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2008), p.20
61 A copy of the text is available at
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=meridian%20house%20address%20djerejian&sourc
e=web&cd=1&ved=0CEIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.disam.dsca.mil%2Fpubs%2FVol
%252014_4%2FDjerejian.pdf&ei=SDz0T4ysHqjL0QWPuLCjBw&usg=AFQjCNFzHjbftXlgws
SBSeA2rfRwWRYaXA, accessed 04-07-2012.
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administration’s ‘dual containment’ policy, at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy’s (WINEP) ‘Soref Symposium’ in 1993, Martin Indyk (then serving
on the National Security Council), stated that despite its decision to confront the
threat posed by Iran, this did not reflect an American objection to the Islamic
nature of its government, but instead its authoritarianism and the specific
direction of its foreign policies.62 President Clinton himself used the opportunity
afforded by a visit to Jordan in 1994 on the eve of the Israeli-Jordanian peace
treaty to declare that “America refuses to accept that our civilisations must
collide.  We respect Islam.”  He also used the same speech to denounce terrorism
and opponents of the peace process.63 In an article the same year in Foreign
Affairs designed to codify the administration’s foreign policy and demonstrate a
cohesive strategic doctrine, 64 National Security Advisor Anthony Lake re-
iterated the essentially secular drives of American policy, and claimed that “the
Clinton administration does not oppose Islamic government.”65
Nonetheless, a reluctance to deal with the consequences of the entry of
Islamist forces is detectable in American policy of the period elsewhere in the
Middle East, though there is little evidence of a single coherent and consistent
policy towards the phenomenon as a whole.  The picture was sharpened by the
fact that three of the ‘backlash’ or ‘rogue’ states, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan,
were located in the Middle East, and ostensibly Islamic in Iraq and Libya’s case,
and explicitly so in the case of Iran and Sudan.  For some critics, this created the
appearance that the label of ‘rogue state’ was used by the US “as a politically
convenient device to cast Islamic states pursuing policies contrary to US interests
as the new post-Cold War threat.”66 The reality was more complex.  Egypt and
Algeria, for instance, proved to be illustrative examples.67 In Algeria, the US
62 Indyk, ‘The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East’
63 William J. Clinton, ‘Remarks to the Jordanian Parliament in Amman, Jordan’, October 26,
1994, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49373 accessed 27-01-2013
64 Author’s interview with Hillary Mann Leverett, former State Department and National Security
Council Official, Washington, D.C., February 2011
65 Anthony Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States,’ Foreign Affairs, 73 (2) 1994, p.50
66 Robert Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War
(Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000) p.8
67 Gerges provides useful case studies of the American relationship with these two states in the
first half of the 1990s in chapters 7 and 8 of America and Political Islam
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was pragmatic, establishing initial contacts with the Islamists, in the form of the
FIS, but severed its links as the country descended into its devastating civil war,
and in Egypt it ensured that contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood remained
very low-key at the insistence of Mubarak’s government, 68 for whom the
organization would remain anathema until the fall of the regime in 2011.  This
strongly suggests that the underlying reason was a preference for the status quo,
which favoured American interests, over the unpredictable forces arising from
widespread social and political upheaval, which might lead to a replay of the
Iranian scenario.  As noted above, American allies in the Middle East, such as
the regime of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, were also careful to promote a
‘confrontationalist’ narrative, emphasising the radical religious nature of their
opponents in the hope of winning US support.
A lack of sectarian prejudice is also visible in American foreign policy in
the US’s dealings with the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, to which the
State Department extended a “cautious welcome,” puzzling Iranian officials, in a
bid to both contain Iran’s regional influence and advance American plans to link
Central and South Asia with energy pipelines.  In Ansari’s words, “It took a
while for the consequences of this move to be understood by Iranian officials, but
the message was ultimately clear.  Radical Islam was not the problem.”69 This
followed on the heels of American support for some of the Taliban’s
predecessors amongst the mujahedin battling the Soviet Union in the 1980s,
which has been discussed extensively elsewhere.  All in all, the overall picture is
one of pragmatism, caution and reserve, instilled perhaps by the experience of
the Iranian revolution.
6.5.2 Rebels against the new world order
There was also a more subtle ideological clash between the US and Iran,
Iraq and other ‘rogue states’ in this era, based on what the US claimed to stand
68 Wikileaks cables also suggest that American diplomats were sceptical of the organisation’s
claims that it was committed to democracy.  For instance, see cable no. 99CAIRO2104, ‘Egypt’s
Muslim Brotherhood at Low Ebb’, http://wikileaks.org/cable/1999/03/99CAIRO2104.html
accessed 05-09-2012.
69 Emphasis in original text Ansari, Confronting), p.146.
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‘for’ rather than ‘against.’  As far as the Clinton administration can have been
said to have a guiding principle in its foreign policy, it was a shift in emphasis
away from ‘geopolitics’ and towards ‘geo-economics’, primarily the promotion
of an interdependent, liberal global order based on free trade and globalised
commerce. 70 In more strictly political terms, this went hand-in-hand with
rhetorical commitments to ‘democratic expansion’ (influenced heavily by the
democratic peace theory), in other words to necessity of enlarging the pool of
democratic states in global politics. 71 President Clinton also seems to have
strongly believed that the future of American prosperity and economic growth at
home was closely tied up with enhancing American competitiveness in an
increasingly ‘globalised’ world, or in other words that “the United States has to
compete in world markets or go under”72.  In Hunter’s words, ‘dual containment’
complemented “other aspects of the Clinton administration’s international
strategy of promoting economic globalization and democracy, because the
administration believed that their strategies would inevitably increase US
economic and cultural influence.”73 To further this agenda, Clinton made several
changes to the American foreign policy apparatus, such as establishing a
National Economic Council (NEC) in parallel with the existing National Security
Council (NSC), and instructing the State Department to do more to promote
American commerce abroad, to such an extent that “Trade is now as essential to
American ambassadors as it has been for [US] allies for years.”74 President
Clinton also sought to enhance the role of the Department of Commerce after
years as a bureaucratic backwater. 75 It also involved pushing hard for the
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
passage through Congress of which became one of the central objectives of
Clinton’s first term.
70 Ofira Seliktar, Navigating Iran: From Carter to Obama (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan,
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To adherents in this vision within the Clinton administration, states like
Iran represented authoritarian, atavistic throwbacks that refused to recognise that
the world had changed and adapt, sought non-conventional weapons in part to
insulate themselves from these forces, and therefore had to be side-lined to allow
the advancement of this ‘new world order.’76 This conflicted with American
strategy in their regions, which was “democratic consolidation, market-led
development and closer integration of the developing countries into the world
market.”77 In Lake’s terms, ‘rogue states’ had a “recalcitrant commitment to
remain on the wrong side of history.”78 In contrast to ‘rogue states,’ ‘good’
states accepted the need to promote “free markets, democratic expansion, and
control of the spread of WMD.”79 However, as Litwak and Fields point out, the
Clinton administration pursued different policies towards each ‘rogue,’ 80
negotiating with North Korea and ‘containing’ Iraq and Iran, which suggests that
this typology was either largely a rhetorical label rather than a functional policy,
or a pragmatic response to different circumstances in a more complex post-Cold
War world.
6.5.3 Terrorism
As well as the trends identified above, perceptions of Iran as ‘the
quintessential rogue state’ were formed in part by the association between Iran
and Islamic terrorism in the minds of some Americans.  Iran was first placed on
the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism in early 1984 because of
its backing for Lebanese Hezbollah,81 only a few months after the bombing of the
US Marines barracks in Beirut.  Aside from its backing for Hezbollah  and
‘rejectionist’ Palestinian factions (discussed more fully below), all whom are
considered terrorists by the US, a number of incidents in the Middle East and
76 Author interview with Kenneth Pollack, Washington DC, March 2012
77 Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War, p.124
78 Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States,’ p.55
79 Moussali, US Foreign Policy and Islamist Politics, p.21
80 Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy; Jeffrey Fields, Adversaries and Statecraft:
Explaining U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Rogue States, PhD Dissertation, University of Southern
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81 Blight et al, Becoming Enemies, Appendix I
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worldwide in the two decades after the 1979 revolution have deepened American
suspicions about Iranian support and involvement in terrorist activities.
Amongst these is the assassination of Iranian dissidents and opposition
figures in Europe, for which Iranian officials have been blamed (and in some
cases legally indicted).  As discussed in chapter 5, among the most high-profile
examples is Shapour Bakhtiar, the last of the shah’s prime ministers, who was
stabbed to death in Paris in 1991, an event that had a major impact on the
perception of Iran in the US government.82 The following year, several Kurdish-
Iranian dissidents were shot dead in a Berlin restaurant.  Five people were
arrested, tried and convicted by the German authorities over the following three
years, including one Iranian.  At the end of the trial in 1996, the court concluded
that the assassination had been planned and executed by agents of the Iranian
state with the approval of President Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khamenei, and
issued a warrant for the arrest of Ali Fallahian, Iran’s minister of intelligence and
security.83 This led to a brief break in diplomatic relations between Iran and the
member states of the EU, who withdrew their ambassadors in protest.84 The
same year, the US State Department’s annual report on global terrorism claimed
that “Tehran conducted at least eight dissident assassinations outside Iran in
1996.”  These included “Reza Mazlouman, a government official under the Shah
[who] was murdered in Paris by an Iranian resident of Germany with alleged ties
to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).”85
The year 1996 also saw another terrorist attack that directly affected the
relationship between the US and Iran.  The Khobar Towers, an American
military housing block in the Saudi city of Dhahran, was blown up by a truck
bomb, killing 19 US Air Force personnel.  Given the poor state of relations
between the US and Iran, suspicion initially fell on Shia militants within Saudi
82 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p.248
83 US State Department, ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996: Overview of State Sponsored
Terrorism’ http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996Report/overview.html accessed 27-
01-2013
84 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p.290-1
85 US State Department, ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996: Overview of State Sponsored
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Arabia linked to Iran.86 President Clinton would subsequently ask President
Khatami for some of the members of the groups accused of carrying out the
attack, alleged to be in Iran, to be extradited to Saudi Arabia, first via the
government of Oman,87 and then directly via a letter delivered to an Iranian
diplomat at the UN. 88 The Iranian government responded by denying any
involvement. 89 Clinton ordered the Pentagon to prepare contingencies for
retaliatory strikes against Iran, but given the ambiguous nature of the evidence
and the risk this posed to his attempts to improve relations in the wake of
Khatami’s elections, he decided to avoid military confrontation.90 The passage
of ILSA in the same year was smoothed by the image of Iran (and Libya, which
was also a target of the act thanks to the efforts of Senator Ted Kennedy and the
advocacy of some of the relatives of the victims of the Lockerbie bombing)91 as a
terrorist state thanks to all of these incidents, and the explosion of flight TWA
800 off the coast of the US while the legislation was being debated, though this
was later revealed to have been caused by mechanical failure.92
6.6 The role of Israel and the Arab-Israeli peace process
Israel played an ancillary but critical role in shaping American
perceptions of threat, both of political Islam in general and Iran in particular.
Israeli leaders were outspoken about the threat they perceived stemming from
both of these sources, and urged the US to confront and contain both of them.
Because of the strong links between the US and Israel, and the historic antipathy
between the US and Iran, this proved to be an effective strategy.  Moussali, for
one, argues that American ‘dual containment’ policy stemmed directly from
Israel’s desire to contain “Islamic fundamentalism and Arab nationalism
86 Bill Clinton, My Life (New York, NY: Alfred A Knopf, 2004), p.718
87 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, p.224-6
88 The text of his message can be found at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB318/doc02.pdf accessed 27-01-2013
89 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB318/doc03.pdf accessed 27-01-2013
90 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, p.171 and p.218
91 Author interview with Keith Weissman, former AIPAC official, Washington DC, March 2012
92 Gary Sick, ‘Rethinking Dual Containment,’ Survival, 40 (1) 1998, p.10
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‘indirectly’.” 93 This is something of an exaggeration, as it risks under-
representing the role of the legacy of hostility between the US and Iran discussed
above, and American perceptions of its own strategic interests in the Middle East
and the Persian Gulf.  Nonetheless, Moussali is correct in that direct lobbying by
Israel and its leaders, and pre-existing American concerns about Israeli security,
played an important role in shaping American perceptions in both the executive
and the legislative branches of the US government.  As Kemp argued, “If the
United States is the “third rail” of Iranian politics, Israel is the “third rail” of US
politics. Hostility to Israel has done more to harm Iran’s image in the United
States, especially within Congress, than any issue since the 1979–1980 hostage
crisis.”94
The nature of the ‘special relationship’ between Israel and the US was
itself a major factor in this development.  The presence of Israel within the
classic triad of US objectives in the Middle East – containing Soviet power, the
free flow of oil at reasonable prices, ensuring Israel’s survival – has ensured that
US policy has been consistently formulated with an eye towards accommodating
Israeli security requirements, giving Israeli leaders a great deal of leverage with
the US.  Consequently, despite the end of the Cold War and a swelling of
negative feelings in Congress and the US more widely against foreign aid, Israel
(followed by Egypt) remained the largest recipient of American aid, despite the
decline in its strategic utility as an anti-Soviet proxy.95 The provision of a major
aid package to Egypt as part of that given to Israel demonstrates this trend also,
as does American fears of the rise of political Islamist forces in Egypt and
elsewhere - it was feared in many quarters that they too, like Iran, would be
implacably hostile to Israel.  This also reflects the nature of the division of power
in the American political system, discussed briefly above and in more detail in
chapters 7 and 8, with legislators in Congress being generally more accessible
and more sympathetic to Israel, and, thanks to the ‘separation of powers,’
holding final say over federal budgets.
93 Moussali, US Foreign Policy and Islamist Politics, p.22
94 Geoffrey Kemp, ‘Iran: Can the United States Do a Deal?’ The Washington Quarterly, 24 (1)
2001, p.115
95 A full statistical breakdown is available at the website of USAID:
http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/detailed.html accessed 27-01-2013
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6.6.1 Rabin and Clinton
In the early 1990s, presidential attention shifted to focus on the ‘peace
process’ that began with the Oslo Accords.  The Oslo process came to be a major
preoccupation of American foreign policy in the Middle East throughout
Clinton’s tenure in the White House, both because of its inherent connection to
Israeli security, and the personal investment of the President in the issue.  Clinton
involved himself personally in many of the negotiation between Israel and the
PLO, and struggled to obtain an Israel-Syrian peace accord as well,96 including
meeting personally with Hafez Al-Assad in Geneva.  Though neither effort
would result in success, this was not from want of involvement or attention on
the American side (though of course there are those who would question
Washington’s motives and tactics), and American efforts continued until Clinton
left office at the end of 2000.  Clinton himself discussed the issue extensively in
in his memoirs, especially his close relationship with Yitzhak Rabin, one of the
prime movers on the Israeli side and the Prime Minister for most of Clinton’s
first term in office.  Reflecting on Rabin’s assassination, Clinton wrote that “In
the two and a half years that we had worked together, Rabin and I had developed
an unusually close relationship, marked by candor, trust, and an extraordinary
understanding of each other’s political positions and thought processes.”97 Rabin
was, according to some accounts, ‘obsessed’ with the threat posed by Iran,98 and
seems to have been forceful in impressing on President Clinton his desire to see
Iran contained as a necessary step on the road towards an Arab-Israeli peace
settlement.99 For Rabin and many of his colleagues in the Labor Party, like
Shimon Peres, the demographic trends within Israel and the Occupied Territories
demonstrated a serious risk to Israeli security: the high Palestinian birth-rate
threatened to make Israel’s conventional military superiority irrelevant by
96 Warren Christopher, for instance, visited Syria 25 times during his tenure as Secretary of State.
Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, p.48
97 Clinton, My Life, p.679
98 Thomas Lippman, Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2000), p.175
99 Author interview with Steve Rosen, former AIPAC official, Silver Springs, MD, March 2012
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endangering the state’s Jewish and democratic character.100 At the same time,
Iran had emerged as a serious rival in the wake of the collapse of Iraqi military
power.  Rabin’s strategy was therefore two-fold: make peace with the
Palestinians and the ‘collar’ countries surrounding Israel, and neutralise Iran by
enlisting US support.101 The White House therefore became more focused on
Iran thanks to this pressure from the Israeli side, which used the leverage of
progress towards a peace agreement to strengthen US-Israeli ties after the end of
the Cold War.
In the absence of the Cold War threat, Israel also had a vested interest in
maintaining its close alignment with the US, and in order to facilitate this it
required a new ‘threat’ to forge a common front against.  Iran and political Islam,
the former a pre-existing enemy for the US, proved to be the best candidates,102
though to be fair the implications of the ‘rise’ of these forces for national security
also worried Israeli policymakers to some extent: Yitzhak Rabin reportedly told
Clinton that the experience of seeing Iraqi Scud missiles hitting Israel in 1991
convinced him that modern weapons made geographical distance less
important,103 which presumably made Iran a ‘front-line state.’  Iran and radical
Islamism were often conflated together in Israeli official discourse.  Gerges, for
one, recounts how Israeli leaders like Rabin stressed the danger posed by radical
political Islam in their public statements, arguing “Iran is posing the same threat
as Moscow in the good old days…fundamentalism incited by Iran is infiltrating
Muslim institutions in the West.”104 Rabin, as stated, was ‘obsessed’ with the
threat he perceived from radical Islamism, which he saw as driven by Iran, and
he declared in 1992 that “Iran is the leading distributor of fundamentalist Islam
in the region.  Iran has replaced Iraq in its megalomaniacal ambitions in empire
building.  Within seven years, this will be the threat in the Middle East.  We have
this time in which to resolve the problems.”105 Parsi, also, argues that Israeli
100 Clinton, My Life, p.545
101 Interview with Keith Weissman, former AIPAC official, Washington DC, March 2012
102 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, chapter 14
103Clinton, My Life, p.545
104 Gerges, America and Political Islam, p.53
105 Yoram Peri ‘Afterword’, in Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, expanded edition (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1996), p.365
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leaders launched a public relations offensive in the US and Europe to portray
Iran as the next great global threat at the beginning of the 1990s.  He cites
numerous examples of dire warnings of Iranian perfidy from Israeli leaders, such
as Shimon Peres’s assertion in 1992 that “Iran is the greatest threat [to peace] and
greatest problem in the Middle East…because it seeks the nuclear option while
holding a highly dangerous stance of extreme religious militarism.” 106 This
public discourse was matched by briefings of US government officials by their
visiting Israeli counterparts about the threat posed by Iran to Israel.107
6.6.2 Enter Khatami and Netanyahu
The focus within Israel on Iran as a threat survived the death of Rabin at
the hands of an Israeli religious extremist in November 1995 and changes of
government. Both Shimon Peres (Rabin’s immediate successor as PM) and Ehud
Barak (then the Foreign Minister) warned that Iran was developing nuclear
weapons, making it “more dangerous than Nazism”, to use Peres’s words.108 The
election of Likud and Benjamin Netanyahu to the office of Prime Minister in
1996 caused Israel to reverse direction somewhat, with a new strategic focus on
the Palestinians rather than Iran and less commitment to the peace process.  Uri
Lubrani, Netanyahu’s most senior advisor on Iran, reportedly concluded that
Khatami’s election represented an “irreversible” trend towards moderation,
which was echoed by other Israeli officials, including the Israeli ambassador to
the US.109 Lubrani apparently travelled to the US to impress this view upon
President Clinton, Secretary of State Albright and Martin Indyk, 110 and
“[a]ccordingly, the Israelis toned down their anti-Iran rhetoric, reduced their
pressure on Congress, and encouraged Clinton to pursue engagement.” 111
Nonetheless, this diversion failed to resolve the fundamental sources of
disagreements between the US, Israel and Iran, so “In the end, Netanyahu’s
106 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p.164
107 Author interview with Ambassador Chas Freeman, Washington DC, February 2011
108 Quoted in Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p.193
109 Lippman, Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy, p.175-6
110 Thomas Lippman, correspondence with author
111 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, p.218
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efforts amounted to nothing but a brief Israeli-Iranian spring thaw.”112 As Iran
continued to develop missile technology and pursue nuclear energy (including
pressing ahead with the construction of a nuclear reactor at Bushehr with Russian
assistance), the Israeli government returned to the subject of the Iranian threat.113
Israeli fears of Iranian developments in missile technology was a factor in
American unease with the progress of Iran’s ballistic missile development
programmes, such as the Shahab-3, a version of the North Korean Nodong-1
(which was in turn based on the venerable Soviet ‘Scud’), and was developed
and tested during the 1990s.114 Aside from the threat that Iran’s possession of
such weapons posed to American facilities in the Persian Gulf and to American
allies on the Arab coast of the Gulf, the development of ballistic missiles by Iran
placed Israel within its strike range, something which was widely trumpeted as a
dangerous development, despite Israel’s possession of a deterrent force of land-
based nuclear-armed ‘Jericho’ IRBM/ICBMs (and possibly submarines with
‘Popeye Turbo’ cruise missiles), and Iran’s status as a signatory to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
As seen in chapter 5, members of Congress therefore introduced legislation
designed to impose sanctions on Russian and Chinese firms at the urging of
Israel and pro-Israeli lobbyists and over the objections of the White House.115 In
addition, Israeli officials also travelled to Washington to brief American
legislators and their staff on Iran’s missile and nuclear programs.116
6.6.3 The peace process
From the beginnings of the policy in 1993, ‘dual containment’ was
therefore envisaged partly as a way of erecting a ‘firewall’ between the most
consequential issues and geographic areas for the US: Israel and its dispute with
112 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p.201
113 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p.206
114 Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, p.187
115 Thomas Lippman, ‘Israel Presses US To Sanction Russian Missile Firms Aiding Iran,’
Washington Post, September 25 1997
116 Author phone interview Stephen Rademaker, former Chief Counsel, House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations, February 2011, Washington DC
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the neighbouring Arab states, and Iraq, Iran and the Persian Gulf.  The primary
architect of dual containment, Martin Indyk, held a variety of roles in the Clinton
administration working on Middle East policy.  His memoir of his time in
government focuses heavily on his (and President Clinton’s) involvement in the
Oslo Process.  On the situation at the beginning of 1993, Indyk writes that
“Clinton’s immediate challenge was to develop and approach to protecting
American interests in the Gulf that would bolster his peacemaking priorities in
the Arab-Israeli arena.”117 Indyk concedes that an Arab-Israeli peace agreement
was, for Clinton, the “primary objective.”  As such, “dual containment was one
branch of a broader strategy designed to generate a dramatic shift in the regional
balance of power that we hoped would result from the achievement of a
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.”  The ‘normalisation’ of the Middle East
would, in turn, marginalise Iran and Iraq and assist in the ‘containment’ of
them.118
Chapter 5 discussed Indyk’s account of how the incoming administration
conducted interagency reviews on how to pursue objectives vis-à-vis Iran and
Iraq.  Regarding Iran, he concedes that it was seen as the “archetype of a hostile,
rogue regime.”119 ‘Containment’ emerged from the process as the best option by
default: Iran was believed to be hostile to both the US and Israel, making
attempts to change its behaviour via “positive incentives” futile, while military
action against it was risky and uncertain.120 This view was maintained until the
election of Khatami, which was a surprise to most observers of Iranian politics in
both official circles and academia.  Consequently, Indyk maintains that the
Rafsanjani government’s decision to offer Conoco a major contract in 1995 was
seen by the Clinton administration as an attempt to embarrass the US and ‘break
out’ of the containment regime, rather than the overture it appears to have been
in retrospect,121 as does Kenneth Pollack.122
117 Indyk, Innocent Abroad, p.32
118 Ibid, p.43
119 Ibid, p.39
120 Ibid, p.39
121 Ibid, p.168, Author interview with Martin Indyk, Washington DC, March 2012; Hunter, Iran’s
Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era, p.52.
122 Interview with Pollack
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Iran’s public opposition to the ‘peace process’, including its support for
some rejectionist Palestinian factions, was therefore a major point of contention
between Washington and Tehran, and was one of the Clinton administration’s
stated reasons for labelling Iran as, variously, a ‘rogue’ or ‘backlash’ state.
Iran’s hostility to the developments in the Arab-Israeli arena had multiple
dimensions: on the one hand, it represented a geostrategic problem, on the other
a more nebulous but equally real ideological/cultural threat (ironically, in much
the same way that many American viewed Iran).  Strategically, it threatened to
isolate Iran from its allies in the Levant, Syria and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and
“took Iran dangerously close to being frozen out of the unfolding regional order
following the first Iraq war.”123 This not only threatened to undermine Iran’s
influence in the Levant, it also contradicted Iran’s view of itself as an influential
regional state that deserved a ‘seat at the table’ when decisions were taken that
would have profound effects on regional security.124 Additionally, aside from
the Iranian view that the process would continue to disenfranchise the
Palestinians, it also “had become such a key politico-moral problem and an
Islamic issue that necessitated the country’s formal opposition to the peace
process on religious grounds.”125 Iranian leaders escalated anti-Israeli rhetoric
and publically opposed the Madrid Conference of October 1991 accordingly.  A
conference of Palestinian groups opposed to negotiations with Israel was
subsequently organised in Tehran, placing Iran in direct opposition to the peace
negotiations.126 Iran’s reaffirmation of its sponsorship and public backing of
Hezbollah in Lebanon, after a ‘dip’ in financial aid,127 was also a catalysing
factor, given the low-intensity warfare between Hezbollah and Israeli forces until
Israel’s withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000.  Ironically, American and
Israeli attempts, as Parsi and Indyk agree, to isolate Iran from the Arab-Israeli
peace negotiations gave it an incentive to oppose them, though it is debateable
123 Anoush Ehtashami, ‘Iran’s Regional Policies Since the End of the Cold War’, in Ali Gheissari
(ed.), Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2009), p.333
124 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p.153-4
125 Ehtashami, ‘Iran’s Regional Policies Since the End of the Cold War’, p.333
126 Litwak, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, p.164; Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p.155
127 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p.155
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that Iran ever possessed sufficient power to derail the process if both Israel and
the PLO were determined to press ahead.128
Following the election of Khatami there was nonetheless a discernible
shift in Iranian attitudes to the peace process,129 which, as discussed above, was
arguably as much a tactical issue as an ideological one for many Iranian
policymakers.  As the Oslo process stalled and difficulties mounted, the threat to
Iran of regional isolation lessened and rhetoric softened.  There was also an
acceptance that opposition to the peace accords made Iran vulnerable in certain
ways, damaging its international reputation and pitting it against Yasser Arafat
and the PLO.  Khatami and other officials therefore moderated their rhetoric, and
signalled that they considered it futile to continue to oppose the process while the
Palestinian leadership was committed, and that even if Iran disagreed with their
decision to do so it would not seek to interfere.  Khatami said in 1997: “Iran
resolutely oppose[s] the peace operation, but, based on the principle of mutual
respect, it does not stand in front of [the Palestinians].”130 Other statements seem
to confirm this view, such as his denunciation of terrorism in his famous 1998
CNN interview with Christine Amanpour (though he distinguished between
‘terrorists’ and ‘freedom fighters’). 131 It was also reported that Khatami
informed Yasser Arafat that Iran would acquiesce to an agreement with Israel at
the 1997 meeting of the OIC in Tehran, though Iranian policymakers believed
the peace process would ultimately fail.132 While denunciations of the peace
process were still forthcoming from many Iranian political leaders for domestic
consumption, these private messages, and the difficulties encountered by the
peace process at this time, moderated the threat Iran posed to the peace process
and encouraged the Clinton administration to explore the option of reconciliation
under Khatami.
128 Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era, p.51.
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The election of Khatami was seized upon by President Clinton, and he
reportedly calculated that it represented an opportunity to ‘break the ice’ and
begin overtures towards Iran, despite the hostility towards the country expressed
by some in the US in his first term.133 Khatami’s public statements and actions
were therefore closely monitored by US officials, especially his CNN interview,
as Clinton believed that a breakthrough in relations with Iran represented the
chance for a wider shift in the region in a positive direction, from the American
perspective.134 However, Clinton remained conscious of the obstacles of such a
course of action, particularly those faced by Khatami within Iran, and expressed
concern that American attempts to respond to his overtures ran the risk of
delegitimizing the Iranian leader. In private, he described attempts at public
diplomacy as “dicey” in the absence of an overriding strategic imperative for the
Iranians to launch a rapprochement with the US. Although he believed there was
more room for him to move the process forwards, he admitted that his advisers
were nearly unanimous in pressing for a more cautious, low-key approach.135
Many officials also worried that a bold gesture of the part of the US risked
handing a propaganda victory to the Iranians, and were wary of making
concessions which might not be reciprocated.136 The issue of the Khobar Towers
bombing was also a contentious one, though ultimately it was decided within the
administration that testing Khatami’s intentions was a better idea than a military
retaliation.137 The initial response to the election of Khatami on the part of the
Clinton administration was therefore a restrained, at least in public, though by the
133 Kenneth Pollack, then a National Security Council official, recalls that he was sent to ‘sound
out’ proponents of sanctions on Iran about the overture, but that the president had decided to
proceed anyway. AuthorInterview with Pollack.
134 Taylor Branch, The Clinton Tapes: Conversations with a President, 1993-2001 (New York, NY:
Simon & Schuster, 2009), p.487
135 Ibid, p.498-9
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Confrontation (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2007), p.187-8
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end of 1997 Clinton and his team had become convinced of Khatami’s bona
fides, and were ready to begin testing the waters.138
6.8 Conclusions
The close attention theorists of neoclassical realism have given to the role
of perception as an intervening variable in the formation of foreign policy is
justified if we consider the case of Iran and the US in the 1990s.  Perceptions of
threat and relative power were key factors in determining the course of US
foreign policy in this period, underlying and defining the concerns of American
policymakers.
While some prominent commentators and politicians expressed hostility
towards Islamist forces throughout the 1990s, official US policy outwardly
tended towards studious neutrality in regards to this phenomenon, and did not
seem to have perceived it as a major challenge to American policy, on a par with
the Soviet Union.  American officials who held posts in the US foreign policy
apparatus, from President Clinton on down, took pains to state that the US was
not hostile to Islam per se, but was not sympathetic to groups and movements
that were perceived as anti-democratic or endangered US interests or those of its
allies.  While the US kept its distance from Islamist groups, such as the various
national branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, this does not seem to have
reflected a sectarian bias.  Nonetheless, the legacy of hostility between the US
and Iran had a major impact on American perceptions of the threat posed by the
Islamic Republic of Iran.  The hostage crisis, the events of the 1980s, and
continuing Iranian hostile rhetoric towards Israel and the peace process
persuaded the incoming Clinton administration to pursue a relatively tough line
against Iran from the outset. Iran was perceived as a volatile and dangerous
force, one that had strong incentives to contest American and Israeli policies
given its ideological and strategic interests.  The containment of this regional
138 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p.312 and 320
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threat was also perceived to be a low-cost, low-risk policy.  This was facilitated
by the strategic picture perceived by American policymakers, one in which
American power was abundant and applicable in a permissive regional
environment, given the military prostration of Iran and Iraq and the absence of a
counterbalancing Soviet Union.
This negative perception of Iran (and Iraq) was shared by Israel, its allies
within the US, and the other major actor in American foreign policy: Congress.
These forces shared a more ‘confrontationalist’ perception of the threat posed
from Iran.  While it would be too simplistic, not to say somewhat inaccurate, to
argue for a binary distinction between an ‘accomodationist’ executive branch and
a ‘confrontationalist’ legislature, this does capture something of the real
distinction between the two bodies.  While the Clinton administration itself
possessed a relatively nuanced (if unsympathetic) view of Iran, some legislators
tended to be more willing to see Iran simply as a dangerous threat that required
the use of American power to challenge and overcome.  In the following
chapters, we shall see how the division of powers in American foreign policy
enabled legislators to influence US dual containment policy, and the efforts of
interest groups to persuade them to do so.
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CHAPTER 7 Domestic Institutions as an intervening variable:
Two Voices?
“Within the United States, the domestic context of US foreign policy derives
from societal forces and the institutional arrangements and structures established
by the US Constitution.  This context makes societal forces – political culture,
public opinion, and group interests and activity – a critical part of the US foreign
policy arena, and it establishes a complex set of fluctuating arrangements among
the people and institutions of government.  Hence, understanding how US
foreign policy makers adapt to the issues and problems of the international
environment first requires a grasp of the societal and institutional settings within
which they act.”1
“Perhaps the moment of sharpest conflict came in 1995-6 with the imposition of
controls on foreign investment in the Iranian energy sector: yet, even here,
Washington itself spoke in two voices – Congressional and Presidential.”2
Having discussed the critical role of the perceptions of policymakers in
the previous chapter, it is now time to consider the institutional context in which
policy is made and enacted, and how the perceptions discussed in the previous
chapter were acted upon and translated into the policy process.  This chapter
deals with the effect of Congressional input on the policymaking process, and
therefore how it affected the conception and implementation of dual
containment.  As discussed in chapter 5, Congress proved to be quite active in its
attempts to shape American policy towards Iran and Iraq during the 1990s, and
many of the measures that the US put in place to isolate Iran and the overt
change in policy towards ‘regime change’ in Iraq originated in Congress rather
than the White House.  To explain this feature of ‘dual containment’ policy, it is
necessary to examine how far these measures reflected the distribution of
1 James A Scott and A. Lane Crothers, ‘Out of the Cold: The Post-Cold War Context of U.S.
Foreign Policy,’ in James M. Scott, After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold
War World (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), p.2
2 Fred Halliday, ‘The Iranian Revolution and International Politics: Some European
Perspectives’, in John Esposito & R. K. Ramazani (eds.), Iran at the Crossroads (New York:
Palgrave, 2001), p.179
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political power between the two branches of government, and the effects of this
on policymaking.  Ultimately these issues are aspects of a larger question, of how
far the ‘separation of powers’ established in the US Constitution impact upon
foreign policy making.
It is argued in this chapter that while the US Congress did not initiate the
dual containment policy, some legislators were successful in using their powers
to ensure that it was taken more seriously by the executive branch.  In that sense,
they were not only also able to exert some influence over the shape the policy
took in practice, but also able to control the direction of American foreign policy
to some extent, though the course of events was such that the latter point was
never seriously contested.  This stemmed from the growing importance of
Congress in American foreign policy in recent decades, but was also a product of
the original ‘separation of powers’ between the different branches of the US
government established in the Constitution and by over two centuries of
accumulated tradition and practice. Legislators also functioned as the medium by
which other actors (the Israeli government and their lobbyists) were able to exert
pressure, which will be discussed more fully in the following chapter.
The chapter is structured as follows: firstly, it re-examines the approach
of more recent NCR scholarship to domestic institutions, drawing on studies
following after the ‘founding texts’ or ‘second wave’ of NCR discussed in
chapter 2.  Secondly, it examines the nature of the ‘separation of powers’ and the
division of labour between the executive and legislature in US foreign
policymaking and the factors affecting it.  Thirdly, it examines the specific case
of US politics in the timeframe of dual containment and the most important
institutional factors in this era influencing the implementation of this policy
(such as the Republican victory in the 1994 mid-term elections).  Finally, this
chapter includes an assessment of the overall effects, and therefore importance,
of this intervening variable in determining the course of US-Iran and US-Iraqi
relations.
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7.1 Dual containment and domestic structure as an intervening
variable
The domestic institutional context in which foreign policy is made is
often considered to be a highly significant determining factor amongst theorists
of both NCR and FPA.  As discussed in chapter 2, a distinctive feature of
neoclassical realism (NCR) is its claim that foreign policy is a “product of state-
society coordination and, at times, struggle.”3 While the primary force driving
and shaping foreign policy formation is the demands of the international system,
how these demands are met is an issue strongly affected by the intervening
variables operating at what Waltz called the ‘second image’ (the individual
state).4 The institutional aspects of this tend to centre on the ability of the
machinery of state and its leaders to extract resources from society.  This is
conditioned by how a state’s political institutions are structured, which may
assist or hinder the foreign policy executive’s (FPE) attempts to mobilise
national assets.  A system of government in which the FPE has few institutional
limits on its power, a ‘strong’ state to use the terminology used by Risse and
others finds this much easier and simpler than their counterparts in a ‘weak’
state, where they must take account of the preferences of other domestic political
actors. It seems that there no real intra-FPE division over dual containment
within the agencies most closely connected to the executive branch, such as
between the State Department and the Defense Department, or between the
National Security Council and the State Department as in other administrations.
In general, relations between the power centres within the administration itself
have been described as “collegial.” 5 In contrast to intra-executive feuding
(which can nonetheless be a significant factor in American foreign policy), the
separation of powers between the Congress and the presidency is inherent, and
has always had profound implications for foreign policy making, and the
influence of the legislature in this regard has varied throughout American history.
3 ‘Introduction’, Steve Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, Jeffrey Taliaferro, (eds.) Neoclassical Realism,
The State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.27
4 Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 2001)
5 John Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992-2000 (Abingdon;
Routledge, 2009), p.36
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Accordingly, while the White House has become predominant in the day to day
management of foreign affairs, it is impossible to understand the making of
American foreign policy in wider terms without taking Congressional input into
account.
This overlapping responsibility for foreign affairs is one of the reasons
that Risse contends the US FPE is relatively ‘weak’ in terms of its autonomy in
decision-making. More specifically, the foreign policymaking apparatus of the
executive branch and both houses of Congress have separate powers but an
overlapping jurisdiction to some extent, which has often led to friction and
disagreement over the direction and content of policy.  We saw in chapter 5 how
‘dual containment’ was originally formulated within President Clinton’s National
Security Council and how it was modified by Congressional legislation that was
introduced independently of presidential initiative.  This chapter examines both
how this is made possible by the structure of the American political system and
how this can be understood within the NCR framework that incorporates
variables influenced by FPA used in this thesis.  Though the American system is,
of course, unique to the US, NCR analysis beyond the ‘third wave’ of studies
discussed in chapter 2 has been fruitfully applied to both the foreign policy
formulation of other states as well as that of the US at different times and in
different contexts 6 (while many of these analyses have also been applied to
‘grand strategy’, no overriding methodological reason exists that precludes
attempting the same thing with ‘dual containment,’ a major regional policy).
Consequently, many other NCR studies focus on the ability of foreign
policymaking executive to extract the resources necessary to pursue its chosen
policies, and how the need to ‘bargain’ with domestic political power centres that
control the allocation of these resources leads to compromise on said policies.7
6 Examples of the latter include Thomas Christensen’s Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy,
Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1996) and Fareed Zakaria’s From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of
America’s World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998)
7 For example, to mobilise military resources for defence or achieve a balance of power.  See
Jeffrey Taliaferro, ‘State Building for Future War: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource
Extractive State’, Security Studies, 15 (3) 2006, pp.464-95; Randall Schweller, Unanswered
Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2006)
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This has the potential to not only affect the level of resources available for
specific policies, but also the overall direction of policy itself.
In the case of dual containment, the effects of institutional structure with
regards to resource-extraction are indirect.  This case is not one in which the FPE
is obliged to compromise with the legislature (or another influential power
centre) to obtain the resources necessary for its policy.  Instead, the reverse is
true, with the legislature pressuring the executive to ‘beef up’ its policies, in
some cases allocating more resources than those requested by the executive and
insisting on their use.  This has some similarities with recent research in NCR.
Ripsman, discussed in chapter 2, hypothesises that in a democracy a powerful
legislature with the ability to “act as a veto for the government’s policy agenda”
is one of the interest groups best placed to be able to influence foreign policy.
Some other NCR scholars, also discussed in chapter two, focuses on the clash of
ideas, perceptions within the political processes of states and the effect that this
has on foreign and defence policies, and in doing so indirectly introduce the idea
that the domestic structure of a state is an important factor.   Steven Lobell, for
example, examines how perceptions of international threats are constructed
within states, and concludes that “the degree of consensus among the [foreign
policymaking executive] and key societal supporters” plays a substantial role in
determining how states formulate policies, though his example is more focused
on economic issues.  Mark Brawley comes to similar conclusions in his analysis
of alliance formation and the balance of power in interwar Europe, where “[n]ot
only did [foreign] policy decisions generate public outcry, they divided parties
from parties, factions within individual parties, and even cabinets.”8 In the case
of dual containment there is a more subtle (but still important) aspect to the
activist policies pursued by the legislative branch, in that these also have
implications for the ‘ownership’ of US policy in the Persian Gulf, and towards
Iran specifically, which are rooted in the formal divisions of power between the
executive and legislative branches.
8 Steven Lobell, ‘Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model,’
and Mark Brawley, ‘’Neoclassical realism and strategic calculations: explaining divergent
British, French, and Soviet strategies toward Germany between the world wars (1919-30), in
Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, p.96
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7.2 Congressional and Executive roles in foreign policy
While the president is commonly held to be the ‘prime mover’ in the
formation of American foreign policy, the nature of the American political
system is such that the legislative branch, Congress (comprising the Senate and
the House of Representatives), has both the opportunity and the means to
influence the process substantially.  The ramifications of this are examined in
this section.
The office of president is widely acknowledged amongst scholars and
observers of American politics to be predominant in the formulation of US
foreign policy.  Not only does the president the act as commander-in-chief of the
military, he or she is also “the principal negotiator of treaties, and the chief
diplomatic representative of the nation,” while the Supreme Court defined the
presidency’s grasp on foreign policy as ‘plenary and exclusive’ in a ruling in
1936, which paved the way for the proliferation of the executive branch’s foreign
policy advisory and management institutions (e.g. The National Security
Council) after the Second World War.9 Colin Dueck, in his analysis of the
foreign policy positions adopted by the Republican Party in the twentieth
century, also argues that presidential leadership is often the decisive factor in
determining foreign policy within parties as well as in the American body politic,
stating that not only are presidents generally given ‘more latitude’ to conduct
foreign policy than they are domestic, but also that, “to a remarkable extent,
when one party occupies the White House, the party’s foreign policy is what the
president says it is.”10
Nonetheless, the president is far from ‘all-powerful’ in foreign
policymaking.  This stems from the nature of the US Constitution, both in the
9 Edward R. Drachman & Alan Shank, Presidents and Foreign Policy: Countdown to 10
Controversial Decisions, Albany (NY: SUNY Press, 1997), p.5
10 Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), p.6-7
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powers its creators allotted to Congress outright, also and those which are not
explicitly allocated to any branch of government, a state of affairs which has
been famously characterised as “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of
directing American foreign policy.” 11 In the words of Edwin Corwin, “The
verdict of history, in short, is that the power to determine the substantive content
of American foreign policy is divided power, with the lion’s share falling usually,
though by no means always, to the President.”12 He emphasises, however, that
the latter state of affairs is not the necessary consequence of this particular
separation of powers, but instead a contingent one:
What the Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer on the President
certain powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and certain other
powers of the same general kind on the Senate, and still other such powers
on Congress; but which of these organs shall have the decisive and final
voice in determining the course of the American nation is left for events to
resolve.13
Consequently, the issue of the balance of power between these two branches of
government in American foreign policy is one that recurs frequently and
resembles a ‘perpetual struggle.’  Therefore, the status of the relationship
between the presidency and Congress plays a significant role in determining
American foreign policy, and it is argued by many scholars that the “contest
between the White House and Congress for a dominant position in the conduct of
foreign affairs is one of the constants in [American] history.”14 In this chapter, it
is argued that ‘dual containment’ and American policy towards Iran in particular
is no exception.
In comparison to many other Western parliaments the powers of the US
legislature in the realm of foreign policy are quite extensive when considered in
their totality.  In terms of the powers explicitly assigned to the legislative branch,
11 Edwin S Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787-1957: History and Analysis of
Practice and Opinion, 4th edition (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1964), p.171
12 Ibid
13 Ibid.  Italics present in the original text.
14 Cecil Crabb & Pat Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy,
4th edition (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992), p.ix
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these are divided further between the Senate and the House of Representatives,
multiplying the number of points at which legislators can attempt to influence the
policy process.  The approval of the Senate in particular is required in the
executive’s choice of senior policymakers and officials such as cabinet members
and diplomats.  International treaties must also be approved by the Senate before
they can be ratified, which famously rejected the League of Nations, the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol (the first two
were voted down, the latter was not presented for ratification because it was
obvious it would not be accepted), despite the fact they had been negotiated and
‘signed’ by the executive branch.  Speaking of Congress more generally (both
the House of Representatives and the Senate), the Constitution allots it the power
to:
lay and collect taxes for the common defense, to regulate foreign commerce,
to create armies and maintain navies, to pledge the credit of the United
States, to declare war, to define offenses against the law of nations and to
make “all laws which shall be necessary and proper” for carrying into
execution not only its own powers, but all the powers “of the government of
the United States and of any department or officer thereof.”15
Formally, therefore, Congress has enormous and wide-ranging powers.  The
most obvious of these are the power to declare war, and to raise and spend
money (though the former, in particular, has proven to be surprisingly ineffectual
in practice: in American history, Congress has very rarely declared war, as
opposed to being bypassed or having its hand forced in some way).16 This leaves
the ‘power of the purse’, which is arguably the most important, and allows
Congress to “determine the size, duties, budget, and activities of the State
Department; the size, composition, and effectiveness of the nation’s military and
economic assistance programs abroad; and nearly all other major and minor
undertakings by the United States in external affairs.”17
15 Corwin, The President Office and Powers, p.184-5
16Between 1798 and 1983 the U.S. deployed its armed forces more than 200 times, while
Congress has only declared war 5 times, four of which occurred after the outbreak of hostilities.
Joseph Avella, ‘The President, Congress, and Decisions to Employ Military Force’, in Phillip
Henderson (ed.), The Presidency Then and Now (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p.51
17 Cecil Crabb, Glen Antizzo & Leila Sarieddine, Congress and the Foreign Policy Process:
Modes of Legislative Behavior (Baton Rouge, LN, Louisiana State University Press: 2000), p.3-4
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How can this be reconciled with the fact that the President is
acknowledged to be the ‘prime mover’ in foreign policy?  More importantly,
what can the contours of Congressional powers in foreign policymaking be said
to be?  The answer to the first question is found primarily in the advantages that
stem both from the nature of the office of the presidency and its own
Constitutional prerogatives.  The President is both commander-in-chief of the
military and chief executive, and therefore head of the machinery of government,
and also has the advantage of being the sole decision-maker within the sphere of
his or her own competencies.  In contrast, Congress, taken as a whole is an
unwieldy (in comparison) collection of over 500 individuals, and must reach a
majority position on an issue in order to play an effective role.  Its decision-
making process is therefore slower and more ponderous, and the instruments it
has to exert its influence are far more indirect.  The President has the inherent
advantage of being able to create ‘facts on the ground’ to which Congress must
then acquiesce, actively support, or try to reverse.  A classic example is the
deployment of military forces abroad, which, as discussed below, congress
attempted to restrict with mixed success.  Reaching a decision on less stark
examples is doubtless a much more difficult challenge for an unwieldy
legislature split by party and faction and with little direct control over the federal
bureaucracy.  As Rossiter argues:
Constitution, laws, customs, the practice of other nations, and the logic of
history have combined to place the President in a dominant position.
Secrecy, dispatch, unity, continuity, and access to information – the
ingredients of successful diplomacy – are properties of his office, and
Congress, I need hardly add, possess none of them.18
In other words, the ‘separation of powers’ ensures that Congress has certain tools
and tactics it can use to influence policy if it chooses to do so, but the inherent
difficulty of employing them successfully ensures that “a stubborn President is
hard to budge, a crusading President hard to thwart.”19
18 Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957), p.9-10
19 Ibid, p.10
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Despite the power of the president, Corwin argues that “no presidentially
devised diplomatic policy can long survive without the support of Congress”.20
This provides the bulk of the answer to the second question (what is the nature
and extent of the foreign policy power of Congress in practice?).  The nature of
the separation of powers outlined in the Constitution, together with how this has
been interpreted, ensures that “the US Congress has more power to influence
foreign affairs than any other national legislature in the world.”21 Congress is the
legislative arm of the government: in general terms its legislation defines what is
lawful and what is not, and what shall be funded and what shall not.  It can
therefore set meaningful limits on the President’s foreign policy by legislating to
make certain actions impossible or forcing the executive to carry them out,
refusing to approve treaties, and stipulating the conditions of how funds shall be
spent and on what projects and policies.  If the collective will of Congress is
strong and united, it can therefore create ‘red lines’ that the resident cannot cross
while Congress’s will holds out, or its legislation cannot be circumvented.
American history is well-stocked with examples from its earliest days, and
includes issues of war and peace.  For instance, the depth of isolationist feeling in
the 1920s and 1930s in Congress ensured that this remained the dominant theme
in US foreign policy in that era.22 Congress was also able to legislate to force the
Regan administration to cut off military aid from official sources to the Contras
in Nicaragua in the 1980s, forcing it to turn to illegal sources and resulting in the
Iran-Contra affair.23 Going further back into American history, Congressional
pressure was pivotal in taking the US to war twice in the nineteenth century, in
1898 against Spain24 and in 1812 against Britain25, though Presidents McKinley
and Madison were reluctant.  Congress was also successful in vetoing President
Grant’s plans to annex Santo Domingo (the modern-day Dominican Republic).26
Congress also enjoys oversight powers, and can hold public hearings on foreign
20 Corwin, The President Office and Powers, p.184-5
21 Crabb & Holt, Invitation to Struggle, p.2
22 Crabb, Antizzo & Sarieddine, Congress and the Foreign Policy Process, p.158
23 Robert Pastor, ‘Disagreeing on Latin America’, in Paul Peterson (ed.), The President, The
Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,
1994), p.217
24 Crabb & Holt, Invitation to Struggle, p.57
25 Crabb, Antizzo & Sarieddine, Congress and the Foreign Policy Process, p.25-6
26 Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency, London, Hamish Hamilton, p.10
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policy matters that can embarrass the administration in the public gaze.  This was
demonstrated by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s hearings into the
Vietnam War, which did much to shape American public opinion and contributed
significantly to the downfall of President Johnson.27 To return to Corwin once
more, “Congress has, to repeat, vast powers to determine the bounds by which a
president may be left to work out a foreign policy.”28
The role of the president is therefore explicitly one of the enactor of
American foreign policy, and the ultimate manager of the agencies and bodies
that exist to carry it out, hence the description of the office as ‘diplomat in chief.’
The president’s role in defining the goals and means of foreign policy is more
open to contestation, and depends far more on the balance of power between the
executive and the legislative branches, though arguably it is somewhat skewed in
the direction of the occupant of the White House.  Whatever policy emerges from
this process of contestation, it remains the president’s duty to carry it out.  To
summarise, it appears that, overall, while the Presidency has enjoyed a pre-
eminent position in the making and conduct of foreign policy, Congress has
always enjoyed the ability to both intervene on specific issues and impose
general limits on the direction and content of American foreign policy.  In many
ways, it is fundamental to the system put in place by the ‘Founding Fathers.’  To
put it another way, “Interbranch competition is permanent, sewn into the
Constitution”.29 The ultimate consequence of this, argues Corwin, is that “Not
only is a struggle for power in this field thus invited; in the absence of a co-
operative disposition all around it is well-nigh inevitable.”30 The next section
examines how this was part of a longer-term trend, the following discusses how
it became a particular feature true of American foreign policy in the 1990s, and
how this shaped the implementation and evolution of dual containment in
particular.
27 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 4th edition (New York, NY: Ballantine Books,
1992), p.420
28 Corwin, The President Office and Powers, p.192
29 Pastor, ‘Disagreeing on Latin America’, p.223
30 Corwin, The President Office and Powers, p.225
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7.3 The growth of Congressional activism and influence
As noted above, Congressional influence on foreign policy is an enduring
phenomenon, with profound impact on the American foreign policy making
process.  Nonetheless, as Corwin notes, the balance of power between the
executive and the legislative branch is “left for events to resolve,” and has
therefore fluctuated at different times. As we saw in chapter 2, Zakaria argues
that the balance shifted away from the legislature and towards the executive in
the era following the American Civil War, leading to the growth of executive
power and an increasingly activist American foreign policy.31 Dual containment,
on the other hand, took place in an era in which executive authority had come
under increasing challenge in both domestic and foreign policy, though, as noted
above, the bulk of the initiative and responsibility for foreign policy remains
concentrated in the hands of the president.  In term of increased Congressional
influence in foreign policy, this stems from several factors that have been
apparent in American politics since the 1960s.
One of these is the increased resources available to legislators.  The
number of support staff and aides to various congressional committees with
responsibility for foreign affairs has steadily increased since the 1960s, and many
of these aides are now experts in their field rather than political associates of the
committee chair and members.  The House Foreign Affairs Committee staff grew
from 9 to 72 people between 1965 and 2001, while the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee grew from 9 to 36.32 In addition, while the role of Congress has
increased, there has been a diffusion of power within the institutions of the
House and the Senate.  While power was previously concentrated in the hands of
a small number of legislators, most prominently the chairmen of committees
overseeing defence, foreign affairs, and finance, a number of institutional
reforms has reduced their role somewhat, allowing ‘rank and file’ legislators
more space to take the initiative and become policy entrepreneurs, 33 partly by
31 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power
32 Lee Hamilton & Jordan Tama, A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President
and Congress (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), p.28
33James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994), p.27-8; Carter & Scott, Choosing to Lead, p.17-8
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bolstering the role and autonomy of various sub-committees, which have a more
open membership. 34 The increasing complexity of foreign affairs and the
growing interconnectivity of issues and economic activity across borders has also
multiplied the number of committees and legislators with an interest in, and
oversight of, some aspect of foreign affairs, such as foreign trade or the
regulation of financial markets, especially the increasing importance of foreign
trade to the US economy in recent decades.35 In addition, some argue the use of
American power abroad, including the deployment and stationing of military
forces and the provision of foreign aid, has naturally led to the organic growth of
Congressional involvement in foreign policy, given that legislators have had
more to oversee and appropriate.36 Congress has also successfully taken more
power to shape some aspects of foreign policy for itself through legislative
measures and reforms.  Arms sales to foreign states, for instance, have required
congressional approval since the Arms Control Export Act of 1976, 37 and
Congress gained the power to reject specific items in defence appropriation bills
prior to 1973, allowing it to ‘de-fund’ specific projects and operations without
affecting the rest of the defence budget.38 The US Congress is also “notable for
the weakness of its party organizations; this weakness represents the result of a
long-term decline in the strength of US political parties,”39 giving more scope to
individual legislators to pursue their own interests and projects, though some
trends in the 1990s strengthened the role of the party leadership within the
Congress itself.40
34 Norman Ornstein, ‘The Constitution and the Sharing of Foreign Policy Responsibility,’ in
Edmund Muskie, Kenneth Rush, Kenneth Thompson, The President, the Congress, and Foreign
Policy (London: University Press of America, 1986), p.55-6
35 Exports accounted for 11 percent of U.S. GDP in 2000, compared with 5 percent in 1970.
Meghan O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p.21
36 Crabb & Holt, Invitation to Sruggle, p.272-3
37 Harold H. Saunders, ‘The Middle East, 1973-1984: Hidden Agendas,’ in  Edmund Muskie,
Kenneth Rush, Kenneth Thompson, The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy (London:
University Press of America, 1986), p.192
38 Hamilton & Tama, A Creative Tension, p.11
39 Michael Mezey, Congress, the President, and Public Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1989), p.123
40 James A. Thurber, ‘Stability and Change in the Post-Cold War Congress,’ in Michael
Minkenberg & Herbert Dittgen (eds.), American Impasse: U.S. Domestic And Foreign Policy
After the Cold War (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), p.66
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Perhaps the most important factor in this trend has been psychological,
with the decline in willingness to accept a monopolization of power on the part
of the president and his advisors.  After the national trauma of Vietnam and
Watergate, and warnings about the dangers of an unchecked ‘imperial
Presidency,’ the legislature has, in general, been more willing to challenge
executive branch policy.41 The most obvious example is the War Powers Act of
1973, designed to limit the ability of the president to deploy military forces
without congressional approval. 42 One net effect of the diffusion and
decentralisation of power within Congress has been to open the system further to
interest groups seeking to influence policy, and many analysts also argue that the
rise in number and influence of interest groups of various stripes competing to
influence legislators has played a role in driving Congress to be less quiescent in
foreign affairs.43 One of the consequences of this trend has also been a marked
decline in co-operation, sometimes referred to as ‘bi-partisanship’, which has
arguably intensified the struggle between the executive and legislative branches.
This was particularly marked in the 1990s, the era of ‘dual containment,’ and it is
to this that we now turn our attention.
7.3.1 Congressional activism and partisan politics in the 1990s
As described above, one of the most distinct features of the American
political system is the extent to which the legislature can challenge, check and
override the executive branch of the national government when it comes to
foreign policy.  This feature means that the potential exists not only for inter-
branch conflict in foreign policymaking, but also for more intense inter-party
disputes when different parties control different branches and there are therefore
more opportunities to battle to control the direction of foreign policy.  This was
the situation that faced American policymakers following the surprise victory of
the Republican Party in the 1994 mid-term elections, which saw the Republicans
obtain a majority of the seats in the House of Representatives for the first time
41 Crabb & Holt, Invitation to Struggle, p.39-40
42 Hamilton & Tama, A Creative Tension, p.11-2
43 Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy, p.29
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since the 1950s, in what was widely described as a landslide.44 Although the
difference in the share of the vote between the two major parties was only 5-
10%, this was sufficient to elect Republicans to 230 seats in the House of
Representatives and 53 in the Senate, giving the party majorities in both
chambers. 45 Admittedly, the focus of the new Republican Congress was
ostensibly not geared towards making significant changes in American foreign
policy.  Overall, this was not the issue on which the 1994 election turned, and
was indeed of limited salience for the bulk of the electorate according to most
polls.  This was symbolised by the Republican Party’s ‘Contract with America’,
a quasi-manifesto issued six weeks before the election.  Of its ten major
proposals, only one addressed American relations with the rest of the world
directly, and this was primarily concerned with limiting American cooperation
with the UN and expanding NATO.46 Nonetheless, once the new Republican
majority in Congress took office, Congressional Republicans made some forays
into foreign policy that led to confrontations with the White House.  The
significance of this event was widely recognised at the time, and this judgement
has been subsequently confirmed by scholars working with the benefit of
hindsight.  Dueck, in his study of the Republican Party’s foreign policy positions
in the 20th century, concurs, arguing that “the Republican Party in 1995-96
clearly pulled Clinton to the right on foreign and military issues as well as
domestic policy.”47 Chollet and Goldgeier also argue that the result of the 1994
mid-term elections had “profound” consequences for American foreign policy,48
while Hyland argues that the results of the 1994 election were a “disaster” for
Clinton, which forced him to engage in daily battles with the newly-elected
legislature.49
44 For example, see: Majorie Connelly, ‘The 1994 Elections; Portrait of the Electorate: Who
Voted for Whom in the House’, The New York Times, 13 November 1994; Robert J. Samuelson,
‘Changing the Mainstream’, The Washington Post, 30 November 1994
45 The U.S. Senate has 100 voting members; the House of Representatives has 435.  In common
with many other political systems, legislation must pass both chambers to become law.
46 Derek Chollet & James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York,
NY: Public Affairs, 2008), p.87-8
47 Dueck, Hard Line, p.260
48 Chollet & Goldgeier, America Between the Wars p.108
49 William G. Hyland, Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1999), p.138
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Aside from the major shift in the balance of the two main parties in
Congress, the 1994 election was particularly significant for two interconnected
reasons: the new generation of Republicans was both highly conservative
(Rockman dubbed them “hyperconservative”50) and less inclined to cooperate
with the Democratic White House.  There is considerable evidence that attests
that the divisions between the two branches in this era were more than an
inevitable conflict between two functionally-different power centres with
overlapping competencies, but also had much to do with a mixture of partisan
politics and visceral ideological conflict.  Walter Russell Meade, for instance,
argues that “The classic institutional struggle between the executive and
legislative branches in American politics was exacerbated and embittered when
insurgent Republicans, many with strong Jacksonian leanings, took control of
Congress in 1994.”51 Dueck concurs with this assessment somewhat, arguing
that the new intake of Republicans were “relatively uninterested in foreign affairs
and lacking in the internationalist pieties of an earlier generation.”52 This fact led
the historian George Herring to sum up the period as one in which “[a] band of
avidly nationalistic congressional Republicans flaunted their hostility to the
world.”53 Dumbrell, too, in his study of Clinton’s foreign policy asserts that the
Republican-dominated Congresses between 1994 and 2001 were “the most
assertive and oppositional…in the American history.”  Consequently, he argued
that they were “a major influence over the developing trajectory over the entire
Clinton foreign policy.”54 In contrast, Wright argues that the end of the Cold
War had the largest role to play in the demise of a bipartisan consensus in
Congress and American politics at large, though he does concede that the
division of the legislature and executive branches between the Republican and
50 Bert Rockman, ‘Leadership Style and the Clinton Presidency’, in Campbell & Rockman, The
Clinton Presidency, p.343
51 Walter Russell Meade, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the
World (New York, NY: Taylor & Francis, 2002), p.305
52 Dueck, Hard Line, p.259
53 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New
York City, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.931
54 John Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992-2000 (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2009), p.36 and 29
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Democratic parties was also a major factor (especially in allowing the pro-Israeli
lobby to influence the legislative process).55
The hostility towards the Clinton administration by the Republican
leadership was demonstrated by two different events at the beginning of the 104th
Congress in 1995.  The first of these was the opening of the inaugural hearing of
the House of Representatives’ International Relations Committee.  The current
Secretary of State is customarily invited to address the committee, but the
committee passed over Warren Christopher in favour of the previous
(Republican) holder of the office, James Baker.  This also demonstrated
somewhat the willingness of the new Republican majority to take a more activist
stance in foreign policy.  Although in his address to the Committee Baker
cautioned them that foreign policy was a presidential prerogative,56 this advice
was “largely unheard – further evidence that in many ways, the old guard of
Baker and [former National Security Advisor] Brent Scowcroft had fallen out of
step with the angry political core of the party.”57 The second such incident
occurred a few months later, when the senior members of Clinton’s national
security team (the Secretary of Defence, Secretary of State, Representative to the
UN, National Security Advisor and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
travelled in person to Capitol Hill to meet with Newt Gingrich (the new
Republican Speaker of the House) and the rest of the Republican Congressional
leadership to brief them on current policy.  The legislators did not show up for
the meeting.58
Admittedly, the bulk of the new crop of legislators was not focused
obsessively on foreign affairs.  Nonetheless, this relative lack of interest was
paired with the streak of fierce, parochial nationalism noted by Herring, so much
so that Dueck also argues that the consequence of this was that, of the different
foreign policy discourses within the Republican Party at the time, ‘conservative
55 Steven Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security: The Foundations of the War on
Terror (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2007), p.106
56 Crabb, Antizzo & Sarieddine, Congress and the Foreign Policy Process, p.50
57 Chollet & Goldgeier, American Between the Wars, p.111
58 Chollet & Goldgeier, America Between the Wars, p.111; Jack F Matlock, Jr., Superpower
Illusions: How Myths and False Ideologies Led America Astray – And How to Return to Reality
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), p.185
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nationalism’ was predominant amongst both the party’s political base and its
members of Congress. 59 Dueck describes this ‘conservative nationalism’ as
being focused on “the preservation of national sovereignty and an unyielding
approach to foreign adversaries.”  Consequently, they expressed distaste for
multilateral approaches and institutions and “demanded a hard line against anti-
American autocrats in Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran.”60 While this was the
most widely-held attitude amongst Republican Senators, Representatives and
activists, there were also, on the fringes, ‘Republican interventionists’ who
argued for the use of force by the US abroad, in order to assert what they
perceived to be a benevolent American global hegemony, leading them to
advocate “strategies of counterproliferation and regime change with regard to
‘rogue states’ such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.”61 Dueck distinguishes these
ideological strands from what he calls ‘conservative realism’ and ‘conservative
anti-interventionism’.  These differ from ‘conservative nationalism’ and
‘interventionism’ in that they tend to be less concerned with moral censure and
the projection of American power for idealistic ends and favour policy based on
either a cold-blooded calculation of national interest or a disdain for foreign
entanglements.  The new Republican majority was therefore one which favoured
an uncompromising, inflexible approach based on the appearance of strength and
American might in the settling of disputes.  Both ‘nationalists’ and
‘interventionists’ shared a strong conviction that the Clinton administration’s
approach and attitude towards these issues was weak and ineffectual.62 Both
therefore sought to use the powers of the legislative branch to either attack
Clinton’s foreign policies as being too soft, or to force the administration to
pursue them more aggressively and unilaterally.  The nationalistic tendencies and
hostility of the new Republicans surprised many officials.  William Perry,
Secretary of Defence from 1994 to 1997, and Deputy Secretary of Defence
before that, said: “1994 wasn’t just a Republican takeover of Congress; it was a
59 Dueck, Hard Line, p.255
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid, p.256
62 Ibid, p.254
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Contract with American takeover of Congress.  I had never seen anything like the
transformation of 1995.”63
One the most visible example of this was the activities of the new Chair
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, a Republican from the
state of North Carolina.  He used his position on this committee to wage lengthy
congressional battles to institute significant changes in the US relationship with
the UN, holding up the payments of American dues to the organisation and
demanding reforms.  Citing the opportunity granted by the 1994 Republican
victory, he also proposed “a radical restructuring of foreign policy apparatus”,
and proposed “eliminating the Agency for International Development, the Arms
Control and Development Agency, the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation and other agencies.”64 He was relatively successful in
both cases.  The dues were paid in return for changes at the UN and a permanent
reduction in US contributions to its budget, as well as the incorporation of some
previously autonomous agencies into the State Department.65 At one point, he
delayed the appointment of 15 ambassadors in order to gain leverage in the issue
of the re-organisation of USAID.66 He was also one of the principal sponsors of
the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act, subsequently known as the Helms-
Burton Act, which was in some ways a model for the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act,
in that it targeted a state deeply unpopular in the US with extra-territorial
sanctions.  In addition to this, the administration also suffered some defeats at the
hands of congress on other multilateral issues, with some international
agreements either rejected or obstructed, the most notable examples being the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto
Protocol.67
63 Chollet & Goldgeier, American Between the Wars, p.111
64 Steven Greenhouse, ‘Helms Seeks to Merge Foreign Policy Agencies’, The New York Times,
16 March 1995
65 Dueck, Hard Line, p.262
66 Sebastian Mallaby, ‘The Bullied Pulpit: A Weak Chief Executive Makes Worse Foreign
Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 79 (2) 2000, p.4-5
67 Dueck, Hard Line, p.260
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7.3.2 Congress after the Cold War
Regarding the decade immediately after the end of the Cold War, the
conventional wisdom holds that with the end of superpower competition, the
threshold to involvement in foreign affairs was now lower, and legislators were
now arguably freer to challenge the executive without fear of appearing
unpatriotic or divisive.68 The death of the Soviet threat also arguably made room
for new enemies and new causes to climb the agenda in American foreign policy,
and occupy the attention of legislators.  Some therefore argue that the end of the
Cold War “expanded the sanctions agenda of Congress to a new range of issues,
such as nuclear testing, environmental protection, and religious persecution.  It
also removed many of the inhibitions regarding the costs of alliance
confrontations on national security.”69 There may be something in this, but the
idea that there ever was a ‘bipartisan consensus’, or an agreement between the
executive and legislative branches not to ‘rock the boat’ during the Cold War is
itself a myth, as history has shown.70 The findings of a study by Wittkopf and
McCormick also suggests that the effect of the end of the Cold War was
somewhat exaggerated in terms of the absolute level of congressional activism,
but that this decade continued the post-Vietnam trend of increased Congressional
involvement in foreign affairs.71 Others argue that the end of the Cold War has
seen a corresponding decline of public interest in foreign affairs, further
empowering interest groups and driving more congressional activism by
incentivising legislators to pay more attention to these groups in the absence of
strong national public perspectives on foreign policy issues.72
The relationship between the end of the Cold War and any changes in
Congressional activity in foreign policy is complex, though there was a shift in
68 Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy, p.32
69 Kenneth Rodman, Sanctions Beyond Borders: Multinational Corporations and U.S. Economic
Statecraft (Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield, 2001), p.175
70 I am indebted to Mr. Stephen Rademaker for pointing this out.  Interview with Stephen
Rademaker, former Chief Counsel to House Committee on International Relations, Washington,
D.C., 23-02-2011
71 Eugene Wittkopf & James McCormick, ‘Congress, the President, and the End of the Cold War:
Has Anything Changed?’ The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42 (4) 1998, pp.440-466
72 James Lindsay, ‘Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive-Legislative
Relations in Foreign Policy,’ Presidential Studies Quarterly, 33 (3) 2003  ¸p.535
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the tone of congressional activism in the wake of the end of the Cold War that
suggests a causal relationship.  Sanctions in particular are perhaps the best
example.  In keeping with a wider trend towards greater congressional activism,
the bulk of American sanctions have been imposed by Congress rather than the
executive branch since the 1960s,73 but the nature of these sanctions changed
somewhat during the 1990s.  Dual containment was by no means an isolated
example, in terms of the imposition of sanctions on specific states.  Aside from
Libya, Iran, and Iraq, the US introduced or tightened sanctions on Cuba, Nigeria,
Sudan and Burma in the 1990s,74 and following the nuclear tests of 1998, India
and Pakistan (the Glenn Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, and
revised again in 1999).75 The issue of American sanctions on foreign states and
companies became a subject of fierce debate in this period, with some accusing
the Congress in particular of the excessive use of ineffectual economic sanctions
that served only to exclude US businesses from lucrative markets without
changing the behaviour of sanctioned states: “The current inventory of US
sanctions covers 26 target countries, accounting for over half the world’s
population.  Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Congress has felt freer to
interfere in foreign policy, instructing the president on the minute details of
imposing and waiving sanctions.”76 This sparked attempts at rebuttals from,
amongst others, Senator Jesse Helms, who disputed these figures, and argued
that sanctions were a necessary price to pay for the pursuit of a “moral foreign
policy.”77 The issue of the kind of sanctions is also important, as they can range
from full embargoes to restrictions on the import or export of a single product or
commodity, and for a host of reasons, as Sullivan points out.78 If Sullivan’s
definition of sanctions is accepted, a deliberately median position defining
sanctions as “the deliberate withdrawal of normal trade or financial relations for
73 Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Elliott, Barbara Oedd, Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered, 3rd edition (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics,
2007), fig. 5.4, p.135
74 Ibid, p.126
75 Ibid, p.134
76 Gary Hufbauer, ‘The Snake Oil of Diplomacy: When Sanctions Rise, the U.S. Peddles
Sanctions’, Washington Post, 12 July 1998.  See also Richard Haass, ‘Sanctioning Madness,’
Foreign Affairs, 76 (6) 1997, pp.74-85
77 Jesse Helms, ‘What Sanctions Epidemic? U.S. Business’ Curious Crusade,’ Foreign Affairs, 78
(2) 1999, p.7
78 Meghan O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, p.12
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foreign policy purposes”, a statistical breakdown of American sanctions imposed
during the 1990s reveals complex picture that falls between the black-and-white
positions drawn by the opposing sides: a sharp spike in new sanctions imposed at
the beginning of the 1990s, followed by a decline in the second half of the
decade. 79 Nonetheless, the evidence does support a case for increased
congressional activism, as “congressionally legislated sanctions – once a rarity –
became as common as their counterparts mandated by the executive branch.”80
If multilateral sanctions are factored out, leaving only unilateral American
sanctions, the picture is even starker, with twice as many sanctions of
congressional origin than those from the executive branch.81 The nature of some
of these sanctions is arguably also significant in and of themselves: “Congress is
most interventionist when it passes a stand-alone law targeting a specific country,
exemplified by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and the Iran-
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.”  In this category, sanctions of this nature were
more numerous in the 1990s than any previous decade.82
7.4 The impact of Congressional activism on dual containment
Given the presence of a hostile Republican majority in Congress, the
administration was compelled to modify its policies and/or deal with
congressional legislation that sought to influence foreign affairs.  As we saw in
Chapter 5, several pieces of legislation regarding Iran and Iraq reached the
statute book in the US during the Clinton administration that began life in
Congress rather than the White House.  The case of Iran is the most glaring
example of this.  As the US had recently fought a large-scale conventional
ground war against Iraq and was committed to containing it with military force, it
therefore made more sense to seek to control the terms it could engage with the
outside world through a comprehensive containment and sanctions regime.  Iran,
on the other hand, was already the target of strict and comprehensive American
sanctions, which were tightened as time went by, without the same risk of the
79 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, p.12
80 Ibid
81 Ibid, p.12, note 5
82 Hufbauer et al, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, p.134-5
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resumption of military threat to American interests.  Pollack argues that Iran in
particular represented an opportunity for Congress to attack the White House:
“Just as America was inevitably a political football in Tehran, so beginning in
1995, Iran became a political football in America.  The new Republican-
controlled Congress knew a good issue when they saw one.”83 It is, of course,
unclear that the administration would have acted differently it not for
congressional pressure, but considerable evidence exists that it was a major
factor.  Although ‘dual containment’ was formulated and announced by
executive branch officials, the administration showed every sign of carrying on
with the previous regime until it was prodded into action by Congress.  In
Pollack’s words, towards the beginning of Clinton’s term in office, dual
containment was “principally a defensive strategy, not an offensive one”, and
“more declaratory than operational.”84 This began to change when the US-based
oil company Conoco signed a development deal with the government of Iran in
early 1995.  It was only when an outcry against the deal was raised by legislators
that the administration chose to intervene, using national security legislation to
veto the project.  This view is also shared by Fields, who also argues that Clinton
changed course because of domestic political pressure.85 The fact that the White
House was aware of the deal but chose not to intervene lends credence to this
view, whether the motives were to assist American businesses abroad or
otherwise.86 Alikhani argues that Clinton was forced to take a stance on the issue
once it went public, and he faced pressure from “Republican congressional
leaders and the Jewish lobby in the United States”, even though “the
Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy and the Treasury were against any
change of policy towards Iran”.87 This is even more plausible in light of the fact
that the White House’s initial response was also to stop the deal, but in a way
that “American companies would still be permitted to buy oil from Iran and to
83 Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York,
NY; Random House, 2004), p.270
84 Ibid, p.263
85 Jeffrey Fields, Adversaries and Statecraft: Explaining U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Rogue
States, PhD Dissertation, University of Southern California, 2007, p.155
86 David Sanger, ‘Conoco Told U.S. Years Ago of Oil Negotiations With Iran’, The New York
Times, 16 March 1995
87 Hossein Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy (London: IB Tauris, 2000),
p.182
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resell it to third countries, a practice that account[ed] for one-fourth of the oil
sold by Iran.”88
As noted in chapter 5, this process was begun by the tabling of a bill by
Senator Alfonse D’Amato, a Republican from the state of New York, who had
become chairman of the Senate Banking Committee after the 1994 Republican
victory.  He introduced the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act to the Senate in
January of 1995, which called for the ban of all US-Iranian trade.  President
Clinton subsequently introduced Executive Order 12957 in mid-March 1995,
which prohibited American firms and citizens from investing in the Iranian
petroleum sector.  This was not enough to assuage D’Amato, and the process was
repeated.  He proposed another Senate bill later that same month, this time
extending sanctions to foreign firms that traded with Iran: the Iran Foreign
Sanctions Act.  This once again prompted Clinton to introduce another Executive
Order, 12959, which finally achieved the objectives Senator D’Amato sought in
his original bill, the closing down of virtually all formal US-Iranian trade.
Again, Clinton’s efforts were not successful in satisfying Senator D’Amato and
the supporters of his bills in the House and Senate.  D’Amato’s second Bill
became law as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 in the face of opposition
from the White House.
This was the legislation that caused the most trouble for the Clinton
administration with US allies, given that it mandated sanctions on foreign
companies that traded with Iran, even those based in close US allies, such as the
European Union member states, Canada and Japan.89 In that sense it was both a
unilateral measure and also a veto of any possibility of a multilateral approach to
Iran.  This was one of the reasons it was so disliked by the executive branch- it
was believed that it impinged on the presidential prerogative in foreign policy,
first by compelling the President to take action when he had previous declined to
88 Douglas Jehl, ‘Oil Concern Ends A Deal With Iran As President Acts,’ The New York Times,
14 March 1995
89 Fawaz Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p.129-130; Ali Ansari, Confronting Iran: The
Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust (London: Hurst & Co., 2006),
p.144
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do so, and secondly by restricting his options in policymaking.  It is not
unreasonable to suggest that one of the reasons it met with a favourable response
in both houses of Congress was that it conformed to the principles favoured by
the new Republican majority - it mandated a unilateral, hard-line approach and
ignored the effects this would have on existing relationships with other US allies.
As Rodman argues, “much of the new class of Republican freshmen and their
leaders were more aligned with the social and ideological agendas behind
sanctions efforts than they were with the views of the business community and
foreign policy establishment.”90 As Wright points out, this also endangered the
international goodwill required for the multilateral approach the administration
was relying on to contain Iraq.91
In addition, there were congressional moves to overturn or undermine the
stated US policy of not seeking ‘regime change’ in Iran.  Executive branch
officials stated on many occasions that official US policy was not to overthrow
the Iranian government as it was currently constituted, or alter its system of
government.  Instead, “Iran… was to be contained within a cordon sanitaire,
within which Iran could do as it pleased as long as it did not bother anyone
else.”92 Despite this, the Speaker of the House, Representative Newt Gingrich,
“recognised that, given the popular antipathies to Iran, the Democrats were
vulnerable to charges that they were not being active enough in trying to change
Iran’s roguish behavior.”93 He subsequently attempted to appropriate funds for a
programme of covert action aimed at ‘regime change’ in what became a
damaging row with the executive branch during the annual budgeting process for
intelligence activities.  Although this was supposed to be a confidential matter it
swiftly became public, and worsened the already antagonistic relationship
between the two states given that the legacy of bitterness in Iran from the
involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the downfall of Iranian Prime
Minister Mossadeq in 1953.  The actual sum of money involved was relatively
marginal, a mere $18m in a $28bn intelligence funding bill for FY1996, and it is
90 Rodman, Sanctions Beyond Borders, p.176
91 Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security, p.113
92 Ansari, Confronting Iran, p.136
93 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p.273
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likely that all parties involved on the American side recognised that it was
unlikely to lead to a repeat of the events of 1953.94 As discussed in chapter 5,
although the executive branch was able to negotiate some leeway on the
conditions on which the money would be spent, this was a fact wasted on the
government of Iran, who announced that they would appropriate an equal amount
to counteract these efforts and publicise American interference in Iranian affairs.
The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 proved to be equally contentious.  As
discussed in Chapter 5, President Clinton had authorized covert attempts by the
CIA to overthrow Saddam Hussein upon entering office, but held back from
more overt attempts to topple him, preferring the lower-risk strategy of
multilateral sanctions and economic pressure.  This was not enough for some
legislators, who sought to turn up the heat on both Iraq and President Clinton by
seeking to make ‘regime change’ official US policy.  The process of the passage
of the ILA paralleled Gingrich’s attempts to allocate funds for the overthrow of
the Islamic Republic of Iran in some respects: it was widely criticised by many
officials, experts and observers as unfeasible,95 and the funds were channelled
away from operational use by the White House.  Congress was less successful in
the case of Iraq because of the differing containment regimes of Iran and Iraq,
which in the case of Iraq, which was far more militarised.  The means to
implement this policy, the military and the intelligence services, were controlled
directly by the executive branch. The sanctions regime on Iraq was also a
multilateral undertaking, and the White House’s domination of diplomacy meant
that there were no dramatic changes in the American position at the UN.
Overall, Congress was poorly placed to attempt to direct American policy
towards Iraq.
Arguably, the legislative measures on Iran and Iraq imposed by Congress
did not lead to major, visible changes in US policy, and the White House did its
best to evade the implementation of them.  However, their passage had a more
94 R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘U.S. Leans Towards Tighter Iran Sanctions; Administration Willing To
Work With GOP On Curtailing Foreign Trade,’ The Washington Post, 10 November 1995;
Reuters, ‘Gingrich ‘Seeks to topple Iranian regime’’ The Australian, 12 December 1995
95 For instance, see: Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack & Gideon Rose, ‘The Rollback Fantasy,’
Foreign Affairs, 78 (1) 1999, pp.24-41
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subtle implication, alluded to previously, which set the scene for a possible
struggle for the direction of policy between the two branches.  In effect, they
went some way towards placing American policy towards these two states on a
legislative footing, rather than one dictated by the White House.  In the case of
ILSA and policy towards Iran, the difference between Executive Orders and acts
of congress is the significant point.  Although they are imposed under authority
granted to the president by legislation (in the case of the executive orders the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act),96 the former are imposed by the
president and can be removed the president, at the discretion of the occupant of
the White House.  The latter, as legislation, requires congress to overturn using
more legislation.  While the president can request that Congress strike out the
legislation once it is passed, it is under no formal obligation to do so.  In theory,
legislation can therefore ‘lock in’ the president to a Congressional policy if
congressional sanctions  are the issue around which define the trajectory of a
policy, or act as an effective veto on its pursuit.  In this case, the lifting of
sanctions on Iran would arguably be a necessary step in reaching an accord with
Iran, or a precondition for a serious dialogue.97
In practice, the situation is of course somewhat murkier.  How pliable
Congress would be to executive persuasion is a difficult thing to gauge, given the
fact that Congressional vs. presidential control of an issue is ultimately
determined by political contestation, as Corwin observed.98 Additionally, in the
case of ILSA, the executive branch was able to negotiate sufficient leeway to be
able to avoid applying any sanctions, and avoid a clash with American allies in
the EU in particular,99 though in the next chapter, we shall see how the move
away from sanctions was facilitated by the changing balance of power within
Congress and the interest groups seeking to influence policy, taking some of the
pressure off the White House.  However, the transfer of more sanctions from the
executive to the legislative shifted the centre of gravity of the issue of American
96 For details, see the text of the orders at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/12957.pdf and http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/12959.pdf accessed 29-01-2013
97 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, p.98
98 Lindsay, ‘Deference and Defiance¸’ p.532
99 Rodman, Sanctions Beyond Borders, p.184-5
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relations with Iran in the direction of the legislature, in so far as sanctions on Iran
remained a defining factor in the relations between the two states.  Brzezinski
argued that the imposition of the sanctions made an opening to Iran “virtually
impossible,” narrowing President Clinton’s policy options.100 At the same time,
it served as notice that the president needed to pursue a harder line with Iran, and
therefore likely had an impact on President Clinton’s approach to the issue,
especially given that he was facing re-election in 1996, and his political advisors
wanted “to avoid being outflanked by Senator D’Amato with Jewish-American
voters in particular.”101
The question of how far Congressional sanctions narrowed President
Clinton’s policy options, as Brzezinski claims, has an Iranian dimension as well
as a domestic American one, making it doubly hard to judge.  The effect of
Congressional sanctions on US-Iranian relations is therefore determined partly
by their effectiveness in their intended objective of putting economic pressure on
Iran, and the closely-connected issue of the impact of this on attitudes to the US
amongst influential Iranian policymakers.  ILSA was originally intended to put
pressure on Iran’s attempts to develop its oil industry, which was facing the
problem of static production and growing domestic demand. 102 Choking off
attempts to enlist the needed international investment in Iran’s energy sector
would therefore force Iran to confront a stark and unpleasant choice between
severe economic strain or complying with US demands. Economically, the
evidence of the effects of the imposition of Clinton’s two executive orders and
ILSA is somewhat mixed.  While Iran was able to continue to export oil in
significant amounts, and was able to continue to secure international partners in
oil and gas development projects (especially after waiving sanctions on the deal
between the National Iranian Oil Company and Gazprom, Total and Petronas in
1998), the indirect effect of the sanctions may have been more significant,103 and
100 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American
Superpower (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2007), p.102
101 Ernest Preeg, Feeling Good or Doing Good with Sanctions: Unilateral Economic Sanctions
and the U.S. National Interest (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 1999), p.54
102 Weissman interview
103 Hossein Askari, John Forrer, Hildy Teegan, Jiawen Yang, Case Studies of U.S. Economic
Sanctions: The Chinese, Cuban, and Iranian Experience (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p.172.
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stem from “higher financing costs, retarded or stalled oil and non-oil joint
venture projects (which, in turn, have impeded oil capacity development and thus
possibly reduced oil production and oil exports), and the like.”104 The Iranian
government apparently signalled that it regarded the removal of sanctions as a
pre-condition for improved relations with the US in 1998, at the beginning of the
tentative attempts at reconciliation initiated after the election of Khatami.105 In
political terms, the imposition of further sanctions on Iran cannot therefore have
had a positive impact on Iranian calculations of the desirability of restoring
diplomatic links with the US, though the subsequent missed opportunities to
improve US-Iranian ties after the election of Khatami may have had as much (if
not more) to do with internal power struggles than the demand for the lifting of
sanctions before negotiations could begin.106 Nonetheless, as O’Sullivan argues,
“[a]ccording to most Iranian political leaders, regardless of their political
leanings, as long as sanctions remain in place, Iran will reject any official
dialogue with the United States.”107 In all probability they were an important
factor, given significance of the relationship with the US in Iranian domestic
politics and the centrality of oil exports to the Iranian economy.  The result of all
of this is that the issue of the congressional ability to veto a process of
reconciliation between Iran and the US was deferred, not resolved as the point at
which this would have been tested was never reached.
7.5 Conclusions
Following the experience of Vietnam and Watergate, the US Congress
sought to reign in the foreign policy powers of the executive branch and re-assert
the Congressional control and oversight of American foreign relations granted by
the constitution.  This led to a number of structural reforms within the institution
to both enhance its own power and widen participation in policy-making.  This
also had effect of making congress more receptive to interest groups seeking to
104 Askari et al, Case Studies of US Economic Sanctions, p.211
105 ‘Iran Pointer to Better US Ties,’ Financial Times, 30 September 1998
106 Ansari, Confronting Iran, p.177-8
107 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, p.47
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influence policy.  These would have serious implications for American policy in
the Persian Gulf in the 1990s.
Consequently, the institutional context in which ‘dual containment’ was
formulated proved to be a strong influence on the evolution of the policy.  The
necessity of taking Congressional pressure to further isolate Iran and Iraq into
account complicated administration policy, and to some small degree altered its
direction also.  While no sanctions were imposed on companies trading with Iran,
the outcry over the links between the US and Iran led to the banning of virtually
all trade between the two states, and succeeded on burying Rafsanjani’s overture
in the Conoco affair, thought this was also viewed with suspicion amongst
several policymakers in the executive branch.  While American overtures to
Khatami eventually proved fruitless, and improvement in the relationship
between the US and Iran would have doubtless required the removal of American
sanctions on Iran at some point.  One of the effects of the sanctions legislation
would have been to give Congress a voice in this decision.  It is impossible to
know what the outcome of congressional-executive negotiations on this issue,
but by itself it demonstrates the influence of Congress on the foreign policy
process.  Ultimately, although the real limits of its power were never tested,
Congress was successful at putting its ‘stamp’ on dual containment,
demonstrating the importance of the domestic institutional context in American
foreign policymaking.
More difficult to measure is the impact of Congressional influence on a
less overt, informal level, on the judgements of key policymakers, including
President Clinton himself.  President Clinton did attempt to build links with Iran
following the election of Khatami, despite knowing how unpopular Iran was with
legislators, which suggests that he believed he had sufficient political capital and
influence with Congress to follow through on his ambitions if the response had
been positive.  However, this is not the only variable at work, as we shall see in
the next chapter.  The next chapter examines the impact of ‘policy coalitions’ of
dual containment, and the attempts of various interest groups to shape American
policy in the Persian Gulf, especially towards Iran.
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Overall, Congress was able to influence the implementation of dual
containment in ways that manifested the ‘separation of powers’ between the
branches with regards to foreign affairs.  In seeking to legislate sanctions on Iran
(and to some degree Iraq, with the ILA), Congress sought to impose limits and
boundaries upon the president.  Conversely, President Clinton used the powers
and prerogatives of his office to maximise his freedom of action within these
boundaries, and to some degree shift them as much as possible, in a process that
has been reflected time and again in American politics.
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CHAPTER 8 Interest groups as an intervening variable:
‘Mischiefs of Faction’?
“AIPAC by its very nature is focused on Capitol Hill, Congress…when Sy
Kenen founded AIPAC he said ‘our job is to get the Senate to tell the President
to order the State Department to stop beating up Israel.’ ”1
The previous chapter focused primarily on the impact of ‘domestic
institutions,’ examining the institutional context in which dual containment
policy was made.  While this is an important factor in understanding American
foreign policy, it cannot tell the whole story.  This chapter plays a
complementary role, and looks at how interest groups originating within society
at large interact with these structures to shape and influence dual containment.  It
examines the role of ‘policy coalitions,’ those constellations of forces within a
society that use political influence to affect policy in different ways, in a manner
determined both by their own ability to do this (based on factors like the skill of
their advocates, public support, and so on), and the opportunities offered to them
by the political system in which they operate.  Specifically, organised interest
groups espousing a variety of causes and interests frequently seek to insert their
preferences and policies into the policymaking process by lobbying legislators
and executive branch officials.  While the institutional context of the state in
which they operate determines how effective they can be (depending on the
relative autonomy of the FPE and the accessibility of the policymaking process
to outside interest groups), it is the degree of influence these forces wield and the
nature of their preferred policies that determine specific outcomes. In the
American case, interest groups are able to influence policy despite holding no
formal power, by lobbying legislators and officials, though their influence varies
from issue to issue and from group to group.
This chapter argues that pro-Israeli lobbyists, specifically AIPAC, were
successful in lobbying Congress to tighten the already stringent American
1 Steve Rosen, former AIPAC official, interview with author, Silver Springs, Maryland, US,
March 2012
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sanctions regime on Iran, and in so doing were able to place some indirect
pressure on the executive branch to pursue a ‘hardline’ policy towards Iran.
AIPAC was not, however, an all-powerful force in determining American policy.
While it, and some organisations like it, possesses considerable influence in the
making of foreign policy in some respects, this depends almost entirely on
certain conditions being met.  This is demonstrated by the failure of opponents of
the sanctions, and of an antagonistic approach to Iran more generally, to make
much headway in their attempts to challenge this trend in American policy,
though they saw some success in moderating American sanctions policy.  The
course of dual containment therefore reflected the results of contestation amongst
interest groups, as it did the perceptions of policymakers and the institutional
context in which it was conceived and implemented.
This chapter examines the role of interest groups pushing for the
imposition of sanctions on Iran and the implementation of measures like the Iran-
Libya Sanctions Act and the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act.  The
passage of this legislation is commonly attributed to the influence of the so-
called the ‘Israel lobby,’ and sometimes the antagonistic approach of American
policy towards Iran more generally.2 In this chapter, we will therefore attempt to
determine the extent to which pro-Israeli lobbying organisations like AIPAC
were able to influence legislative measures targeting Iran with sanctions, and
indirectly the trajectory of American policy towards Iran more generally.  This
will be preceded by an exploration of the theoretical underpinnings of this
approach to the study of foreign policymaking, and how this fits in with the
wider framework of neoclassical realism (NCR) as it is utilised in this thesis as a
whole.  This is followed by an examination of the nature of this lobby and
attempt to draw an accurate picture of its power and influence, despite the
controversies that have dogged it and determine if, as Smith alleges, American
sanctions on Iran came about “in substantial part at the insistence of ethnic
lobbies.”3 The insistence of Parsi, and some other scholars, on the importance of
2 For instance, in Hossein Alikhani’s Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy (London: IB
Tauris, 2000)
3 Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American
Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p.16.
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Israel and its allies in the US on the American approach to Iran, also makes this a
pressing issue that must be examined closely.  The reasons why the pro-Israeli
lobby is regarded as so influential in American policymaking is also discussed.
This is followed by an examination of rival interest groups that attempted to
counteract its effects, and the comparison of their influence with their opponents
in the pro-Israel lobby.
8.1 Interest groups, foreign policy and neoclassical realism
The role of interest groups in American politics and foreign policy has
been debated since the foundation of the US as part of wider debates about the
pros and cons of democratic government.  A good definition of an interest group
(which he termed a ‘faction’) was given by James Madison in The Federalist
Papers, and is arguably still valid today: “a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”4
In chapter 2, we explored how some neoclassical realists viewed legislatures as
one version of an 'interest group.'5 It is a feature of the American political
system that the Congress is able to play this role, and simultaneously that of a
significant part of the policymaking system which is itself open to lobbying by
interest groups in society.  While the executive branch is generally the single
most influential actor in determining the course of American foreign policy,
Congress also retains an influential role, and Congress can in turn be strongly
influenced by public opinion and organised interest groups.  This chapter
therefore seeks to examine the role of interest groups seeking to use their
influence with Congress to shape American foreign policy.
The impact of domestic interest groups within states on the formation of
foreign policy has been largely passed over by NCR theorists, whom, to date,
4 James Madison, ‘The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and
Insurrection’ The Federalist, no.10, 1787, available at
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm accessed 28-05-2012
5 Norrin Ripsman, ‘Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups,’ in Steven Lobell, Norrin
Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassicial Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
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have been less concerned with individual foreign policies like dual containment
and (in general) more concerned with ‘grand strategy,’ which of necessity
focuses less on the narrower agendas typically pushed by interest groups.  This
chapter therefore has fewer precedents in regards to NCR theory, because it
examines the role of interest groups seeking to influence a specific foreign policy
in a specific state, the US, and largely by lobbying Congress.  Consequently, this
chapter draws more upon the research into the role of interest groups, particularly
ethnic interest groups, on American politics and foreign policy from FPA and
Political Science, though it remains rooted in NCR.  Among the NCR scholars
who focus on interest groups based in society are Lobell, who theorises about the
role of competition between domestic and export-focused economic interest
groups in foreign policy formation, but is a partial exception, given his focus on
larger forces.6 The work of Ripsman is a more direct precedent, as he has also
sought to study the role of interest groups on foreign policy more generally,
though his definition of interest groups is more extensive.  Nonetheless, he
theorizes that interest groups based within society (rather than the government)
can influence foreign policy if they are “well-organized, coherent, vote-rich,
single-issue interest groups that can provide an electoral payoff” to leaders.   This
chapter argues that the pro-Israel lobby strongly resembles Ripsman’s picture.
Debates about the role of interest groups in American politics in general
and in foreign policy specifically have a long pedigree.  In regards to foreign
policy, those who have engaged in this debate share a tendency to take one of
two different sides.  On the one hand, there are those who lament the role of
interest groups, especially ethnic interest groups, in the making of American
foreign policy, arguing that they have in recent years become too powerful and
have made it more difficult for the government to make foreign policy in a
disinterested and objective fashion, especially since the end of the Cold War.7
Huntington, for example, argued in 1997, that “Without a sure sense of national
6 Steven Lobell, ‘Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model,’ in
Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the States, and Foreign Policy
7 For example, see George Kennan, The Cloud of Danger: Some Current Problems of American
Foreign Policy (London: Hutchinson, 1977); Charles Matthias, ‘Ethnic Groups and Foreign
Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 59 (5) 1991-2, pp.975-998; Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The
Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2000), p.2
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identity, Americans have become unable to define their national interests, and as
a result subnational commercial interests and transnational and non-national
ethnic interests have come to dominate foreign policy.”8 On the other, there are
those, like Milbrath, who concluded that interest groups are relatively
unimportant. 9 As stated above, an important element is the nature of the
American political system, which is highly pluralistic and provides fertile ground
for interest groups to flourish.  These debates are also complicated by the issue of
the position taken by interlocutors on where the bulk of the power and
responsibility for forming foreign policy should lie, the executive or legislative
branch, given that the former is usually held to be more insulated from social
pressures.  Engaging in these debates in a comprehensive way is beyond the
scope of this work, which is in any case focused on different goals.  Nonetheless,
we can conclude that the fact that these debates occur and reoccur in American
politics indicates that interest groups have influence enough in some ways to
attract the attention of scholars and policymakers.  Madison, one of the architects
of the US Constitution and the Bill of Rights, warned of the dangers posed to
democracy by the “mischiefs of faction” but accepted that these were inevitable
in a democratic system.10 More recent scholarship suggests that ethnic interest
groups have some influence, but no more than other kinds of group, such as “the
media, business groups, and nonelected elites”, and in many cases less.11 The
question becomes, therefore, why are some interest groups more influential than
others?
While no interest group, representing an ethnicity, single-issue campaign
group, industry (such as aerospace, oil, or mining and so on) or other sector of
society enjoys ‘power’ per se, the fact that they represent genuine citizens or
businesses gives them a varying amount of influence with legislators and
8 Samuel Huntington, ‘The Erosion of American National Interests’, Foreign Affairs, 76 (5) 1997,
p.29
9 Lester Milbrath, ‘Interest Groups and Foreign Policy,’ in James Rosenau (ed.), Domestic
Sources of Foreign Policy (London: Free Press, 1967)
10 James Madison, ‘The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and
Insurrection’
11 David Paul & Rachel Paul, Ethnic Lobbies & US Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2009), p.203
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officials, who are more-or-less inclined to listen to them for a host of reasons.12
Therefore, when an interest group is described as ‘powerful,’ what this generally
means is that its views are taken seriously by the government figures its seeks to
influence, and that this has an impact on their formation of policy as a result.
Admittedly, this is a very difficult thing to measure, and “Such an approach may
lead to fallacious conclusions concerning the power and influence of a group or
to the problem of “parallelism” (that is, of attributing influence to a group based
on a set of factors and influences unrelated to anything that group has or has not
done.” 13 Nonetheless, this is an important area that deserves serious and
sustained attention.  As other scholars have argued, the interplay of such
nebulous factors is an extremely important part of the day-to-day politics in
which policy is made, much of which takes place in an informal manner and out
of the public eye.14
For scholars of international relations, this begs a question: why focus in
particular on Congress and domestic interest groups, particularly those
represented by lobbyists, when “the number of nongovernmental factors that can
shape a society’s foreign policy is staggering and, accordingly, the task of
piecing them together into a coherent whole is extraordinarily complex”?15 The
question of Congress has been answered above and in the previous chapter, but
bears repeating: the US Congress is almost unique in its formal power over
foreign policymaking.  The attention given to lobbying groups in this chapter is
somewhat more problematic, given that much attention has also been given to the
role of other groups and factors, such as the media, public opinion and so on,
especially within the subfield of FPA.  This too, however, can be explained.  As
stated in the previous chapter, it is somewhat misleading to speak of Congress as
a single unitary body, with a cohesive policy of its own.  Aside from the fact that
it is composed of two houses, the House of Representatives and the Senate,
12 Paul Watanabe, Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the
Turkish Arms Embargo (Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), p.21-22
13 David Howard Goldberg, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups: American and Canadian
Jews Lobby for Israel (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990), p.11
14 Rebecca Hersman, Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign
Policy, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.3-5
15 James Rosenau, ‘Introduction’, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (London: Free Press,
1967) p.4
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which may be controlled by different parties at any one time (and may not see
eye-to-eye on any given issue in any case given their differing institutional
perspectives), both are composed of groups of individuals operating under a
weak party system.  Each attempt by the legislature to force the executive to
change its policy, or to accept one from Congress, must therefore begin with a
single legislator, or group.
This stands in contrast to a view expressed by scholars who have argued
that domestic interest groups and Congress have little direct influence on foreign
policy.  Milbrath, for instance, writing in the mid-1960s, concluded that the
president dominated the foreign-policymaking process, and that the most
effective way for interest groups to affect policy was to capture his attention.16
Milbrath dismisses the powers of Congress as ones to set limits on the power of
the president, but not to intervene directly.  However, this took place before the
expansion of Congressional involvement in foreign policy that took place after
the Vietnam War, described in the previous chapter, when the executive branch
enjoyed much more autonomy from societal pressures, and a strong Cold War
consensus existed.17 Nonetheless, despite the fact that he concluded that the
ability of interest groups to influence foreign policy was very limited,18 Milbrath
offers a useful description of the task facing interest groups seeking to influence
foreign policy:
groups desiring to influence foreign policy decisions must know the optimum stage
of the decision for delivery of their message; they must know the officials or their
advisers who are involved in the decision and who are most likely to be receptive
to the messages; they must find an open and clear channel to such persons; they
must attract the attention of officials so that they will be heard; they must compose
messages that are credible and legitimate.  They may want to supplement these
methods by stirring up messages from the grass roots or they may wish to
concentrate on elites who are more likely to send supplementary
messages…Lobbying to influence foreign policy is no easy matter.19
16 James Rosenau, ‘Introduction,’ Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, p.4
17 Ralph Carter & James Scott, Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy
Entrepreneurs (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), p.15
18 Milbrath, ‘Interest Groups and Foreign Policy,’ p.25
19 Milbrath, ‘Interest Groups and Foreign Policy’, p.244
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8.2 The pro-Israel lobby: influence, not power
It is a widely-held belief amongst observers of American politics that the
‘Israel lobby’ is amongst the most powerful of the various interest groups trying
to influence American government policy, with some placing it second only to
the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). 20 While the AARP
claims to have a membership of almost 40 million, making it the largest such
group in the US,21 the groups that make up what is acknowledged to be the ‘core’
of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington are small in comparison, yet the belief in
their potency one that persists amongst many scholars and American politicians.
For instance, a survey of ‘Washington insiders’ conducted by Paul and Paul
place it at the top of the list of ethnic interest groups in terms of influence,22
leading them to conclude that “Only AIPAC has the policymaking prowess to
rival organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce or the AARP.” 23
Mearsheimer and Walt offer a reasonable definition of the boundaries of the
lobby, stating that they take it to be “the loose coalition of individuals and
organisations that actively work to shape US foreign policy in a pro-Israel
direction.”24 The two organisations that make up the core of the organized pro-
Israel lobby in the United States are the Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organisations (or ‘Presidents’ Conference’), and the American
Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC), The Presidents’ Conference has
traditionally maintained a lower profile, and focused on lobbying the executive
branch.  It is widely held to be relatively ineffective, at least in comparison to its
sister organisation, though it is taken to represent (and sees itself as) the
representative of the collective voice of the American Jewish community. 25
20 Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran, p.177
21 Figured drawn from AARP official website, http://www.aarp.org/about-aarp/press-center/info-
2007/rx_bargaining_power.html accessed 01-06-2012; Burdett Loomis & Allan Cigler,
‘Introduction: The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics’, in Allan Cigler & Burdett
Loomis (eds.), Interest Group Politics, 7th edition, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), p.13
22 Paul & Paul Ethnic Lobbies & US Foreign Policy, p.135-6
23 Ibid, p.211
24 John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (NY;
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007), p.112
25Author interview with Rosen
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AIPAC, on the other hand, has been at the forefront of lobbying Congress on
foreign policy, and been the target of much of the criticism directed at the lobby.
This stems from a perception in some quarters that it wields a disproportionate
and unhealthy amount power, and has been able to pressure American
policymakers into pursuing policies that are beneficial for Israel but detrimental
to the US, as well as trying to delegitimise critics of Israel and its policies.26
Both AIPAC and the Presidents’ Conference are rooted in the Jewish American
community, though in recent years some evangelical Christian groups and
leaders have adopted Israel as an issue, largely from the belief that the Jewish
state has a role to play in fulfilling Biblical prophecy.27 It is partly for this reason
that it is incorrect to refer to a ‘Jewish lobby,’ at least as far as the issue of the
American relationship Israel and the Middle East more generally is concerned.
A more important reason is the fact that Jewish Americans are not a single
coherent mass that offers unflinching and unqualified support for the state of
Israel on every single issue, and other Jewish groups that have clashed with
AIPAC and the larger lobby have been formed (though they have not proven to
be as successful in their attempts to attract support, shape debate and lobby
policymakers).  The most recent, and most high-profile of these groups is ‘J
Street.’28 Nonetheless, given the Jewish roots of AIPAC and the Presidents’
Conference and the groups it represents, scholars usually place the ‘Israel lobby’
within the sub-set of ‘ethnic’ interest groups competing to influence policy,
which includes others such as the Cuban-American and the Greek-American
lobbies.29
What is nearly universally-acknowledged is the success that AIPAC and
the wider lobby have enjoyed in comparison to other ethnic interest groups.
Much of this stems from the fact that its members have proven to be highly
skilled and professional.  Paul and Paul, in their study of ethnic interest groups
and American foreign policy, attest that “To most observers, and the consensus
26 The best known and most controversial is Mearsheimer and Walt.  See also, George Ball &
Douglas Ball, The Passionate Attachment: America’s Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the
Present (New York City, NY: WW Norton & Co., 1992)
27 Ball & Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p.203
28 See http://jstreet.org/about accessed 27-01-2013
29 For instance Paul & Paul, Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy
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of those interviewed for this study, AIPAC is the gold standard of an effective
organisation”, and that it is “routinely appraised as being the most effective ethno
racial lobby in the United States.”30 This view is echoed by Eric Unslaner, who
states that “The best organized, best-funded, and most successful of the ethnic
lobbies represents the interests of Israel.  The most important ethnic lobby on
foreign policy is…AIPAC.” 31 This high level of organisation and
professionalism is manifested partly in its skill in mobilising its grass-roots
members to put pressure on legislators.32 It also comes across in the competency
and consistency with which it carries out its direct lobbying of legislators.  Many
sources attest to the comprehensiveness with which AIPAC keeps track of
developments in Congress and the close watch it keeps on American foreign
policy towards Israel and other Middle East states.  It has also been careful to
cultivate links with legislators and their aides by providing them with useful
research and assistance, so that it is one of the first sources they turn to for
information and advice, and one of the most trusted. 33 As Smith argues,
“[m]oney and votes alone cannot buy this kind of access, which is gained instead
by patience, diligence, determination, and the time to build up infrastructures of
influence- attributes that neither single individuals nor an ethnic community
alone can provide but which are the hallmarks of an institutionally effective
lobby.”34
The other sources of the lobby’s success that are commonly cited can be
summarised as: the nature of the American political system, the depth of the
lobby’s support within the Jewish-American community and American
population at large, and the relative weakness of the groups that seek opposite
objectives, such as Arab-Americans or oil companies.  Firstly, the American
30 Paul & Paul, Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy, p.48 and p.107
31 Eric Unslaner, ‘American Interests in the Balance: Do ethnic groups dominate policymaking?’,
in Allan Cigler & Burdett Loomis (eds.), Interest Group Politics, 7th edition (Washington DC:
CQ Press, 2007)
32 Mitchell Bard, The Water’s Edge and Beyond: Defining the Limits to Domestic Influence on
United States Middle East Policy (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), p.13
33 Camille Mansour, Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Columbia
University Press, 1994), translated by James Cohen, p.240-242
34 Thomas Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American
Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p.124
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political system is in many ways more pluralistic and accessible to interest
groups than those of many other states.  This stems partly from the nature of the
'separation of powers' described in the previous chapter: Congress is unusually
powerful in regards to its ability to check or override the wishes of the executive
branch.35 Each legislator is therefore a potentially-useful point of access to the
policymaking system for interest groups hoping to influence policy, with the
House of Representatives perhaps being the most accessible and most responsive
to the public, as its members face election every two years and are answerable to
a relatively small constituency, unlike the state-level constituency of a senator or
the nation at large in the case of the president, who are elected for six and four-
year terms respectively.  The constituency of a Representative is therefore quite
small, and a well-organised group among his or her constituents can therefore
gain considerable access to their representative quite easily.  The nature of the
system in which interest groups operate therefore sets the 'ceiling' on what they
can achieve.  The relatively 'open' nature of the American political system and its
institutions means that this ceiling is relatively high.  This is therefore a
necessary, but not sufficient condition, for an interest group (especially one that
focuses on foreign policy, given its traditional monopolisation by executive-
based elites) to succeed in influencing policy.
Secondly, the nature of the Jewish community in which the pro-Israel
lobby is primarily based, and from which it draws much of its support, is one of
the most important of the sufficient conditions that determine its level of clout.
Many sources agree that Jewish Americans, considered en masse, possess
political influence disproportionate to their numbers (comprising just over 2% of
the population of the US as a whole), essentially through utilising as fully as
possible the opportunities open to them as American citizens.36 This is derived
from their historically high levels of participation in the political process, both in
turning out to vote in national elections in remarkably high proportions (much
35 Christopher Hill argues that it has “no rival” in this regard, The Changing Politics of Foreign
Policy (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.253
36 Paul & Paul, Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy, p.105
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higher than the national average) 37 and in making financial contributions to
political campaigns, especially to the Democratic Party.38 Jewish Americans are
also 'clustered' together in a manner that enhances their electoral power, in
elections for both Congress and the presidency, in states that possess relatively
large numbers of votes in the Electoral College, such as New York, New Jersey
and California, and forming large minorities in some Congressional districts.39
As Bard points out, the 10 US states with the highest Jewish populations account
for 244 of the 270 Electoral College votes needed to elect a president.40 Paul and
Paul also argue that the demographic distribution of Americans Jews is unique in
that while many are clustered, there are also smaller but sizeable populations in a
large number of other districts, giving access to more legislators by Jewish
interest groups via their constituents.  This pattern is “complemented extremely
well” by the population pattern of evangelical Christians, who have a strong
presence in districts where there are relatively few Jews, and also tend to be pro-
Israeli.41 This all enhances the profile of the lobby amongst legislators and
officials, and contributes towards ensuring that the organisations that make up
the lobby are well-funded.
In addition, the issue of Israeli security has been a consistently important
one for the American Jewish community, something which has been given an
added urgency by the Holocaust, and this has acted as a catalysing element
driving and sustaining popular involvement in and support for pro-Israel
lobbying activity.  Support for Israel and its policies became akin to a touchstone
of Jewish identity in the United States following the foundation of the state in
1948, in light of the fact that the majority of American Jews have chosen not to
37 Ball & Ball, The Passionate Attachment, claim these figures as 90% and 40-50% respectively;
Unslaner, ‘'American Interests in the Balance?  Do Ethnic Groups Dominate Foreign Policy
Making?', p.307; Mitchell Bard, ‘The Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups on American Middle
East Policy,’ in Charles Kegley & Eugene Wittkopf (eds.), The Domestic Sources of American
Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence (New York, St. Martin’s, 1988), p.58-9; Nimrod Novik,
The United States and Israel: Domestic Determinants of a Changing U.S. Commitment (Boulder,
CO: Westview/Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1986), p.59
38 Michael Thomas, American Policy Toward Israel: The Power and Limits of Belief (Abingdon,
Routledge, 2007), p.21; Smith, Foreign Attachments, p.107; Mansour, Beyond Alliance, p.245
39 Mansour, Beyond Alliance, p.248; Novik, The United States and Israel, p.58-9
40 Mitchell Bard, ‘The Israeli and Arab Lobbies’, The Jewish Virtual Library,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/lobby.html#2 accessed 21-04-2012
41 Paul & Paul, Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy, p.111
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exercise their 'right of return' but instead support it from afar as a way of staying
in contact with and reinforcing their identity as Jews.42 Consequentially, by the
1970s it had become almost impossible to obtain a leadership position in a
national Jewish organisation without espousing strong support for Israel.43 The
perception that Israel exists in a constant state of peril has therefore been an
important part of pro-Israel solidarity amongst Jewish Americans, despite the
fact that they, as individuals, hold as diverse a range of views, attitudes and
policy preferences as the nation at large.  As an example, many scholars and
observers point to the Six-Day War of 1967 and the October War of 1973 and as
important moments that led to an increase in support for Israel and financial
contributions to pro-Israeli organisations like AIPAC amongst Jewish
Americans.44 As one observer once said, "Israel's geographic proximity to actual
or potential enemies has created a "siege" mentality in which the potential exists
for "American Jews to see the Middle East through the lens of genocide."”45
The fact that the pro-Israeli lobby is geared almost exclusively towards
foreign policy is also a facilitating factor.  This must be balanced against the
traditional domination of foreign policy by the executive branch, which is less
accessible to lobbying by outside groups.  On the whole, the power of the
legislative branch in foreign affairs, and its relative openness to lobbyists and
interest groups, does much to counteract this bias, as does the nature of the
‘special relationship’ between the US and Israel.  This has two important
consequences.  Firstly, lobbyists for, and supporters of, Israel can concentrate on
one policy area and focus all of its efforts and resources upon it, unlike other
groups who might have to focus their attention on a variety of issues, perhaps
42 Ian Bickerton, ‘America’s Israel/Israel’s America,’ in John Dumbrell & Axel Schäfer,
America’s ‘Special Relationships’: Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p.176; Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and
Ameerican Foreign Policy(New York: NY, Simon & Schuster, 1987), p.249
43 Tivnan, The Lobby, p.76
44 Bickerton, ‘America’s Israel/Israel’s America’, p.176; Ball & Ball, The Passionate Attachment,
p.202-3; Thomas, American Policy Toward Israel, p.30; Watanabe, Ethnic Groups, Congress,
and American Foreign Policy, p.10; Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel
Relations After the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), p.68; Goldberg, Foreign Policy and
Ethnic Interest Groups, chapter 3
45 Shai Franklin, quoted by Thomas Ambrosio,  'Entangling Alliances: The Turkish-Israeli
Lobbying Partnership and Its Unintended Consequences', in Thomas Ambrosio (ed.), Ethnic
Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p.156
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even across both the foreign and domestic policy spheres.  This also gives pro-
Israel lobbyists another strategic advantage in their attempts to influence
American policy, as they have less need to accept compromises in the pursuit of
their core mission in order to achieve other objectives.  This exclusive focus also
works for pro-Israel lobbyists in that it allows them wide latitude in seeking
allies and in targeting their lobbying activity.  Neither of the two main political
parties in the US has a monopoly on support for Israel, making it very much a
bipartisan issue, and AIPAC in particular seeks to cultivate ties to and engage
with both Democrats and Republicans.46 Within Congress itself, this removes
obstacles for lobbying groups like AIPAC, who are free to cultivate legislators
and officials from both parties, unlike many other interest groups.  Organised
labour, for instance, is essentially tied to the Democratic Party for both practical
and ideological reasons, as are advocates of environmental regulation.  Lobbyists
for Israel are not therefore necessarily hamstrung if Congress changes hands.
The nature of the American political system and electoral process are also
beneficial to single-issue lobbying groups like AIPAC in another way.  The open
nature of candidate selection (via ‘primary’ elections in most cases) 47 can
empower narrowly-focused groups, who can make candidates’ positions on their
particular area of concern the deciding factor in offering their support or
endorsement (although admittedly in reality many congressional candidates are
unopposed in their party’s primaries).  This could tip the balance in a closely-
contested race.  Candidates taking positions that are perceived as critical of
Israel, or ‘pro-Arab’, may therefore find themselves facing an opponent
supported by the pro-Israel lobby at the primary stage, as has been reported on
several occasions.48 Political campaign funding reforms in the post-Watergate
era have resulted in a legislative branch open to large-scale funding from interest
groups, in contrast to presidential campaigns, leading to a sharp increase in the
costs of political campaigns.49 Candidates may also legally accept funding from
46 Bard, The Water’s Edge; Rosen interview
47 Smith, Foreign Attachments, p.88
48 Paul Latham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration’s Competing
Interests in the Middle East (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p.67
49 Michael Mezey, Congress, the President, and Public Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1989) p.127
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groups or individuals from outside of the constituency they seek to represent,
meaning that national networks of members of interest groups can fund the
campaign of a candidate ‘approved’ by a particular lobby.  Although AIPAC, in
particular, is barred from funding political campaigns as a registered lobbying
organisation, it can play a coordinating and facilitating role and shares many
members with groups that can, 50 and earning its ‘seal of approval’ has the
potential to either greatly assist or undermine a candidate’s campaign. 51 Its
members all over the country can therefore contribute to specific political
campaigns in districts far removed from their own, if they so choose, on the basis
of a candidate's (or his or her opponent's) views on Israel, both in primary intra-
party elections, and contests for Congressional and Senate seats.  Paul and Paul
conclude that, amongst America's numerous ethnic interest groups, Jewish-
Americans are by far the most active within the field of contributions to
candidates in this regard by a substantial margin, based on their analysis of
donations by pro-Israeli political action committees (PACs).  However, they also
point out that donations from PACs organised around ethnic lobbies are small in
both absolute and relative terms in comparison to other sources, especially
business groups (though these groups rarely take a position on specific foreign
policies, even oil companies with a strong presence in the Arab states, as
discussed below).52
A major factor in the success of the pro-Israel lobby is also the simple
fact that the American public is generally supportive of Israel,53 over and above
any pragmatic considerations of American national interests, with a ‘default
position’ based instead in a “deep concern of a great part of American public
opinion for the survival and prospering of this new state.” 54 Polls show a
consistently high support for Israel amongst the general populace since 1967.55
50 Ball and Ball, The Passionate Attachment, p.209
51 Robert Dreyfuss, ‘AIPAC From the Inside, Part 1: Isolating Iran’, Tehran Bureau,
PBS/Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/06/aipac-from-the-
inside-1-isolating-iran.html accessed 16-04-2012; Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel:
Influence in the Special Relationship, (New York, NY: Praeger, 1984), p.199
52 Paul and Paul, Ethnic Lobbies & US Foreign Policy, Chapter 3 and p.198
53 Goldberg, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups, p.24-5
54 George Kennan, The Cloud of Danger, p.81
55 Bard, ‘The Israeli and Arab Lobbies’
224
This gives the lobby leverage vis-à-vis legislators and officials, in addition to
their own understanding of the need to reflect as least some of the public's views
in policymaking.  Many scholars trace this to sympathy for the Jewish people
engendered by the Holocaust and reinforced by the wars and terrorist attacks
Israel has experienced in its short history.  Pro-Israel groups have also worked
hard to highlight the links between the US and Israel, and emphasised the fact
that Israel has existed as a fellow democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships
for much of its life.  In contrast, many Americans have clichéd and less
sympathetic views of Arabs and Iranians. Incidents that illustrate this abound,
and in some instances candidates for office have refused or shunned support from
Arab-American groups, even prior to Al-Qaeda’s attacks on Washington DC and
New York in 2001.56 The size of Israel also engenders some sympathy: as a
small state with a small population, it appears doubly vulnerable and therefore in
need of support, as a Jewish ‘David’ against an Arab ‘Goliath,’ whatever the
facts on the ground may be regarding the military superiority of Israel over its
neighbours and its regional monopoly on nuclear weapons.  This is not a
sufficient condition to guarantee a positive view of Israel amongst the general
population of the US, but it is undoubtedly a necessary one, as it would be
unlikely for any interest group to successfully promote its preferred policies in
the face of opposition from the public at large.57 As Bard argues, “If you add the
non-Jews shown by opinion polls to be as pro-Israel as Jews, it is clear Israel has
the support of one of the largest veto groups in the country.”58
Given the advantages and examples cited above, the pro-Israeli lobby,
and in particular AIPAC, seems to conform closely to the picture painted by
Ripsman of an influential interest group: single issue, organized, vote-rich,
coherent and able to offer electoral benefits.  It therefore arguably enjoys a great
deal of potential influence over both individual legislators and officials, and
perhaps even administrations as a whole.  Politicians must make careful
calculations about the electoral consequences of adopting a position that goes
56 Unslaner ‘American Interests in the Balance?’ in Cigler & Loomis, Interest Group Politics,
p.306
57 Ibid, p.310
58 Bard, The Water’s Edge and Beyond, p.7
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against Israel and/or its supporters’ wishes.  In addition, its reputation and
perceived political influence means that its suggestions and preferences will be
taken seriously in the formation of policy, meaning that it does not always have
to act to be influential.  Overcoming its efforts when it was fully mobilised on a
controversial issue would require a large investment of political capital on the
part of the White House, something that may be in scarce supply, as was
demonstrated in the Reagan administration’s struggle to gain congressional
approval for the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia.59 If all other forces are in
balance, its efforts therefore have the potential to be decisive, as any other
powerful interest group able to sway legislators and officials to its point of view
would be.
8.3 Other lobbies: Oil, agricultural, and ethnic
Aside from ethnic lobbies, the only groups with a substantial
psychological or financial investment in the US relationship with Iran are trade-
focused.  The most obvious one of these is the oil industry, given the size of
Iran’s own reserves, and the fact that it borders regions that contain two of the
greatest concentrations of proven hydrocarbon reserves in the world: the Persian
Gulf and the Caspian Sea.  American agricultural interests also had a stake in
US-Iranian trade, and lobbied for the easing of restrictions on agricultural exports
to ‘rogue states.’  The interests of these groups placed them on the other side of
the debate from pro-Israel lobbyists like AIPAC.  We shall now examine these
groups, and how their ability to influence policy towards Iran was less than that
of their opponents.
8.3.1 Arab- and Iranian-Americans
Few ethnic lobbies are as professional, motivated and well-organised as
AIPAC.  For instance, Arab-Americans, most scholars agree, are not as
politically unified or their advocacy groups well-organised as they tend to be
59 See Latham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, for details
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amongst American Jews.60 There are relatively few Arab-Americans in absolute
terms, with an estimated population of approximately 1.6 million in 2010,
according to the US Census Bureau, comprising about 0.5% of the US
population as a whole.  Its members are immigrants from, or descended from
immigrants from, almost two dozen different countries.  For example, the size of
the Palestinian-American community was probably less than 100,000 in 2010,
compared to an estimated 500,000 Lebanese-Americans,61 of whom a majority
are Christians and somewhat unsympathetic to the goals of the wider ‘Arab
lobby’.62 Despite the fact individual Arab-Americans tend to be comparatively
well-educated and prosperous, Arab-Americans as a collective body tend to
contribute less in terms of funding political campaigns than Jewish Americans.63
These ‘internal’ differences makes it difficult for lobbying groups that represent
their interests to build up a national network of supporters and mobilise them to
bring pressure to bear, or to channel political contributions in a way that
maximises their impact on election campaigns, or to fund day-to-day lobbying
activities.  As some argue, the situation is so marked as to call into the question
the existence of an organised ‘Arab Lobby’ in the first place.64
The Iranian-American population is even smaller, numbering
approximately 450,000 in 2010,65 rising from approximately 330,000 in 200066
(though, as with many ethnic groups in the US, these figures are disputed)
making for an even smaller pool of resources on which to draw, despite the fact
that Iranian-Americans also tend to be more affluent and better educated than the
60 Bard, The Water’s Edge and Beyond, p.7-11, p.13-17; Unslaner ‘American Interests in the
Balance’, in Cigler & Loomis, Interest Group Politics, p.308
61 This data was retrieved using the U.S. Census Bureau’s ‘American FactFinder’ website,
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml, accessed 21-04-2012
62 Mitchell Bard, ‘The Israel and Arab Lobbies’, Jewish Virtual Library,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/lobby.html#2 accessed 31-04-2012
63 Unslaner ‘American Interests in the Balance?’, in Cigler & Loomis, Interest Group Politics,
p.307
64 Bard, ‘The Israel and Arab Lobbies’
65 U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder
66 Soraya Fati & Raha Rafii, Strength in Numbers: The Relative Concentration of Iranian
Americans Across the United States, Iran Census Report, National Iranian American Council,
September 2003
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national average.67 The issue of factional division is also true in the case of the
Iranian-American community, who are, in regards to lobbying organisations,
relatively poorly-organised and fragmented amongst different groups.68 Iranian-
Americans also tend to have a complex and ambiguous relationship with their
country of origin, with many being exiles suspicious of the government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and its policies,69 and perhaps less willing to give it the
benefit of the doubt on some issues, though at the same time also in favour of the
US pursuing diplomatic, rather than coercive, policies towards it. 70 In
demographic terms, they are also clustered more intensely in a relatively few
districts, meaning that they have access to fewer legislators as constituents, with
the largest number clustered in California, particularly around Los Angeles, and
form small proportions of their local population.71 Lobbying groups representing
Iranian and Arab-Americans also spend some of their time and energy
campaigning against discrimination and bigotry faced by their members.  Groups
representing Jewish Americans are also involved in this (most notably the Anti-
Defamation League), but this is one of the things that separates any ‘Jewish
lobby’ that exists in the US from the ‘Israel lobby,’ which concentrates on Israel
and foreign affairs.  No group comparable in size or influence to AIPAC lobbies
on behalf of Iran or any single Arab country.  Some Arab countries, such as
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, have retained professional lobbying and public
relations firms, but are hindered by the fact that they are, after all, foreign states
and not as well-regarded by the American public as Israel, whereas “the Israel
lobby, by contrast, is a manifestation of the political engagement of a subset of
American citizens, and so its activities are widely and correctly seen as a
legitimate form of political activity.”72 Foreign governments, in contrast, do not
represent any actual American voters whose support a politician may require to
67 Ali Mostashari & Ali Khodamhosseini, An Overview of Socioeconomic Characteristics of the
Iranian-American Community Based on the 2000 U.S. Census, Iranian Studies Group at MIT,
February 2004. Available at: http://www.isgmit.org/projects-storage/census/socioeconomic.pdf
accessed 24-01-2013
68 Paul & Paul, Ethnic Groups and US Foreign Policy, p.53, 156
69 Ali Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of
Mistrust (London: Hurst & Co., 2006), p.134
70 Neil Macfarquhar, ‘Exiles in ‘Tehrangeles’ are split on Iran’, New York Times, 9 May 2006
71 Fati & Rafii, Strength in Numbers
72 Mearsheimer & Walt, The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, p.144
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gain or retain office.  In regards to foreign states attempting to influence
members of the various diaspora populations living in the US, Israel, in
particular, is able to retain strong links to the Jewish population of the United
States, but Arab states, and Iran, are much less able to do so without being
regarded with suspicion, and are less likely to be seen as in need of sustained
political support.
8.3.2 Business lobbies
The other constituencies with a stake in US-Iranian relations are rooted in
commerce between the two states.  In terms of lobbying by corporations, like oil
companies, and commerce-oriented interest groups, these are also marginal in
regards to many foreign policy issues, although these organisations contribute far
more to political campaigns than ethnic lobbies and employ many more
lobbyists.  As a result, lobbying by the business community seems to be a
relatively insignificant force in regards to many specific foreign policies such as
dual containment, at least in recent decades.73 Business groups, such as arms
manufacturers, have in the past attempted to act as a counterweight to pro-Israel
lobbying, such as in opposing attempts to block arms deals with Arab countries,
but success has been mixed.  For instance, during the Reagan administration, the
sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia in 1981 proved to be a bruising political
battle for the White House, though it was eventually narrowly successful, and
one that was assisted by the lobbying efforts of the manufacturers of these
aircraft Boeing and United Technologies, amongst others.74 Some subsequent
arms deals with Arab countries in the 1980s were, however, dropped.75 On the
whole the Reagan administration’s battle with Congress over the sale of AWACS
to Saudi Arabia, lobbying by business groups seems to have been largely
73 One unusual exception may be the exemptions won by soft-drink companies such as Coca-
Cola Co. from US sanctions on trade with Sudan in the 1990s.  Sudan was the world’s primary
source of gum Arabic, an important ingredient in their products.  Jonathan Randal, Osama: The
Making of a Terrorist, revised edition (London, IB Tauris, 2012), p.159
74 Tivnan, The Lobby, p.153
75 Bard, ‘The Influence of Ethnic Groups on American Middle East Policy’, in Kegley &
Wittkopf, The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, p.66-67
229
inconsequential, though Mearsheimer and Walt argue that is played a role.76 In
his in-depth study of the AWACS affair, Latham states that “the business
community has, for the most part, abstained from involvement in American
policy in the Middle East.”77 In contrast, he attributes the success of the sale in
that instance to the obvious strategic import of Saudi Arabia, Cold War tensions,
and the intense lobbying efforts of President Reagan and his aides.
Oil companies, cited by some as part of the 'pro-Arab' lobby, have made
surprisingly little impact, at least in the 1990s, and have instead focused their
lobbying efforts on other areas rather than foreign policy, such as trade,
environmental regulation, permits for exploration and taxation.78 This claim was
also advanced by a former director of AIPAC, Morris Amitay.79 This view
clashes with that of his predecessor as AIPAC director, I.L. Kenen, who argued
that the major American oil companies operating in Middle East was part of a
“petro-diplomatic complex” that made an ethnic Arab lobby unnecessary, though
this view referred to an earlier era, when the US was building its involvement in
Saudi Arabia in the post-war period, and most day-to-day interactions with Saudi
Arabia were conducted via ARAMCO.80 The efforts by various oil companies
to challenge the sanctions on Iran were also limited by the difficulties they
discovered in operating in Iran, which lessened the enthusiasm of some of them
for operating there.  BP, originally very interested in expanding into Iran 81
(perhaps appropriate given that it started life as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company),
in particular, found the Iranian political scene difficult to navigate and the Iranian
government an antagonistic negotiating partner and eventually concluded that the
returns did not justify the trouble involved,82 especially with the added worries of
being denied Export-Import bank funding and credits from the US under ILSA.83
76 Mearsheimer & Walt, The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, p.143-4
77 Latham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, p.61
78 Mearsheimer & Walt, The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, p.144
79 Tivnan, The Lobby, 194
80 Cited in Mitchell Bard, ‘The Israeli and Arab Lobbies’
81 Robert Corzine, ‘BP ready to invest in Iran if US line eases,’ Financial Times, 23 April 1998
82 Author’s correspondence with former oil company executive, May 2012
83 Weissman interview
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The company’s merger with the US-based Amoco raised the stakes for it in this
regard by increasing its stake in the American market.84
Nonetheless, oil companies and associated businesses did make some
attempts to prevent the passage of ILSA, and sponsored some attempts to support
criticism of the sanctions regime against Iran, though these proved to be
ineffectual.  Dick Cheney, for instance, at the time a former Secretary of Defense
and the head of the oil services company Halliburton, was publically opposed to
the sanctions imposed on Iran by ILSA and Clinton's prior Executive Orders and
lobbied against them.85 Fayazmanesh asserts that Clinton sought to reduce the
pressure on Iran and re-forge some economic links between Iran and the US at
the behest of the companies like Halliburton.  He points to the opportunities
these companies sought in the Caspian Sea in the early 1990s as the reason for
their opposition to ILSA, something which would be severely hindered by the
American economic embargo on Iran.  A sign if this, argues Fayazmanesh, was
the foundation of the American-Iranian Council (AIC) in 1997, which received
much of its funding from oil companies, who were represented on its board of
directors, and several were also corporate members of the organisation, including
Unocal, Conoco and Mondoil.  He also asserts that lobbying by agricultural firms
was also a factor, with Archer Daniels Midland and Continental Grain seeking an
end to sanctions affecting their business with Iran. 86 This activity was co-
ordinated by an umbrella group, 'USA*Engage', which was closely associated
with the National Foreign Trade Council, and supported legislation which aimed
to curtail unilateral American sanctions, the Lugar-Hamilton-Crane Sanctions
Policy Reform Act.87 This legislation was designed to make imposing sanctions
by Congress a more rigorous and measured process, imposing an automatic two-
year time limit on sanctions (after which they had to be renewed by the president
or congress), and guaranteeing the president more latitude in the imposition and
84 Rodman, Sanctions Beyond Borders, p.190
85 Terence Lau, ‘Triggering Parent Company Liability Under United States Sanctions Regimes:
The Troubling Implications of Prohibiting Approval and Facilitation,’ American Business Law
Journal, 41 (4) 2004, p.414.
86 Sasan Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars, and the Policy of Dual
Containment (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), electronic edition, chapter 5
87 William Roberts, ‘Sanctions flexibility sought,’ Journal of Commerce, 25 June 1998
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application of sanctions.88 USA*Engage was founded in 1997, and describes
itself as ‘a broad coalition of Americans speaking out for US engagement
overseas’. 89 Its membership includes large corporate concerns like Boeing,
Caterpillar, Unocal, Chevron, Mobil, Texaco, and IBM. 90 USA*Engage has
consistently pressed for the reform of unilateral American sanctions on foreign
states, including Iran and Cuba.  Many companies became much more strident in
their criticisms of the Iranian sanctions following the Clinton administration’s
decision to waive the sanctions on the deal between Iran and Total, Petronas and
Gazprom in 1998, arguing that it demonstrated that American firms were
excluded from the Iranian market without having any impact on Iran’s ability to
carry out international trade.91 Support for the sanctions reform legislation was
described as “effectively a political counter attack to two major trade sanctions
bills enacted by the 104th Congress after Republicans won control of the House
for the first time in 52 years, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and the Helms-Burton
Libertad Act”.92 It led to a larger battle on sanctions legislation as supporters of
reform struggled with proponents of sanctions, like the Christian Coalition, after
reform efforts stalled.93
8.4 Lobbying: legislative outcomes
Given its advantages over its rivals, AIPAC was well-placed to attempt to
influence the legislative agenda with regards to Iran.  Its prestige, expertise, and
perceived power allowed it to find sympathetic legislators to act as a channel of
access into the legislative process in Congress, and coordinate with them to carry
88 Michael Lelyveld, ‘Sanctions lose their sting as US obsession grows’, Journal of Commerce,
19 June 1998
89 See
http://www.usaengage.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=43,
accessed 21-02-2012
90 Ken Silverstein, ‘So You Want to Trade with a Dictator,’ Mother Jones, June 1998, p.41
91 Michael Lelyveld, ‘Clinton makes few friends at home on sanctions waiver,’ Journal of
Commerce, 20 May 1998
92 Roberts, ‘Sanctions flexibility sought’
93 Micheal Lelyveld, ‘Last minute Senate maneuvering stalls sanctions bill’, Journal of
Commerce, 9 October 1998
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its agenda into action.  Aside from an attempt to assist the government of Israel,
it possessed its own reasons for taking up the cause of Iran.
8.4.1 AIPAC vs. Iran
Divisions within AIPAC and the wider Jewish-American community
became a factor in the drive to sanction Iran in the early 1990s with the
announcement of the Oslo Accords and the unfolding of the Arab-Israeli peace
process.  Thomas and others, including AIPAC insiders, have described how the
organization became increasingly identified with the 'hawkish' right-wing
political tendency in Israel, represented by the Likud Party, which dominated
Israeli politics for most of the period between 1977 and 1992. 94 AIPAC's
endorsement of the peace process therefore threatened to provoke a damaging
split within the organisation, which had previously been at pains to present a
united front and in turn avoided taking positions that risked splitting the
American Jewish community (for example, AIPAC has never endorsed the
presence of Israeli settlements in the West Bank or Gaza).95 Some major donors
who opposed negotiations with the Palestinians went so far as the cease making
contributions to the organisation, and as a consequence it was forced to lay-off
staff to cut costs.96 Iran proved to be a consensus issue that energised AIPAC's
supporters, and allowed it to maintain its role as the vanguard of the organised
pro-Israeli lobby amongst Jewish Americans.  There were also some divisions
within the organisation over tactics: some wanted to pursue economic sanctions
against Iran, where others wanted to focus on preventing the flow of missile and
nuclear technology to Iran from Russia and China.97 As it turned out, both of
these aims found fertile ground in the Congress and were implemented to some
degree.  There are also some observers who believe that long-standing mistrust
on the part of Yitzhak Rabin towards AIPAC may have been a factor in his
decision to ask the organisation to lobby for extra Congressional pressure on
94 Thomas, American Policy Toward Israel, p.24. The only prime minister of Israel in this period
who was not a member of the Likud Party was Shimon Peres, for a two year period in the mid-
1980s as part of an unusual Labor-Likud coalition.
95 Interview with Weissman
96 Interview with Weissman
97 Interview with Rosen
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Iran. In particular, some believe he may have worried about agitation within the
US against his plans for a peace accord with Syria, and hoped to find something
to occupy the American pro-Israeli lobby’s attention.98 As a leader of the Israeli
Labor Party, Peres was also mistrustful of the organizations growing links to
Likud in the 1980s, and saw it as an ‘interloper’ in his relationship with
Clinton.99
The organization subsequently produced a policy document in early April
1995 that outlined and advocated a series of stringent measures that the US could
undertake to toughen the existing sanctions against Iran.  Amongst these
measures were the severance of all US-Iranian trade and the imposition of
secondary sanctions against foreign companies trading with Iran. 100 As
discussed in previous chapter, this program was adopted by Senator Alfonse
D’Amato of New York, who introduced different pieces of legislation to outlaw
US-Iranian oil trade, and subsequently all US-Iranian trade with the assistance of
AIPAC, which eventually became ILSA.  It was these bills, inspired by and
drafted with the assistance of AIPAC,101 that led President Clinton to introduce
the Executive Orders discussed in previous chapters, 12957 in March of 1995,
and 12959 in April, which outlawed American-Iranian oil commerce and then
virtually all US-Iranian trade respectively.  When this proved to be unsuccessful
in pre-empting the congressional drive towards imposing sanctions, the White
House moved to attempt to water down the legislation that resulted, originally
titled the Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act.  The first version was introduced by
Senator D’Amato in September of 1995 and focused on sanctioning the export of
technology to Iran’s energy industry by foreign (i.e. non-American) firms.  The
Senate version of the act attracted 44 cosponsors, while the House version,
introduced by Rep. Benjamin Gilman, the chairman of the House International
Relations Committee, attracted 157.  By the time it passed the Senate for the first
time in its initial version in December of 1995 its provisions included sanctions
98 Interview with Weissman
99 Thomas, American Policy Toward Israel, p.137-138 and 158-59
100 AIPAC, ‘Comprehensive US Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action’ April 2, 1995, cited
in Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p.187
101 Dreyfus, ‘AIPAC from the Inside, Part 1: Isolating Iran’; Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p.188
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on foreign investment in Iranian oil and gas.  The House of Representatives
passed its version in June of 1996, and the Senate passed the final version in
July, and President Clinton signed it into law the following month.  Even more
important was the role AIPAC played in working with legislators and their staffs
in proposing and drafting the legislation itself.  Senator D’Amato had previously
proposed bills sanctioning companies trading with Iran, but these had received
little attention and support.102 It was only when AIPAC began to publicise the
issue and threw its weight behind attempts to legislate a tougher sanctions regime
that the notion of sanctioning Iran and its trading partners began to gain traction.
The announcement of the deal between the National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC) and Conoco around this time was therefore extremely helpful in raising
the profile of the issue.103 In an interview with the author, the State Department
official who oversaw the negotiations between AIPAC and Senator D’Amato’s
staff and the White House credits the organisation with the passage of ILSA, and
expressed doubt that it would have passed without its efforts.104
In fact, AIPAC appears to have been involved at virtually every stage of
the legislative process.  The legislation was opposed by the White House, which
saw it as an example not only of Congressional intrusion onto presidential turf
(foreign policy) that could restrict executive autonomy, but also because it
threatened to damage relations with American allies by pushing unpopular
unilateral measures.  The White House therefore sought to ‘water down’ its
provisions to contain the damage, once they realised that it attracted so much
support in Congress that it could not be blocked.  Executive branch officials
therefore began negotiations with Senator D’Amato and his aides, and AIPAC
itself, in order to produce a more congenial, compromise bill that offered the
president some choices in how and when it should be applied.105 Reportedly, it
was AIPAC’s representative who helped strike a crucial compromise between
different Congressional committees, and made a final concession that the bill
102 Interview with Weissman
103 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p.186
104 Telephone interview with David Welch, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near
East Affairs, London, August 2012
105 Interview with Weissman
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would not include sanctions on foreign banks that did business with Iran that
broke the final deadlock and led to the passage of the bill. 106 While other
instances of major Congressional intervention in foreign policy are not
uncommon in US political history (as we saw in the last chapter), it is much rarer
that these are conceived and shepherded through the process by a small coalition
focused on a single interest group, especially in the face of White House
disapproval. Perhaps one of the closest other examples would be the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment.  In that case, Congress mandated sanctions on US-Soviet
trade by amending the 1974 Trade Act to penalize the USSR for its efforts to
restrict Jewish emigration.  Much of the impetus for the legislation came from
the convictions and presidential ambitions of Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson,
but was also sustained with the assistance of pro-Israel lobbyists and the
organized labour movement in the US.107 The legislation that mandated non-
compliance with the Arab economic boycott of Israel was also strongly
influenced by interest groups outside of the formal structure of government,
notably trade groups and pro-Israel groups, who negotiated a compromise bill
amongst themselves that was then enacted by Congress, despite the misgivings
of the White House.108
A former AIPAC official, Keith Weissman, claimed that many oil
companies chose not to try to compete with AIPAC and the Israel lobby before
and after the passage of ILSA because its influence was so strong, and instead
chose to cooperate with it to achieve other, mutual objectives, such as lobbying
for the construction of the oil pipeline that today links the Caspian Sea port of
Baku in Azerbaijan, via Tbilisi in Georgia, with the Mediterranean port of
Ceyhan in Turkey, bypassing Iranian territory.109 This, in particular, involved a
tactical alignment110 with pro-Azerbaijani and pro-Turkish lobbyists working to
106 Robert Greenberger & Laurie Land, ‘Influencing business becomes AIPAC’s affair,’ Wall
Street Journal Europe, 18 June 1996
107 For a detailed account, see Paula Stern, Water’s Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of
American Foreign Policy (Greenwood, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979)
108 Thomas Franck & Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy By Congress (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1979), p.200-209
109 Robert Dreyfus, ‘AIPAC from the Inside, Part 1: Isolating Iran’
110 Ambrosio, ‘Entangling Alliances: The Turkish-Israeli Lobbying Partnership and Its
Unintended Consequences,’ p.153
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remove sanctions on Azerbaijan imposed by Congress in 1992,111 angering pro-
Armenian lobbyists who had previously enjoyed a cordial and cooperative
relationship with pro-Israel lobbyists.112 Within the oil industry, there was a
perception that it had been outfought by AIPAC, and had not stood a chance in
its attempts to prevent the severing of trade links with Iran.113
Given the advantages enjoyed by AIPAC described above, there was no
effective coalition to challenge the original drive towards the imposition of
economic sanctions against Iran.  The pro-Israeli lobby, in the form of AIPAC,
enjoyed high levels of organisation, credibility, popularity and resources, and
was therefore highly successful in persuading legislators to adopt its policy
proposals.  Trade lobbyists, particularly oil companies, were at a disadvantage
with regards to their desire to trade with Iran, given its unpopularity with the
American public and their lack of widespread support within wider American
society.  It was also a less important issue from their perspective, which made
capitulation an acceptable alternative, as Iran was not a major source of revenue,
especially for the biggest oil companies.114 The executive branch, in many ways
the most powerful lobbying force on foreign policy issues it could not control
directly, also chose not to attempt to arrest the push for additional economic
sanctions on Iran.  This stems from the issues discussed in previous chapters: the
decision of the administration to try to isolate Iran from the peace process, and
the co-option of the President to the view of Iran as a strategic rival held by
Rabin and his successors as Prime Minister of Israel.  Instead, the executive
branch sought to use its own lobbying power in a more subtle fashion, by
modifying the sanctions legislation in such a way that it did the least possible
damage to the administration's existing foreign policy (though, as described in
previous chapters, it led to serious disagreements with both the EU and Russia).
111 Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran, chapter 5
112 AIPAC avoids direct lobbying on issues not directly concerned with Israel, but offered ‘tacit
support.’ Ambrosio, ‘Entangling Alliances: The Turkish-Israeli Lobbying Partnership and its
Unitended Consequences,’ p.153
113 Correspondence with former oil company executive
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8.4.2 Sanctions challenged
In response to the threat of legislation on sanctions reform, the Clinton
administration did eventually ease the sanctions on sales of American foodstuffs
to Iran, Libya and Sudan, in April 1999, but at the same time refused a request
from the oil company Mobil to undertake an 'oil swap' deal with Iran, in which
oil pumped by Mobil would be deposited in a northern Iranian port in return for
an equal amount from southern Iran.115 The result of this, argues Fayazmanesh,
was "a chaotic policy that took no particular direction."116 This judgement fails
to account for the complex interplay between the executive and legislative
branches and the varying impact of different groups striving to influence policy.
Instead, it would be more accurate to view these shifts and inconsistencies as the
result of a shifting coalition of forces within the US political system contending
to shape policy towards Iran and the process of imposing sanctions.  As
O’Sullivan concludes, changes in American sanctions policy owed much to the
contestation between pro and anti-sanctions constituencies.  While this was
facilitated by changes in policymaking ushered in by changes in Congress and
the end of the Cold War (as we saw in the previous chapter), “it also reveals the
growing salience of ethnic, religious, and other single-issue lobbies and
Congress’s receptivity to them…The tapering off of the number of new sanctions
enacted in the mid to late 1990s in part reflects the mobilization of other interest
groups – led by American business – to counter the earlier upsurge.”117
The turn away from sanctions and pressure from anti-sanctions groups
was apparent in Congress (including the departure of Senator D’Amato, the
legislator who had done so much to bring ILSA to the statute book, who was
defeated in his bid for re-election in 1998).  Like O’Sullivan, Hersman attributes
this in part to a ‘sanctions backlash,’ a reaction against the number of sanctions
imposed by Congress and their perceived lack of success, coupled with the
115 Shirl McArthur, 'Luger, Crane, Reintroduce Sanctions Reforms, While Colleagues Earn Their
Pro-Israel PAC Contributions', Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, June 1999,
http://www.wrmea.com/component/content/article/177/2251-lugar-crane-reintroduce-sanctions-
reforms-while-colleagues-earn-their-pro-israel-pac-contributions.html, accessed 20-02-2012
116 Sasan Fayazmanesh, The United States and Iran, chapter 5
117 O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, p.23.
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complaints of American businesses shut out of commercial opportunities
abroad.118 Aside from this, a new grouping of legislators emerged who saw
benefits to re-engaging with 'rogue states' like Iran, Libya and Sudan.  They
hailed from 'farm states', heavily-dependent on agriculture, and pressed for the
scrapping of restrictions on sales of agricultural products to states sanctioned by
the US at the same time that demand for American agricultural exports was
declining due to the Asian financial crisis, and, as described above, were
supported by groups like USA*Engage and agri-businesses.  This was catalysed
by the announcement of a request from Iran to purchase $500 million of
American grain and other crops in 1998, comprising over 5 million metric tons
of wheat, soybeans, corn rice, sugar and other products.  As an example, after the
request was made and became public, Senator Larry Craig of Idaho wrote to the
president recommending that the sale be approved by the Department of
Commerce, and the letter was co-signed by more than 30 members of Congress,
including 15 members of the Senate.119 The deal was approved in April of 1999,
and also coincided with another push by some legislators (including Senators
Hagel, Lugar and Crane) and exporters to introduce legislation120 to revise the
use of sanctions, which, some argue, “prompted the Clinton administration to
pre-empt further congressional action by announcing a series of modifications
and changes to its use of sanctions.” 121 Ultimately, efforts to reform the
sanctions process during the second Clinton administration met with mixed
success.  The threat of legislation did prompt the administration to introduce
some reforms (discussed below), but the legislation itself was resisted by the
Administration, which believed it placed too many restrictions on the executive
and not enough on the legislative branch.  Despite its popularity in the
legislature, these two measures did not reach the statute book.122 In contrast,
another measure become law in 2000, though this codified the moves the
118 Hersman, Friends and Foes, p.50-1
119 Gene Linn, ‘Farmers seek spark in grain export bottom line,’ Journal of Commerce, 27
January 1999
120 Lugar’s ‘Sanctions Policy Reform Act’ in the Senate, and the ‘Enhancement of Trade,
Security, and Human Rights through Sanctions Reform’ in the House of Representatives.
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administration had already made with regards to the export of food and medical
supplies to ‘rogue states’ like Iran, Sudan and Libya.123
Perhaps the most obvious of the shifts towards rapprochement in
American policy towards Iran was the attempt by the administration to seize the
opportunity offered by the election of Khatami to the presidency of Iran in the
elections of 1997.  This was assessed by the president, amongst others, as a
chance to repair relations with Iran, and the administration attempted several
overtures to Khatami and his government.  The absence of a serious
congressional challenge to this new direction took some high-ranking executive
branch officials by surprise.124 Some executive branch officials credit this 'farm
lobby' with giving some political cover to Clinton's decision to seek a
rapprochement with Khatami's government.125 This had been a serious concern
of the executive branch at the time, given the previous introduction of the ILSA,
the ILA, and the on-going pressure regarding Iran’s acquisition of nuclear and
missile technology from Russia and China.126 As noted in chapter 6, AIPAC and
the Israeli government also signalled their acceptance of the adoption of a less
confrontational strategy in regards to Iran after the election of Khatami, and
raised no objections to traveling in this direction, though both the Israeli
government and AIPAC retained serious doubts about how much would really
change.  Both AIPAC and the Israeli government (at this point under Benjamin
Netanyahu of Likud, who began his premiership as less focused on Iran than
Rabin and Labor) were eager to see what opportunities Khatami's election would
bring to 'get Iran out of the terrorism business,' as one observer put it, and were
just as willing to see this come about through endogenous changes in Iranian
politics as through pressure applied from the outside. 127 The new Likud
government in Israel saw it as prudent to lower the tension with Iran that had
123 The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act stipulated that the president seek
congressional approval before imposing unilateral sanctions that prevented the export of
American food or medical supplies.  See Dianne Rennack, ‘Economic Sanctions: Legislation in
the 106th Congress,’ CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 15,
2000
124 Author's interview with Martin Indyk, Washington DC, March 2012
125 Interview with Indyk
126 Author’s interview with Kenneth Pollack, Washington DC, March 2012
127 Interview with Pollack
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been built up under the previous Labor-led coalition.128 In one sense, both had
already achieved a major goal in regards to American policy towards Iran.
ILSA, by this point, was already on the statute book, and could not be removed
without Congressional approval.  Meanwhile, pressure on the White House to
curtail Iran's nuclear and missile development programs was also maintained by
Israel and AIPAC via Congress.  These measures were directed against Russia
and China specifically, rather than Iran, and the administration did its best to
slow down their passage, going so far as to veto one measure (as discussed in
Chapter 5).129
8.5 Conclusions
The influence of interest groups on foreign policy is difficult to measure
effectively.  In the case of dual containment, some things are clear.  Firstly,
AIPAC was successful in persuading Congress to adopt its proposals for
secondary sanctions on Iran.  The original proposal for these sanctions originated
in an AIPAC policy briefing that was circulated amongst legislators and
members, and the organisation played a critical role in ensuring its passage
through Congress and into law.  It also maintained the pressure on legislators and
the White House to limit Iranian development of missiles and nuclear
technology.
While the impact of lobbyists on Congress is measureable, making a
definitive judgement about the role and influence of pro-Israeli lobbyists (and of
pressure from the government of Israel itself) on dual containment more broadly
remains a difficult proposition, making any strong conclusions about the
influence of this factor tenuous.  This difficulty stems from the same problem
discussed in the previous chapter, one of gauging how far Congressional
sanctions on Iran restricted the autonomy of the executive branch. If, as
Brzezinski argues,130 the passage of ILSA and the tightening of sanctions on Iran
128 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, p.196-200
129 Nancy Dunne, ‘Clinton vetoes sanctions law,’ Financial Times, 25 June 1998
130 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American
Superpower (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2007), p.102
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made a rapprochement between the US and Iran effectively impossible, the pro-
Israel lobby (and Congress) played a decisive role in shaping American ‘dual
containment’ policy.  Given that the circumstances that would put this to the test
did not materialise, this can only remain a matter of opinion, though as we saw in
the previous chapter the evidence is mixed, and the imposition of congressional
sanctions made long-term prospects for rapprochement between the US and Iran
more subject to Congressional influence.
Whatever the truth of this point of view, AIPAC was far more successful
than the other groups which hoped to shape US policy towards Iran, namely oil
companies and the coalition of exporters operating under the umbrella of
USA*Engage, which sought to maintain economic links and trade with Iran,
without losing their stake in the American market.  They were ultimately unable
to counter the lobbying efforts of AIPAC, and therefore for the most part sought
to accommodate themselves to the organised pro-Israel lobby, and cooperate
with AIPAC on other projects of mutual benefit, such as oil pipelines.  This
result reflects the sympathy the American public and legislators held for Israel
and the skill to which AIPAC deployed its efforts, as well as the unpopularity of
Iran and the lack of an effective pro-Iran lobby which had more than a
commercial stake in the direction of American policy towards Iran.  This is part
of a noticeable historical trend, in which pro-Israel forces in the US have often
succeeded in influencing (but categorically not controlling) American policy in
the Middle East.  What is clear in this case is that interest groups like AIPAC and
USA*Engage are able to influence policy, but only under certain conditions.
Subsequent developments in the relationship between the US and Iran
(and Israel) cloud the picture somewhat.  While some sources indicate that
‘sanctions fatigue’ and the influence of legislators and lobbyists for agricultural
interests was enough to persuade the US to allow sales of agricultural products to
Iran and other ‘rogue states,’ this took place at the same time as a wider initiative
on the part of the Clinton administration to recast relations with Iran in a more
positive way in the wake of the election of Khatami.  This initiative was also
backed by both Israel and AIPAC, and was eagerly pursued by both President
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Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, making it difficult to
determine the effectiveness of these factors in relation to each other.
In summary, the interplay of legislative and executive forces, and the
influences of interest groups on these forces in turn, combined to shape
American policy, in ways conditioned by the varying strengths of these forces,
circumstance, and the unique features of the American political system.
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CHAPTER 9 Conclusions & intervening variables assessed
This thesis has examined in detail the origins and evolution of US ‘dual
containment’ policy between 1991 and 2001, and the factors conditioning its
conception and adoption by policymakers.  Consequently, it is now time to
consider what conclusions can be drawn from this undertaking and reflect on
what has been accomplished in the previous pages, as well as assess the overall
impact and contribution of the different intervening variables.  This chapter
summarises the previous chapters and outlines the conclusions drawn from the
research contained therein.  It also discusses the theoretical framework adopted,
and concludes with a discussion of the contributions to the field of this research.
It then assesses the varying impact of each intervening variable in the case of
dual containment, and concludes with possible future directions for research in
NCR, FPA and IR more widely as it pertains to the study of American foreign
policy and the Middle East.
9.1 Dual containment and the Persian Gulf in the early 1990s
Chapter 2 outlined the theoretical framework utilised in this thesis,
providing a short introduction to NCR and discussed how the elements of the
thesis drawn from FPA were integrated into the framework.  In addition, it
discussed the objections raised by some scholars to the core tenets of NCR, as
well as justifying this choice of framework.  Chapters 3 and 4 discussed the
historical background to the time period covered in this thesis, (the 1990s).
Chapter 3 explored the ways in which previous American involvement in the
Persian Gulf created enduring ties with some regional states, accompanied by an
infrastructure that enabled US intervention the Gulf, and precedents for
American management of the sub-region’s security system.  Chapter 4 explored
the corresponding endogenous factors that enabled and incentivised American
involvement, and introduces the idea of the Persian Gulf as a scalene tripolar
system, with three poles: Saudi Arabia (the weakest pole, hence scalene), Iran
and Iraq.  Chapter 5 discussed the circumstances under which ‘dual containment’
was conceived of and introduced to the public by policymakers, and also traced
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the evolution of the American containment of Iran and Iraq, paying close
attention to how this shifted thanks to changing circumstances in the Middle
East, and legislative activism in the US.  The following three chapters dealt in
turn with the ‘intervening variables’ identified in chapter 2: perceptions of power
and threat that played formative roles in the conception and evolution of dual
containment (chapter 6), the role of the domestic political structures in which the
policy was created and implemented, particularly the impact of the perennial tug-
of-war between Congress and the White House over foreign policy (chapter 7),
and the impact of policy coalitions on the policymaking process, especially the
role of pro-Israel and pro-trade interest groups (chapter 8).
With this accomplished, it is worth revisiting the context in which ‘dual
containment’ was designed to address.  As we saw in chapter 3, the US has
generally pursued a ‘realist’ strategy in the Persian Gulf region, with
policymakers perceiving the region and its resources as a ‘prize’ to be kept out of
the hands of any potentially hostile forces.  In chapter 4, it was argued that this
was an interest that coincided with those of some regional states seeking to enlist
external allies against neighbours, leading to the ultimate result that the US has
sought to prevent the domination of the Persian Gulf by any unfriendly state.
The consequence of this had been that the US had traditionally favoured a
balance of power in the region that had tilted in the favour of its allies, allies
which had changed over the years as circumstances dictated, with the exception
of Saudi Arabia and the other states of the GCC, which have closely aligned with
the US (or Britain) since the end of the Second World War.
However, upon the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War, American
policymakers were faced with the following dilemma: how to ensure security and
stability in a region considered vital to US national interests, but without any
reliable regional proxies that could act as the managers and enforcers of a benign
security system?  Saudi Arabia, America’s closest regional ally, was not
militarily strong enough and had required American military assistance to
confront Iraq.  As argued in chapter 4, from a realist perspective, the Persian
Gulf forms a scalene tripolar system, consisting of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia
(and to some extent the other members of the GCC).  While these states had
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previously been able to maintain something akin to a balance between
themselves with minimal need for an overt external patron(s) with a shifting
system of alignments, the Iranian revolution and Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait
put paid to this.  With no possibility of enlisting any consequential regional
allies, Saudi Arabia (the weakest pole in terms of conventional military strength)
chose instead to accept the transition of American power from ‘over the horizon’
to a posture of ‘in the back yard’, and run the risks of provoking a domestic
backlash in the process.  A subsequent attempt to enlist Syria and Egypt in
regional security (the Damascus Declaration) foundered.  Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
was the threat that had to be contained, while Iran came with an overabundance
of historical baggage and also represented something of a threat in the minds of
American policymakers, given the poisonous legacy of historical relations
between the two states, its hostility to American presence in the region, and its
antagonistic relationship with American allies like Saudi Arabia.  The scalene
triangle was no longer capable of maintaining an endogenous balance.
There were also other important, global factors that distinguished the
1990s from previous eras.  The end of the Cold War meant that the previously
overriding impetus of American foreign policy, the containment of the Soviet
Union, was gone.  This allowed the US more autonomy in its formulation of
policy, as considerations of the Soviet response was no longer a factor, and gave
the US freer rein to attempt to shape the international system, and in particular
adopt a quasi-hegemonic role in the security system of the Persian Gulf sub-
region, which retained a vital status in the eyes of American policymakers
despite the demise of bipolar competition.
Viewed with hindsight, it is clear that ‘dual containment’ was not the
rejection of a ‘balance of power’ system in the Persian Gulf per se, but rather a
reconfiguration of it by upgrading the role played by the US in the system.
While Martin Indyk (widely cited as the architect of the policy of dual
containment) said that the idea of the balance of power in the Persian Gulf has
been discredited in the eyes of American policymakers, he was speaking in terms
of the regional context, and this rejection was not of the same nature as that of
the rejection of the ‘balance of power’ discussed by other authors, such as
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Quinn,1 on ideological grounds.  Instead, it signalled the construction of a new
balance of power system, one which rested on a foundation of American military
power rather than the reliance on proxies that had formerly been the enduring
feature of American policy in the region, such as the reliance on the British
presence in the region prior to the 1971, the ‘Twin Pillars’ (Iran and Iraq) of the
1970s, and the dependence on Iraq as a buffer against Iran in the 1980s.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the decision not to do so in the 1990s derived from
any deep-seated ideological distaste for the idea, especially from an
administration that demonstrated a great deal of pragmatism in other matters of
foreign policy, such as its negotiations with North Korea and Syria. In this
sense, ‘dual containment’ was a logical, rational choice when these factors are
considered from the perspective of the American policymakers charged with
reviewing US policy in the Persian Gulf at the onset of the Clinton
administration.  The components for a regional balance of power were not in
place, from an American perspective, for such a policy to be feasible, and with
the end of the Cold War the US felt much freer to pursue a more overt role,
which was assisted by the marginal military capacity of Iran and Iraq.  Were
alternatives available?  As one former official interviewed for this thesis
admitted, it would have been ‘remarkable’ to expect the US to “walk away” from
its existing commitments in the region in 1992 in the wake of the expulsion of
Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  This would have necessitated reneging on the defence
agreements it was negotiating with several GCC states and the traditional role the
US had played had played as the security guarantor to Saudi Arabia, not to
mention a radical re-appraisal of American engagement with the region.  In that
sense, a more ‘hands off’ approach was never an option.  In creating and
pursuing the policy of dual containment, the US therefore conformed closely to
the realist mindset that had dominated American policy towards the Persian Gulf
in previous decades.
1 Adam Quinn, US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology from the founders to the Bush
Doctrine (Abingdon, Routledge, 2010)
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9.2 NCR and intervening variables
However, the narrative discussed above is complicated by the presence of
other factors in this process, as well as subsequent events in the 1990s.  While it
is possible to consider the situation faced by American policymakers in the wake
of the 1991 Gulf War and the arrival of the Clinton administration in abstract,
geostrategic terms in this way, doing so misses important aspects of the story.
These aspects are located primarily in domestic American politics, or the ‘unit
level’ to use the terminology of IR theory, and played important roles in shaping
policy at different stages, both in conception and implementation.  The most
obvious of these at the initial stages of the formulation of dual containment is
perception, both of American power and of the nature of the threats to American
interests in the Persian Gulf in this period.  In particular, the nature of the
American relationship with Iran played a major role in defining its place in the
American-dominated security system of the Persian Gulf as a threat to be
contained, despite the fact that the two states had not come to blows (while the
US and Iran engaged in a series of naval skirmishes during the Iran-Iraq War,
this could not compare with the war over Kuwait) and Iran, unlike Iraq, had not
attacked any of its neighbours.  While President Bush (1988-1991) had made a
cautious attempt to enlist Iran in freeing American hostages in Lebanon, and
perhaps reach a wider accommodation while doing so, this had come to
nothing.by the arrival of the Clinton administration in 1992.  Even if the Clinton
administration had reached office with radical new plans to break with previous
Persian Gulf policy (there were no signs that it did), it lacked the time and
inclination to bring Iran ‘in from the cold,’ and the Clinton administration was
arguably therefore left with the option of ‘containing’ Iran almost by default.
The negative perceptions of Iran stemming from the pre-existing antagonistic
relationship between the two states was therefore inextricably intertwined with
American strategic concerns in the region, and would continue to be so.  These
aspects can therefore only be understood by considering the relationship between
the US and Iran, which informs this picture in profound ways.  As stated, this
relationship in turn can only be considered in reference to domestic American
politics.
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Given the need to integrate unit level variables into the analysis of dual
containment, while maintaining an overall realist framework that reflects wider
American concerns and its role as an external superpower, from the outset this
thesis utilised NCR to explain dual containment, one that incorporates insights
and research drawn from the FPA strand of scholarship in International
Relations.  It has done so by utilising the works of Thomas Risse, and some of
his collaborators and co-authors, by incorporating factors he identifies as making
up the relative autonomy of policymakers as amongst the ‘intervening variables’
at work in the case of dual containment, alongside the perceptual variable: a
state’s domestic political structure, and the policy coalitions operating within it.
It is hoped that this thesis has demonstrated that this is a valid approach,
identifying the role played by the domestic structure of the American federal
government, and the role of domestic interest groups, on the formation of foreign
policy in general and the impact of these factors in shaping dual containment
policy.  These were identified as key variables thanks to the idiosyncratic
influence of domestic political forces on American foreign policy, which Risse
and others argue is very strong, especially in relation to other states, despite the
widely-held view that foreign policy is virtually the exclusive preserve of the
President.
In particular, the ‘invitation to struggle’ identified by Corwin was at work
in the case of American policy towards Iran and Iraq in the 1990s, in both the
legislation passed to direct foreign policy, and the defining of limits of what was
permissible and possible for the executive branch to pursue in regards to these
states.  This was influenced somewhat by some interest groups, outside of the
formal structures of government in some cases, to both persuade legislators to
adopt their policy proposals, and at the same time assist them in turning their
proposals into law.  This can be seen in legislation like the 1996 Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act and the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, which stand out like landmarks
on a larger landscape of American foreign policy in the Persian Gulf.  In the case
of pro-Israel lobbyists like AIPAC, their credibility, moral authority as allies of
Israel and, their high degree of professionalism in the pursuit of their goals,
together with the inherent advantages enjoyed by the lobby, ensured that their
ideas and proposals were taken seriously and heard sympathetically by legislators
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and officials, and allowed them to successfully insert their proposals into the
policymaking process.  In contrast, lobbyists for corporations with substantial
economic interests in reopening trade with Iran were unsuccessful in persuading
legislators to move away from a sanctions-led policy even though they enjoyed
greater financial resources, despite the relaxation of restrictions on the export of
some goods (especially foodstuffs).  To be fair, this may also reflect
unwillingness on the part of Congress to narrow its own range of options for
influencing the policymaking process by making it more difficult to impose
sanctions.  In the case of Iraq, legislators were also successful in inserting their
agenda into official policy by legislating the adoption of ‘regime change’ as the
avowed goal of American Iraq policy, albeit with little real impact due to the
White House’s control of the mechanisms of policy implementation.  In this
sense, rancour between the two competing branches was also an important factor,
as it has always been in the formulation of American foreign policy, as it made
the legislative branch more willing to engage in this kind of foreign policy
activism, especially since the end of the Cold War had lowered the threshold for
doing so.
At the same time, this was strongly influenced by the negative
perceptions of both Iran and Iraq held by policymakers, legislators, lobbyists and
the general public, though naturally the intensity and the nature of these
perceptions was different on a case-by-case basis, and modulated by institutional
and personal outlooks.  Part of this ‘negative perception,’ for want of a better
term, stemmed from the attachment between Israel and the US, and the strong
commitment of the Clinton administration to the Oslo Process, which helped
ensure that Israel was able to influence (but not determine) American
policymakers’ perceptions of threat vis-à-vis Iran.  Also important was the
fraught history between the US and Iran, and to some degree Iraq, which did
much to determine how these two states were perceived by American officials.
In the case of Iran in particular, the legacy of the 1979 revolution and the hostage
crisis that followed the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran has
overshadowed all subsequent US-Iranian relations, and coloured the American
perception of Iran as a threat to American interests in the Persian Gulf, making
the pursuit of a policy based on dialogue and diplomacy politically difficult.
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With regards to Iraq, American policy remained unreservedly hostile throughout
the 1990s, and Saddam Hussein’s continued rule in Iraq was perceived as an
enduring nuisance, but one that the White House was prepared to live with,
whereas a substantial number of legislators pushed for a more hard-line,
aggressive policy.
In contrast, the executive branch proved to be more cautious and
(instrumentally) rational in its policymaking, in terms of its assessment of
American power and the threat posed by Iran and Iraq, and the means to address
them.  Its assessment of the situation was coloured by some biases, but for the
most part it avoided the temptation to use American power to attempt to impose
radical changes on the states of the Gulf.  Its attempts to topple Saddam Hussein
were carried out covertly and indirectly, indicating that it was cognisant of the
costs and risks involved in ‘regime change.’  Iran was a somewhat similar case:
the history of antagonism between the two states ruled out its rehabilitation at the
end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the White House bowed to political
pressure to maintain its isolation when this coincided with the desire to advance
the Arab-Israeli peace process.  Nonetheless, once an opening arrived in the form
of the election of Khatami, the Clinton administration was diligent in its attempts
to pursue a reconciliation, though the controversial nature of such a policy (in
both states) meant that this had to be approached carefully, with an eye towards
the domestic political environment, which remained consistently hostile and
antagonistic towards Iran in important respects, imposing political costs and
limiting the freedom of the White House to manoeuvre.  Nonetheless, the
administration was able to use the powers of the presidency to water down
attempts to further escalate American-Iranian tensions originating in Congress
and elsewhere.  While Iraq was obviously the main object of concern, Iran
remained a problem for American policymakers.  Bush’s tentative approach to
re-opening relations had come to nothing, for reasons that are still disputed
amongst some scholars.  The depth of antagonism between the US and Iran
would require a major, bilateral effort to overcome the mutual suspicion between
the two states, and also Congressional approval would be needed to remove the
sanctions on Iran.  This would likely be a condition of any reconciliation between
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the US and Iran, giving Congress a great deal of leverage over any administration
that sought to improved relations with Iran.
9.3 Intervening variables assessed
With hindsight, and with the individual analysis of the role of each
variable complete, we can turn to the question of which proved to be the most
important factor.  The importance of each variable in relation to the others is
difficult to assess.  Upon closer inspection, it is far from clear that they can be
meaningfully separated in terms of their contributions to the conception and
evolution of dual containment, making an assessment of this kind frustratingly
difficult.  Taking a broad overview of the issue, it is clear that the intervening
variables identified in this thesis form an interlocking lattice or web in this case,
especially the ‘domestic institutions’ and the ‘coalition-building
processes’/’policy coalitions’ at work in dual containment – the policy coalitions
operate within the context of the American domestic political system, meaning
that they cannot be wholly disaggregated, and are instead in a sense reflections of
each other.  Some of the members of the ‘policy coalitions’ active in shaping
dual containment were themselves members of the institutional structure as
Senators and Representatives, the powers of which were defined in part by the
nature of the domestic structure of the federal government, and defined in other
ways by their political influence, which was in turn partly a reflection of the
policy coalitions at work. These two variables in particular are therefore
overlapping and co-constitutive in an important sense that makes them difficult
to disaggregate.
The perceptions of policymakers are somewhat more distinct, but still
closely linked to the other intervening variables, as these were the means by
which these perceptions of threat, power and interest were acted upon.
Furthermore, the fact that the perceptions differed in important ways between
different individuals and groups is also significant.  This was reflected in the
domestic ‘balance of power’ between the legislative and executive branches of
the government, which is a core feature of the ‘domestic structure’: as discussed
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in chapters 6 and 7, the executive branch has always held a more nuanced and, in
many ways, realistic view of the nature of the ‘threat’ posed by Iran, Iraq, and
political Islam.  In comparison, the legislature at times advocated a more
simplistic, less flexible approach, and based on the public statements of
important legislators, a more alarmist view of the dangers posed by Iran and Iraq.
This also reflects the differing perceptions of different ‘policy coalitions’ acting
within the institutional framework of the federal government of the US.
Moreover, different ‘policy coalitions’ expressed different perceptions of Iran.
Lobbyists and advocates for maintaining and expanding American trade links
with Iran were largely unsuccessful in advancing their agenda, whereas
advocates of sanctions and a more confrontational approach enjoyed more
success.  Perceptions played a key role in this process.  As we saw in chapter 6
and 8, Iran was (and to some degree still is) perceived in highly negative terms
within the US, and this was one of the major reasons that no politically-effective
constituency mobilised on its behalf.  Those that did mobilise, such as the
exporters’ lobbying organisation USA*Engage, were forced to struggle in the
face of these negative perceptions, while those pressing for a more hard-line
position held a comparative advantage.  Iraq, synonymous with Saddam Hussein,
on the other hand, was near-universally distrusted.  Disagreements therefore
focused in large part on means rather than ends in regards to policy towards Iraq,
though outcry amongst some sections of the American public over the
humanitarian impact of the international sanctions regime embarrassed the
Clinton administration at times.
The role of the perceptions of policymakers cannot therefore be
understood fully in isolation from the other two intervening variables, and none
would be effective at all in absence of the other two.  Nonetheless, the perception
that Iran was hostile to the US in 1992 formed a major factor in the judgement
that a ‘dual containment’ policy backed by an American presence in the Persian
Gulf was the preferred course of action, which was made by officials serving in
the executive branch and endorsed by the President.  This decision had three
aspects – recognition of the mutual mistrust between the two states, recognition
of the deep unpopularity of Iran amongst Congress and the public, and an
ingrained mistrust of Iran amongst policymakers (such as Secretary of State
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Warren Christopher).  Of the intervening variables examined in this thesis,
American perceptions of Iran, largely negative, were therefore ‘prior’ to the other
two in that they formed a substantial part of the original assessments
underpinning dual containment.
However, when we consider the policy of dual containment more widely,
and include subsequent developments in the policy, such as Congressional
attempts to toughen sanctions and Clinton’s attempts to cultivate Khatami, to say
nothing of later developments in American policy towards Iraq, the picture
becomes cloudier once again, and we must look beyond monocausal
explanations.  Bearing this in mind, it seems that the key issue is therefore one of
interaction.  Without the interaction of these three intervening variables, dual
containment would not have evolved in the ways in which it did.  Aside from the
role of policymakers’ perceptions, if any can be said to be most fundamental of
the remaining pair, it is the domestic structure of the US federal government and
its policymaking apparatus.  The division of powers between the executive and
the legislative branches, by a combination of constitutional mandate, custom and
convention, defined the procedures and limits of the policymaking process, yet
by itself was not decisive – given its nature, it could not be.  The interplay of
domestic political forces, operating within the structure of institutions, were
important in determining policy in the sense that they too shaped the limits of
political acceptability, and in some cases successfully brought about alterations
in policy.  These different coalitions acted according to their perceptions of Iran
and Iraq, which were in turn part of a wider perception of Iran and Iraq as
dangerous, hostile, anti-American states.
Overall, in a wider perspective, American mistrust of Iran and Iraq
proved to be a large part of the decision to pursue a largely-unilateral two-track
concurrent containment policy that was the hallmark of dual containment.  In
terms of the actual policy pursued by the US, the implementation and evolution
of dual containment reflected the division of powers between the legislative and
executive branches of the federal government and the on-going struggle between
the two.  While the legislature was able to impose some broad limits and
conditions upon the Clinton administration, particularly in terms of sanctions on
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Iran, the administration was able to use the ‘traditional’ prerogatives of the
presidency in foreign affairs, chiefly the day-to-day management of the foreign
policy apparatus, to pursue its chosen policies as best as it could within these
broad limits.
9.4 Possible avenues of future research
Despite the demonstrated relevance of this approach and the interaction
of the three intervening variables examined in this thesis, theoretical and
conceptual questions remain to be answered.  Arguably the most substantial of
these is the question of ideology and national identity: although this has been
something that has not been covered in great depth in this thesis, it would be
naïve in the extreme to assume that they played (and continue to play) no role in
the formation of American foreign policy.  The role of identity in International
Relations has been a subject of intense study and fierce debate within the field,
and was given an added impetus by the rise of ‘constructivism’ in recent decades.
Consequently, a wider examination of the degree to which American strategic
and political culture shapes the perceptions of policymakers and the public, and
the means by which it does so, would be a valuable addition to NCR accounts
like those of this thesis.  This would also contribute to the on-going codification
of NCR theory and attempts of scholars working in this tradition to formalize an
NCR model of the state.  The logical assumption would be that this would
involve the addition of another intervening variable to the mix, but it is beyond
the scope of this thesis to speculate further about how an NCR framework could
be modified and conceptualised to include it, though it should be noted that
scholars who have made some moves in this direction seem to have done so.2
This would doubtless increase the complexity of the picture exponentially –
especially when one considers the possible linkages between political/strategic
culture and domestic political structures and coalitions, and the question of how
these in particular have impacted upon each other.
2 At time of writing, some of the most notable examples with regards to American foreign policy
are the aforementioned Adam Quinn, in his book US Foreign Policy in Perspective, and Nicholas
Kitchen, ‘Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand
Strategy Formation,’ Review of International Studies, 36 (1) 2010, pp.117-143
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It would also be interesting to see if a similar NCR model could be
applied to a study of Iranian foreign policy, and if the same or similar intervening
variables were at work.in shaping Iranian foreign policy.  Some attempt was
made at this in chapter 4, with the examination of the regional politics of the
Persian Gulf, and a deeper study that integrates a theoretical framework
(something which, as stated in the introduction of this thesis, has been lacking in
too much research into the Middle East) would doubtless benefit both our
understanding of Iran and its foreign policy process, but also help advance the
on-going project of NCR, if only incrementally.  Understanding of the dynamics
of the Persian Gulf sub-region would also benefit, given the interpenetration of
these states and the necessity of their governments to balance both externally and
internally, as discussed in chapter 4.  In the case of Iraq, the fall of Saddam
Hussein and his regime has led to a huge cache of official documents becoming
available to scholars, and there will doubtless be a number of studies published
detailing the decision-making process of Ba’athist Iraq.3 However, states remain
a ‘moving target,’ and contemporary Iraq and Iran will remain more obscure,
even as the political situation becomes more urgent.  Sadly, the opacity and
complexity of the Iranian political system in particular makes this a daunting
task, though the rewards would be correspondingly great, given the importance
and influence of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the intensity of its relationship with
the United States.  Nonetheless, the prospect is an intriguing one.  It would be
ironic, and perhaps appropriate, it we were to discover that both parties in this
unique relationship approached it and conceptualised it in the same ways.
3 So far, these have included Kevin Woods, David Palkki and Mark Stout’s (eds.), The Saddam
Tapes: The inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, 1978-2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011)
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